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THE UNSOUNDNESS OF SILENCE:1 SILENT 
CONCURRENCES AND THEIR USE IN MARYLAND 
SHANE M.K. DOYLE* 
 
“When a judge on [the Court of Appeals] concurs in the 
judgment only, it is helpful to explain why.  Then the reader 
knows whether there is a substantive reason for that judge’s 
reticence and can assess whether that reason has any merit.”2 
 
This Comment will discuss the judicial practice of issuing a “silent 
concurrence,” and examine the use of silent concurrences in Maryland.  A 
silent concurrence is when an appellate judge concurs only in the judgment,3 
but does not write a separate opinion.4  Concurring only in the judgment 
means a judge agrees with the outcome of a case, but “refuses to join the 
majority opinion.”5  Or, more consequentially,6 the judge refuses to join the 
lead opinion in a plurality decision.7  Usually, a judge concurs only in the 
judgment because the judge believes the main opinion is wrong about why 
the outcome is correct.8  We know this because judges concurring only in the 
                                                          
© 2020 Shane M.K. Doyle.  
 1.  But see SIMON AND GARFUNKEL, The Sound of Silence, on SIMON AND GARFUNKEL’S 
GREATEST HITS (Columbia Records 1972). 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The 
author thanks Grace O’Malley, Bianca Spinosa, and other editors of the Maryland Law Review for 
their thoughtful comments and valuable contributions.  He dedicates this Comment to his mother, 
whom he would like to thank for working so hard to raise him and for making everything he has 
accomplished possible—“I’ll love you forever, I’ll like you for always, as long as I’m living my 
Mommy you’ll be.”  ROBERT MUNSCH, LOVE YOU FOREVER (1986). 
 2.  State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in 
judgment only).  Judge McDonald begins his concurring opinion in Payne with this apparent 
criticism of Maryland Court of Appeals judges who issue silent concurrences.  Id.  
 3.  Sometimes called simply “concurring in the judgment,” and also “concurring in the 
judgment only,” “joining in the judgment,” “joining in the judgment only,” and “joining only in the 
judgment,” with the word “result” sometimes being used instead of “judgment.”  See App. Tb. 1 
(listing the 175 Maryland cases that had a silent concurrence(s) from January 1, 1990, to August 31, 
2019, some of which use one formulation while some use others).  
 4.  Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Concurrences, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 351, 351–52 (2016); 
Alexander I. Platt, Deciding Not to Decide: A Limited Defense of the Silent Concurrence, 17 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 141, 141–42 (2016). 
 5.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 351–52.  
 6.  See infra text accompanying note 17; Sections I.B & I.E.2. 
 7.  This Comment uses the term “main opinion” to refer to majority and lead opinions 
collectively. 
 8.  See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR 
THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 135–36 & n.306 (1912) (taking it for granted that when a judge concurs 
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judgment typically write separate opinions explaining their alternative 
reasoning.9  A “silent” concurrence, though, is when a judge concurs only in 
the judgment without writing a separate opinion.10  In other words, the judge, 
                                                          
only in a judgment, it is because the judge has alternative reasons for reaching the result); 
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352–54 (explaining that a judge who writes an opinion concurring 
only in the judgment agrees with the result but disagrees with the main opinion’s reasoning). 
 9.  For example, see State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719–21, 104 A.3d 142, 165–66 (2014) 
(McDonald, J., concurring in judgment only).  In Payne, the court vacated and remanded the 
decision below, holding that a police officer’s testimony regarding cell phone location data was 
“expert” testimony requiring the officer to be admitted as an expert.  Id. at 164–65.  Judge McDonald 
explained in his concurring opinion that he disagreed with the majority that the officer’s testimony 
was “expert” testimony, but still agreed the case should be vacated and remanded.  Id. at 165–66.  
Judge McDonald explained that, in his view, the officer only provided lay testimony, but vacating 
and remanding was proper because the officer’s testimony required the additional testimony of an 
expert to be probative.  Id.  See BLACK, supra note 8, at 135–36 & n.306 (taking it for granted that 
a judge concurring only in the judgment would write separately explaining their alternative reasons 
for reaching the result); Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 357 (explaining that when a judge concurs 
only in the judgment but does not write separately, no one really knows why that judge, in that 
particular case, voted for the result but refused to join the main opinion); see also Platt, supra note 
4, at 143–44 (explaining that silent concurrences are rare, i.e. judges usually write separately when 
concurring only in the judgement).   
 10.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352 (“By definition [a silent concurrence] provides no 
explanation for why a[n appellate judge] agrees with the judgment but refuses to join the majority 
opinion.”).   
To avoid confusion, note that there are two kinds of concurrences, a concurrence in the 
judgment only (a “special” concurrence), and a so-called “regular” concurrence.  Goelzhauser, 
supra note 4, at 353–54.  As explained below, only the former can be issued “silently” because it 
would be impossible to issue a regular concurrence without writing a separate opinion, but it is 
possible to concur in the judgment only without writing a separate opinion.  Id.  But see infra note 
76 and accompanying text (providing an exception: in California, a swing-vote judge cannot concur 
in the judgment only without writing a separate opinion because the California Constitution, as 
interpreted by the California Supreme Court, prohibits it).   
A regular concurrence is when a judge does join the main opinion; i.e. the judge agrees both 
with the result the court reached and the main opinion’s reasoning for why that result was correct, 
but the judge also writes a separate opinion of their own.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 353–54.  In 
such a case the opinion would state, for example, “Judge A delivered the opinion of the court, joined 
by Judges B, C, D, E, F, and G.  Judge G also filed a concurring opinion.”  The separate note about 
Judge G is only there because Judge G decided to write separately, while if Judge G had not done 
so, the opinion would just state that Judge G joined the majority opinion because there would be no 
“concurrence” to speak of.  Id. at 358.   
Alternatively, if Judge G concurred in the judgment only, this means Judge G did not join the 
majority opinion, so regardless of whether Judge G writes separately, the opinion must still explain 
Judge G’s disposition in the case.  Thus, the opinion will state, for example, “Judge A delivered the 
opinion of the court, joined by Judges B, C, D, E, and F.  Judge G concurred in the judgement only.”   
While one might expect Judge G to write a separate concurring opinion explaining why he 
refused to join the majority opinion (as judges concurring in the judgment only usually do, see supra 
text accompanying note 2; supra note 9 and accompanying text), Judge G’s refusal must be noted 
either way.  Silent concurrences only exist, then, because a judge can vote for a result while refusing 
to join the main opinion, which necessitates noting that this judge concurred in the judgment only; 
and if said judge does not file a separate opinion, no one knows why Judge G voted for the result 
but refused to join the main opinion (i.e. Judge G’s concurrence is “silent”).  Goelzhauser, supra 
note 4, at 352, 356–57; see infra text accompanying notes 14–16.  
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without offering any explanation, votes in favor of the result but refuses to 
join the main opinion.11  
Commentators have described silent concurrences as “puzzling,”12 and 
even indefensible,13 although there have been attempts to defend it as an 
unfortunate, but occasionally necessary, judicial technique.14  One thing is 
certain, though.  When a judge concurs silently, the only person who knows 
why that judge refused to join the main opinion is that judge.15  Therefore, it 
is anyone’s guess whether the judge actually had any substantive issues with 
the legal reasoning of the main opinion, and if so, why the judge did not 
articulate any alternative rules the judge thought were superior.16  
Furthermore, while a silent concurrence does not usually impact the 
precedential value of a case, when a swing-vote judge concurs silently, 
resulting in a plurality decision, the swing-vote judge unilaterally prevents 
the case from establishing any clear precedent—but does not explain why.17 
This Comment will explore the criticisms of, and potential justifications 
for, silent concurrences in general; specifically examine their use in 
Maryland; and make three ultimate conclusions.  First, silent concurrences 
are a generally unsound practice because, notwithstanding their potential 
justifications, litigants and the public have the right to expect judges who 
vote for the result but do not join the main opinion to offer at least a brief 
explanation rather than no explanation at all.18  Second, the data suggest that 
regardless of whether the potential justifications for silent concurrences are 
valid, they do not explain the most recent silent concurrences in Maryland.19  
Third, the Court of Appeals should promulgate a rule that nullifies the effect 
                                                          
 11.  See supra note 10.  
 12.  Madelyn Fife et al., Concurring and Dissenting Without Opinion, 42 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 171, 
171 (2017); Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352.  
 13.  Richard B. Cappalli, What is Authority? Creation and Use of Case Law by Pennsylvania’s 
Appellate Courts, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 303, 380 (1999) (calling it “a debilitating practice with no 
visible redeeming value”); see also Platt, supra note 4, at 142 (“[The silent concurrence] is widely 
regarded as illegitimate.  It has been criticized as ‘perplexing,’ ‘an abomination,’ ‘unnecessary,’ 
‘trouble-provoking,’ and ‘condemnable,’ accused of ‘thwart[ing] the judicial process,’ of offering 
‘little value,’ or none at all, and condemned as a practice that ‘cannot be justified as appropriate 
judicial methodology,’ and must be ‘eradicated’ or ‘abandon[ed].’” (alterations in original) (internal 
footnotes omitted))). 
 14.  See infra text accompanying notes 294–300; infra note 362.  
 15.  See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.  Not to mention why the judge agreed the 
outcome was correct in the first place and voted for it.  See infra text accompanying notes 247–252. 
 16.  RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 152–53 (3d ed. 2012); see also State v. Payne, 
440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in judgment only) (pointing 
out that when a Maryland Court of Appeals judge concurs silently, no one knows “whether there 
[was] a substantive reason for that judge’s reticence” (emphasis added)); supra text accompanying 
notes 8–9; infra text accompanying notes 61–62, 301–312 (explaining reasons other than 
substantive legal disagreement for which a judge might silently concur).  
 17.  See infra Sections I.B, I.E.2, II.D. 
 18.  See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 19.  See infra Section II.C. 
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of silent concurrences on the precedential value of plurality decisions and by 
extension discourages the use of silent concurrences generally.20 
Part I of this Comment will give the following relevant background.  
First, it will discuss what silent concurrences mean in the context of stare 
decisis.21  Second, it will explain how they impact the precedential value of 
a case when a court is divided, in general, and in Maryland specifically.22  
That analysis requires examining how the Court of Appeals applies its 
plurality decisions, which, it turns out, contrary to popular belief, does not 
appear to be the Marks rule.23  Third, it will provide a survey of the criticisms 
levied at silent concurrences generally.24  Fourth, it will give potential 
explanations for the use of silent concurrences.25  Fifth, it will discuss the 
trends associated with,26 and the consequences of,27 the use of silent 
concurrences in Maryland from January 1, 1990, to August 31, 2019. 
Part II will analyze whether silent concurrences are justifiable, in 
general,28 and in Maryland specifically,29 by examining whether their 
potential uses outweigh the criticisms levied at them, in light of the 
alternative options judges have besides issuing a silent concurrence.30  Part 
II will argue that silent concurrences are a generally unsound practice that 
should be questioned and discouraged,31 particularly in Maryland,32 and are 
an indefensible practice in the context of plurality decisions.33 Part II will 
also suggest a rule to help prevent the problems silent concurrences can 
cause.34 
Silent concurrences do not appear to serve any function so worthwhile 
that we should expect litigants and the public to ignore that silent 
concurrences undermine the principles and ideals of our legal system.35 
                                                          
 20.  See infra Section II.D. 
 21.  See infra Section I.A. 
 22.  See infra Section I.B. 
 23.  See infra Section I.B.1; see also infra Section I.B.2.b (critiquing the approach to plurality 
decisions the Court of Appeals apparently uses).  
 24.  See infra Section I.C. 
 25.  See infra Section I.D. 
 26.  See infra Section I.E.1. 
 27.  See infra Section I.E.2. 
 28.  See infra Section II.A–B. 
 29.  See infra Section II.C. 
 30.  See infra Sections II.A.–C. 
 31.  See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 32.  See infra Section II.C. 
 33.  See infra Sections II.A–D. 
 34.  See infra Section II.D. 
 35.  See infra Part III. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
Silent concurrences are worth discussing primarily because judicial 
decisionmaking in the American legal system operates under the maxim of 
stare decisis.  Stare decisis, “Latin for ‘to stand by things decided,’”36 means 
appellate courts treat their own prior decisions, or the decisions of higher 
courts in the same jurisdiction, as binding precedents that dictate how to 
resolve new cases with the same or analogous facts.37  This doctrine operates 
under the general assumption that courts, and by extension judges, issue 
written opinions explaining why they voted for the result in a given case.38  
Section I.A briefly reviews how the doctrine of precedents operates and how 
the silent concurrence arises under this framework.  Section I.B explains how 
silent concurrences disrupt precedent-setting, which is of course integral to 
stare decisis.  Section I.B also explains that, contrary to popular belief, 
Maryland does not actually apply the Marks rule to its own plurality 
decisions.  Rather, Maryland uses the “all opinions approach,” a “related 
principle” of Marks that differs significantly from the Marks rule.39  Section 
I.C presents the criticisms levied at silent concurrences.  Section I.D 
discusses potential explanations for the use of silent concurrences.  Finally, 
Section I.E discusses the use of silent concurrences in Maryland. 
A.  The Mechanics of Stare Decisis and Silent Concurrences 
When the majority of an appellate panel agrees that a particular outcome 
is the proper result in a given case, that will be the result and the resolution 
of the dispute between the two parties.40  Importantly, appellate courts also 
publish opinions that tell not only the parties, but the rest of us, why the court 
decided the outcome was correct.41  Explaining the result is at the heart of 
                                                          
 36.  Stare Decisis, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis (last 
updated Mar. 2017).  
 37.  Id.; BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–5, 7, 10–11; see also infra notes 200–203 and accompanying 
text (explaining the justifications for subscribing to the doctrine of stare decisis). 
 38.  See BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–5, 7, 10–11 (taking it for granted, in explaining the doctrine 
of precedents under the maxim of stare decisis, that courts issue written opinions to explain their 
decisions). 
 39.  See infra Section I.B.1; see also infra Section I.B.2.a (explaining how silent concurrences 
impact the precedential value of a plurality decision in Maryland under the all opinions approach); 
Section I.B.2.b (critiquing Maryland’s use of the all opinions approach).  
 40. BLACK, supra note 8, at 136.  For example, if party A seeks reversal of a trial court decision 
while party B seeks affirmation, and the court decides in favor of party A to reverse, reversal is the 
result.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 2–3, 131–132.  For example, picking up from the hypothetical in note 40, the opinion 
explaining why reversal is the proper outcome might be something like, “In this situation, a trial 
court must do XYZ before making the kind of decision at issue in this case.  The trial court, however, 
did not do XYZ.  Therefore, we are reversing the trial court’s decision.”  Thus, the court articulated 
a rule that dictates reversing the lower court decision, and that rule is essentially, “in a factual 
scenario like the one here, when a lower court is making the kind of decision at issue here, that court 
has to do XYZ, so if a lower court makes this kind of decision, in this kind of scenario, without doing 
XYZ, then that decision gets reversed on appeal.”  Under stare decisis, future courts would thus need 
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stare decisis because when the majority of an appellate panel agrees on both 
(1) the outcome of a case and (2) the legal reasoning for why that outcome is 
correct—the single opinion that enjoys majority support binds that court, and 
lower courts in the same jurisdiction, in future cases.42  Majority opinions 
therefore articulate rules, tests, and/or principles that lower and future courts 
must apply to similar factual scenarios.43  That is why, as law students learn 
on day one, appellate opinions are the lifeblood of our legal system. 
For purposes of this discussion, it is helpful to (simplistically) visualize 
the appellate decision-making process as the judges casting two separate and 
successive votes: First, the members of an appellate panel vote on what 
should happen as it pertains to the case at hand.  If a majority of the panel 
members vote for outcome A, then outcome A becomes the judgment of the 
court that binds the parties of that case.44  That vote only determines the 
outcome, it does not establish binding precedent for future cases.45  This is 
where the second vote comes in, as the judges who formed a majority in favor 
of outcome A will then vote amongst themselves on why outcome A is 
correct, i.e. the legal rule(s) that dictate outcome A.46  
For example, in a seven-member appellate panel, five judges may agree 
that the proper result is a reversal of the lower court decision.  This means 
the result of the first vote is 5-2, so reversal will be the outcome of the case.  
It might also be that only four of those five judges agree on the legal 
reasoning for why reversal is proper in that case.  Thus, the result of the 
second vote is 4-1.  Notice that there is still a majority of the court (four out 
of seven) voting in favor of both the result, and a particular opinion 
explaining that result (of course, one of those four is the one writing the 
opinion in the first place).  Thus, the single opinion with the support of those 
                                                          
to apply this rule in similar (or sufficiently analogous) situations and reverse or affirm as dictated 
by the rule.  See infra note 42.  
 42.  BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–5, 10, 135–136; Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the 
Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1596 (1992); Richard M. Re, 
Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1948 n.28, 1966 (2019); see, e.g., Cappalli, supra 
note 13, at 324 (explaining that at least two members of a three-judge panel must agree on both the 
result and the underlying rationale to create binding precedent); see also supra notes 40–41 (giving 
a hypothetical explaining binding precedent under stare decisis in more detail); infra notes 200–203 
and accompanying text (discussing the justifications for subscribing to the doctrine of stare decisis). 
 43.  BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–4.  Of course, any court of last resort is free to overrule its own 
precedents, but this departure from stare decisis is supposed to be reserved for “exceptional cases 
and for the very strongest reasons.”  Id. at 3.  
 44.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 45.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  It is not strictly speaking true that a result by 
itself has no precedential value.  The result itself can be precedential, i.e. a future court with identical 
or analogous facts would be bound to reach the same result but could use whatever reasoning.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 78–80.  The current discussion, however, is about precedential 
opinions, which is the reasoning behind the result.  
 46.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
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four— the majority opinion—becomes binding precedent under the principle 
of stare decisis.47 
As for the one remaining judge who agreed with the other four about the 
result but disagreed with them as to why that result is correct, that judge is 
said to be concurring only in the judgment.48  In other words, concurring only 
in the judgment means that judge is voting along with the other four for 
reversal, but refusing to vote for the legal reasoning the other four agreed 
justifies reversal.49 
A judge concurring only in the judgment has two options.50  First, they 
can write a separate opinion explaining what they believe to be the superior 
grounds upon which the court should have based its decision.51  The separate 
opinion will not be binding of course, but it can at least be persuasive 
authority that points out where the judge believes the majority went wrong 
and can contribute to further developments in the law.52  Second, a judge can 
simply state they concur in the judgment only and leave it at that without 
writing a separate opinion.53   
This second option, the “silent” concurrence, tells readers nothing more 
than that the judge agreed with the result but chose not to join the main 
opinion explaining that result.54  While one might assume the judge had some 
                                                          
 47.  See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.  
 48. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 351–52. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.  
 51.  See, e.g., supra note 9 (summarizing an opinion concurring only in the judgment in State 
v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 104 A.3d 142 (2014)); see supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.  Or, 
the judge can at least write a “perfunctory opinion,” i.e. a brief explanation as to why the judge did 
not wish to join the main opinion, e.g., stating simply that the judge agreed with the lower court’s 
original reasoning for its decision rather than the main opinion’s reasoning for affirming that 
decision.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352; see, e.g., infra note 441 (gathering and quoting brief 
statements provided in lieu of a full separate opinion).  
 52.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 354 (“Written concurrences, like written dissents, are 
potentially valuable for a number of reasons.  As an initial matter, a concurring opinion may prove 
to be highly influential in the subsequent development of law.”).  Professor Goelzhauser cites as an 
example Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952).  Id.  See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 149–50 (explaining that a concurring opinion 
may “appeal to the intelligence of a future day, when a change in the law may be forthcoming” 
(quoting R. Dean Moorehead, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 821, 823 
(1952))); id. at 154 (citing the “classic” example of such an opinion—Justice Traynor’s famous 
concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 453 (Cal. 1944) that 
commanded majority approval from the court eighteen years later); Fife, supra note 12, at 171 (“As 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg once wrote, separate opinions ‘may provoke clarifications, 
refinements, [and] modifications in the court’s opinions.’  Justice Antonin Scalia echoed this point, 
emphasizing that a ‘dissent or concurrence puts [an] opinion to the test, providing a direct 
confrontation of the best arguments on both sides of the disputed points.’” (alterations in original) 
(footnotes omitted)).  
 53.  See supra note 10. 
 54.  See Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1127 (Cal. 1995) (“[A silent 
concurrence] is equivocal.  ‘It could mean that the concurring justice does not agree with the 
principles [stated in the main opinion]; or that [the justice] agrees with the principles or some of 
them but not with the manner of their statement or the reasoning or authorities set forth in support 
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issue with the main opinion’s reasoning and had alternative reasons for 
reaching the same result,55 that is just an educated guess.56  A judge who 
concurs silently, by definition, leaves us with no definitive explanation for 
why they refused to join the main opinion.57  Thus, all anyone can truly say 
about a silent concurrence is that the judge refused to join the main opinion—
but one can only speculate about why they refused.58  No one really knows 
whether the judge had substantive issues with the main opinion (e.g., the 
judge disagreed with the legal rule the opinion establishes), or if instead the 
judge refused to join the main opinion for personal, political, or other 
reasons.59 
Consider that a judge might silently concur over some inconsequential 
issue with the main opinion that is purely a matter of linguistic preference.60  
For example, based on private papers that later became publicly available, 
here is why former Chief Justice Burger silently concurred in Army & Air 
Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan:61 
After Justice Blackmun circulated a draft opinion . . . Chief Justice 
Burger sent him a private note that read in part: “I have tried—and 
I think succeeded in getting almost everyone to avoid the term plea 
‘bargain.’  That word has no place in the judicial vocabulary.  I can 
join your opinion heartily if you can change ‘bargain’ . . . to 
                                                          
of them; or that [the justice] neither agrees nor disagrees but wishes to stay aloof and keep himself 
[or herself] intellectually free to examine the question anew at some later date (perhaps as the author 
of an opinion); or that [the justice] objects to something in the opinion—a quotation, reliance on an 
authority that is anathema to him [or her], humor or satire, or castigation of a litigant or counsel—
and withholds his [or her] signature because the author would not take it out.’” (third, fourth, fifth, 
sixth, and seventh alterations in original) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT 
OPINIONS 223 (1977))); supra note 10 (explaining that a silent concurrence by definition tells us 
nothing more than that the judge refused to join the main opinion).  
 55.  See Ira P. Robbins, Concurring in Result Without Written Opinion: A Condemnable 
Practice, 84 JUDICATURE 118, 118, 163 (2000) (assuming that silently concurring judges took some 
issue with the main opinion’s legal reasoning); see also supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text 
(explaining that judges usually write separately explaining alternative reasons for reaching the result 
when they concur only in the judgment).  
 56.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 357 (“[B]ecause the [judge] has not revealed why he or she 
is concurring, one is left to speculate regarding the possible reason.” (quoting PAMELA C. CORLEY, 
CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 19 (2010))); see supra note 54. 
 57. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352.  The judge also leaves us with no explanation for why 
they voted for the result in the first place.  See infra text accompanying notes 247–252. 
 58. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 357 (“[B]ecause the [judge] has not revealed why he or she 
is concurring, one is left to speculate regarding the possible reason.” (quoting PAMELA C. CORLEY, 
CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 19 (2010))). 
 59.  See State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring 
in judgment only) (implying that when a judge concurs silently, no one knows “whether there [was] 
a substantive reason for that judge’s reticence”); supra note 54; infra text accompanying notes 61–
71; see also infra Section II.A (criticizing silent concurrences precisely because they lead people to 
believe there is something wrong with the main opinion, even though judges sometimes issue silent 
concurrences for reasons that have nothing to do with the reasoning of the main opinion).  
 60.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 373. 
 61.  456 U.S. 728 (1982). 
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‘negotiations.’”  Burger concluded with an ultimatum: “So, show 
me accordingly as joining or joining the judgment.”  Blackmun 
refused Burger’s request, suggesting that the phrase had “acquired 
an accepted meaning in the judicial vocabulary” and was “far more 
accepted than the noun ‘commute’ for which I fought a 
battle . . . when no one supported me, and surely is far more 
acceptable than the Court’s constant misuse of the word ‘viable.’”  
Blackmun closed by citing several opinions Burger had joined that 
included the phrase “plea bargain,” to which Burger playfully 
responded: “Yes, but I’ve joined the last one.  It is a perversion of 
the English language [and] the law!”  As a result of this exchange, 
appended to the end of Blackmun’s otherwise unanimous opinion 
in Sheehan is the line: “The Chief Justice concurs in the 
judgment.”62 
One might also infer from circumstance that optics, rather than an issue 
with the main opinion, could be the reason a judge silently concurred in a 
particular case.  For example, consider International Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump.63  In International Refugee, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, in an opinion by Chief Judge Gregory 
and joined by Judges Motz, King, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, and Harris, that (1) the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland properly granted a 
preliminary motion for injunction on President Trump’s so-called “Muslim 
ban”64 because the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of “succeed[ing] on the 
merits of their Establishment Clause claim,”65 and (2) the district court erred 
in extending that injunction to President Trump directly.66  Although the 
opinion stated that “Judge Traxler wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment,”67 that “opinion” amounted to nothing more than a silent 
concurrence.68  Since Judge Traxler agreed with everything the court did and 
                                                          
 62.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 373 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 63.  857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).  
 64.  Id. at 576 (quoting J.A. 480). 
 65.  Id. at 579, 588, 601–02. 
 66.  Id. at 604–06. 
 67.  Id. at 571. 
 68.  Below is Judge Traxler’s opinion in its entirety: 
  I concur in the judgment of the majority insofar as it affirms the district court’s 
issuance of a nationwide preliminary injunction as to Section 2(c) of the Executive Order 
against the officers, agents, and employees of the Executive Branch of the United States, 
and anyone acting under their authorization or direction, who would attempt to enforce 
it, because it likely violates the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.  
I also concur in the judgment of the majority to lift the injunction as to President Trump 
himself.   
Id. at 606 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment).  This only amounts to a silent concurrence 
because Judge Traxler did not indicate what led him to refuse to join the majority opinion, since he 
notes no points of disagreement.  See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352 (“By definition [a silent 
concurrence] provides no explanation for why a[n appellate judge] agrees with the judgment but 
refuses to join the majority opinion.”). 
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offered no indication that he refused to join the majority opinion over 
disagreements with the majority’s reasoning, one is compelled to guess why 
he refused to join.69  One guess could be that Judge Traxler, who has an 
overwhelmingly conservative voting record,70 agreed with the majority but 
did not wish to sign his name to an opinion otherwise joined exclusively by 
the liberal judges in a high-profile, politically-sensitive en banc case.71 
B.  The Impact of Silent Concurrences on Precedent-Setting 
In the hypothetical from Section I.A, the judge’s refusal to join the 
majority opinion does not prevent the setting of a precedent.72  A four-judge 
majority already exists, so regardless of whether the concurring judge writes 
separately (or even dissents), there is still a majority opinion that is binding 
precedent.73  In such a situation, while one may take issue in the abstract with 
judges neglecting to explain their judicial decisions,74 at least the silent 
concurrence does not affect the precedential value of the case.75  
When a court is so divided that it issues a plurality decision, however, 
there is no majority opinion.  For example, only four judges in a seven-
member panel agree that outcome A is correct, but only three agree on why.  
In such a scenario, a silently concurring judge is unilaterally (by withholding 
their swing vote) deciding to leave ambiguities in the law while offering no 
explanation of why they did so, let alone alternative legal rules.76  
California’s Constitution, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, 
actually prohibits swing-vote silent concurrences that result in a plurality 
decision.77 
                                                          
 69.  Id.; see supra note 10; supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.  
 70.  Sharon McCloskey, Is the 4th Circuit Veering Back to the Center?, N.C. POL’Y WATCH 
(Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2013/02/13/is-the-4th-circuit-veering-back-to-the-
center/. 
 71.  See infra text accompanying note 312 (elaborating on what Judge Traxler may have been 
trying to avoid).  
 72.  See supra text accompanying notes 46–49.  
 73.  See supra text accompanying notes 46–49. 
 74.  See infra note 497; notes 240–254 and accompanying text. 
 75.  But see ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic statement, ‘I concur in the 
judgment,’ has bothered many readers. . . .   It produces all the evils of a concurring opinion with 
none of its values; i.e., it casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion without 
indicating why they are wrong or questionable.” (emphasis added) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL 
ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))). 
 76.  BLACK, supra note 8, at 135–36; Cappalli, supra note 13, at 327–30; Kimura, supra note 
42, at 1596; Robbins, supra note 55, at 118, 160, 163.   
 77.  Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1126–28 (Cal. 1995); see also infra notes 
509–512 (explaining in more detail how the California Supreme Court interpreted the California 
constitution as prohibiting swing-vote silent concurrences). 
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Traditionally, a plurality decision resulted in no binding precedent for 
future courts, aside from the result itself.78  The result is binding in the sense 
that a majority of the court agrees that in situation X, outcome A is the proper 
result; they just cannot agree on why.79  Thus, a future court may be bound 
to reach the same result should situation X arise again, but said court is free 
to use whatever reasoning to explain this result.80  Section I.B.1 explains how 
the United States Supreme Court changed the status quo in Marks v. United 
States,81 making it possible for Supreme Court plurality decisions to establish 
binding precedent.  Section I.B.1 explores how the Court of Appeals extracts 
precedent from its plurality decisions, which is somewhat similar to the 
Supreme Court’s rule, but also significantly different.  Section I.B.2 discusses 
the potential impact of silent concurrences on the precedential value of a 
plurality decision in Maryland,82 and also examines the implications of 
Maryland’s approach to plurality decisions.83  Section I.B.3 summarizes the 
impact of swing-vote silent concurrences on the precedential value of 
plurality decisions. 
1.  How Post-Marks Courts Sometimes Afford Precedential Weight 
to Plurality Decisions 
Although plurality decisions are traditionally non-precedential,84 today, 
there are mechanisms by which an appellate court can afford precedential 
weight to an opinion, or opinions, in a plurality decision.  The Supreme Court 
established the Marks rule to determine which opinion in a Supreme Court 
plurality decision is binding: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and 
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”85  Courts faced 
                                                          
 78.  BLACK, supra note 8, at 135–36; see also Re, supra note 42, at 1948 n.28 (gathering pre-
Marks authorities that doubted the precedential value of plurality decisions or dismissed them as 
non-precedential).  
 79.  See supra note 78.   
 80.  See supra note 78.   
 81. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 82.  See infra Section I.B.2.a. 
 83.  See infra Section I.B.2.b. 
 84.  See supra note 78. 
 85.  Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)).  Ironically, Gregg was itself a plurality decision, and so although the Marks rule 
originated from Gregg, it was not until the majority in Marks adopted the rule that it became a 
binding legal test.  Re, supra note 42, at 1948–49.  Even more interesting is that Justice Powell, who 
authored the Marks opinion, was a member of the plurality in Gregg.  Id. at 1951.  So, first, in 
Gregg, the plurality invented a new “narrowest grounds” rule that, if accepted, would suddenly 
mean the plurality’s own  nonbinding opinion was actually binding (since the lead opinion in Gregg 
was likely the “narrowest grounds” opinion).  Id. at 1948.  Then, a year later, a member of that 
Gregg plurality authored a majority opinion in Marks officially adopting the very rule the Gregg 
plurality had self-servingly invented.  Id. at 1951.  Thus, “[i]n this way, the clear precedential 
authority of a majority opinion indirectly blessed the more dubious authority of a plurality.”  Id.   
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with applying a Supreme Court plurality decision can use this rule to find that 
the lead opinion, or a concurring one, is binding because it reached the 
judgment “on the narrowest grounds.”86 
Since Marks, some state courts of last resort have adopted the Marks 
rule, or something similar, to apply to their plurality decisions.87  This 
includes the Court of Appeals, which appears to use a technique known as 
the “all opinions approach.”88  The all opinions approach is a “related 
principle” of the Marks rule that differs in essential ways, as explained 
below.89 
Some believe the Court of Appeals adopted the Marks rule in State v. 
Falcon,90 but the court only said in that case that Maryland uses a “somewhat 
similar approach” to Marks.91  An analysis of Falcon reveals that this 
“somewhat similar approach” is the “all opinions approach,” which differs 
from the Marks rule in two significant ways.92  First, unlike the Marks rule, 
the all opinions approach considers all the opinions in a plurality decision—
including the dissents93—a clear departure from the Marks rule’s search for 
“that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on 
                                                          
 86.  Marks, 430 U.S. at 193–94; Re, supra note 42, at 1947–50; see also supra note 85.  
Although, even the Supreme Court has recognized that the rule can be “more easily stated than 
applied.”  Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994); see also Re, supra note 42, at 1995 
(referring to the preceding quote from Nichols as “an exercise of understatement”). 
 87.  Re, supra note 42, at 1944, 1960–65, 1977, 1980. 
 88.  State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 161–62, 152 A.3d 687, 701 (2017) (explaining that the Court 
of Appeals applies “a somewhat similar approach [to the Marks rule] in determining the precedential 
significance of a case without a majority opinion by this Court,” while citing cases that looked at 
both concurring and dissenting opinions in a plurality decision to identify particular legal 
propositions of which a majority of the judges agreed); id. at 161–73, 701–08 (looking at all the 
opinions in a Court of Appeals plurality decision to extract a precedential legal proposition of which 
a majority agreed and then applying that proposition to the case at hand); Re, supra note 42, at 
1988–89 (explaining that the “all opinions approach,” a “related principle” of Marks is substantively 
different from Marks in that it allows for consideration of all the opinions in a plurality decision, 
including the dissents, and involves deducing particular legal propositions that at least a majority of 
the court agreed with); see also infra note 106.  But see infra notes 179–180 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the all opinions approach was only ever proposed as a way for lower courts to 
predict how a higher court would rule, not for courts of last resort to apply to their own plurality 
decisions); infra Section I.B.2.b. (explaining why it is concerning that a court of last resort would 
apply the all opinions approach to its plurality decisions). 
 89.  Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89; see supra note 88; infra text accompanying notes 90–100. 
 90.  For example, the Maryland State Bar Association’s Litigation Section interprets Falcon to 
mean that Maryland applies the Supreme Court’s Marks rule to its plurality decisions.  See Alan B. 
Sternstein, Locating a Fragmented Appellate Court’s Rule of Decision – The Marks Rule Marks the 
Spot?, MD. APP. BLOG (Aug. 28, 2018), https://mdappblog.com/2018/08/28/locating-a-fragmented-
appellate-courts-rule-of-decision-the-marks-rule-marks-the-spot/ (citing Falcon for the proposition 
that Maryland uses the Marks rule). 
 91.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–62, 152 A.3d at 701. 
 92.  Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89. 
 93.  Id.  But see id. at 1990 (suggesting that there are subversions of the all opinions approach 
that would still focus on individual points of law rather than looking for a single binding opinion 
but would not consider the dissents). 
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the narrowest grounds.”94  Second, unlike the Marks rule, the all opinions 
approach does not look for a single binding opinion.95  Rather, the all 
opinions approach extracts individual points of law that at least a majority of 
the judges either implicitly,96 or explicitly, agreed on.97 
Therefore, the all opinions approach is substantively different than the 
Marks rule.98  The Marks rule is an exercise in determining which opinion in 
a plurality decision, the lead opinion or a concurring one, is the single opinion 
that must be treated as binding.99  Meanwhile, the all opinions approach only 
looks to find individual points a majority of the judges could be said to have 
agreed on, regardless of whether those judges concurred or dissented.100 
While the Court of Appeals has never explicitly defined Maryland’s rule 
as the “all opinions approach,” and even though many think Maryland uses 
the Marks rule,101 an analysis of Falcon reveals that the Court of Appeals 
actually applies the all opinions approach to its plurality decisions to extract 
binding precedent.102  In Falcon, the court considered how to apply Schisler 
v. State,103 a plurality decision.104  Schisler was “a significant case” bearing 
on the matter at hand, but because Schisler was a plurality decision, it was 
unclear how Schisler applied to the facts in Falcon.105  The Falcon court 
explained that Maryland uses a “somewhat similar approach” to Marks, while 
citing to other Maryland cases that looked at all the opinions in a Court of 
Appeals plurality decision, including the dissents, to extract individual 
propositions a majority of the court agreed on (i.e. the all opinions 
approach).106  The Falcon court spent about ten pages applying this 
                                                          
 94.  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion))); see also Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 760 F.3d 600, 620 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nder Marks, the positions of those Justices who 
dissented from the judgment are not counted in trying to discern a governing holding from divided 
opinions.” (emphasis in original)). 
 95.  Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89.   
 96.  See infra text accompanying notes 183–188.   
 97.  Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89; see also infra note 100.  
 98.  Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89. 
 99.  See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193–94; Re, supra note 42, at 1947–50; see also supra note 94.  
 100.  Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89.  But see infra notes 179–180 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the all opinions approach was only ever proposed as a way for lower courts to 
predict how a higher court would rule, not for courts of last resort to apply to their own plurality 
decisions); infra Section I.B.2.b. (explaining why it is concerning that a court of last resort would 
apply the all opinions approach to its own plurality decisions). 
 101.  See supra note 90; infra note 349 (citing two pre-Falcon Court of Special Appeals cases 
where the court implied that Maryland uses the Marks rule). 
 102.  See supra note 90.   
 103.  394 Md. 519, 907 A.2d 175 (2006).  
 104.  State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 161, 152 A.3d 687, 701 (2017); Schisler, 394 Md. at 519, 
907 A.2d at 175. 
 105.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 161, 152 A.3d at 701.  
 106.  Id. at 161–62, 152 A.3d at 701.  The following sentence and its accompanying citations are 
the only discussion in Falcon about how exactly Maryland affords precedential weight to its 
plurality decisions: 
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“somewhat similar [to Marks]” approach to Schisler, ultimately determining 
that “careful examination” of Schisler revealed useful precedent.107   
To understand how swing-vote silent concurrences can impact the 
precedential value of a case in Maryland, it is necessary to first examine the 
Falcon court’s lengthy analysis of how it applied Schisler.108  An analysis of 
Falcon provides insight into what Maryland’s application of the all opinions 
approach looks like in practice, revealing how silent concurrences could 
impact the approach.  Examining the court’s analysis is essential because the 
court did not actually explain the mechanics of what it was doing in any 
detail, and so the only real explanation of the rule comes from the court’s 
discussion of how Schisler applied.109 
Falcon was a separation of powers case, where the ultimate question 
was whether the Maryland General Assembly had unconstitutionally usurped 
the power of the governor by only terminating the gubernatorially appointed 
members of a statutorily created commission.110  The General Assembly 
amended the statute that established the School Board Nominating 
Commission of Anne Arundel County, removing the governor’s statutory 
authority to appoint five of the eleven members of the commission.111  Under 
the amended statute, those five members would, like the other six members, 
be appointed by some entity besides the governor.112  The issue in Falcon 
was that the amendment also terminated the five incumbent gubernatorial 
appointees before their terms had ended.113  Four of the five gubernatorial 
appointees on the commission at the time filed suit, arguing that the Maryland 
Constitution only allows the governor to terminate civil officers appointed 
by the governor for a term of years, and so the General Assembly had 
                                                          
This Court has applied a somewhat similar approach [to Marks] in determining the 
precedential significance of a case without a majority opinion by this Court.  See, e.g., 
Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 318, 321, 26 A.3d 899, 910, 911 (2011) (In analyzing what 
this Court termed a “fractured” opinion, we explained why we were adopting the 
reasoning of the dissent, stating: “For purposes of stare decisis, we note that this is a 
proposition that garnered the support of four Judges[.]”); see also State v. Giddens, 335 
Md. 205, 213 & n.6, 642 A.2d 870, 874 & n.6 (1994) (This Court stated that the issue of 
whether a prior conviction bears on witness credibility is a matter of law because, in an 
earlier case with no majority, “two concurring judges and two dissenting judges[—i.e., 
four Judges—]each thought that the question was a matter of law.”). 
Id.  at 162, 152 A.3d at 701 (second and third alterations in original).  The opinion then states, 
“Having discussed how precedential value is determined with a [Maryland] plurality opinion, we 
turn to Schisler.”  Id.  The court then proceeded to analyze how to apply Schisler by looking at all 
the opinions, including the dissents, ultimately finding that a majority of the judges, in fact all seven, 
implicitly agreed on a particular point.  Id. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08.   
 107.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08.  But see infra Section I.B.2.b (critiquing 
the court’s approach and conclusion in Falcon). 
 108.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08. 
 109.  Id.; see also supra note 106.  
 110. Falcon, 451 Md. at 141–42, 152 A.3d at 689–90.  
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id. at 142–43, 152 A.3d at 689–90.  
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unconstitutionally usurped this exclusive power of the governor when it 
ended their terms early.114 
The parties disagreed about how Schisler applied to the case at hand.115  
Schisler was “a significant case” addressing a somewhat similar question, but 
both parties in Falcon believed Schisler stood for opposite propositions.116  
The plaintiffs argued that under Schisler, “the General Assembly may abolish 
or reconstitute a commission, but may not terminate only the gubernatorial 
appointees on a commission.”117  Alternatively, the State argued that, under 
Schisler, the General Assembly has the power to restructure a statutorily 
created entity and change who appoints its members, even if that results in 
the early termination of the existing gubernatorial appointees.118 
In Schisler, the plurality held that the General Assembly had 
unconstitutionally usurped the governor’s power when it terminated the 
members of the Public Service Commission, all of whom were gubernatorial 
appointees, and restricted how the governor could choose their 
replacements.119  Unlike in Falcon, the General Assembly had not amended 
the law that created the commission, removing the governor’s authority to 
appoint the members and assigning that authority to some other entity.120  
Rather, in Schisler, the General Assembly left the statute that gave the 
governor authority to appoint the members untouched, amending a different 
statute in the Public Utilities Article to provide that (1) “all existing members 
of the Public Service Commission would be terminated by a certain date,” 
and (2) “that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House would 
submit lists of names, from which the Governor would choose five new 
members.”121  Distinguishing that amendment, the Falcon court explained 
that “the legislation at issue in Schisler did not involve a restructuring or 
reconstituting of the Public Service Commission that would implement 
changes that would apply prospectively to all future appointees.”122  Instead, 
the legislation in Schisler “involved the General Assembly wresting authority 
away from the Governor and giving itself the one-time authority to submit 
lists to the Governor and make appointments before reverting back to the old 
gubernatorial appointment process.”123   
In Schisler, the lead opinion, concurring opinion, opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, and dissenting opinion disagreed about: (A) 
                                                          
 114.  Id. at 159, 152 A.3d at 699–700. 
 115.  Id. at 161, 152 A.3d at 701. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. at 141–42, 159, 152 A.3d at 689–90, 699 (emphasis added). 
 118.  Id. at 158, 152 A.3d at 699. 
 119.  Id. at 163–66, 152 A.3d at 701–04 (citing Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 596, 907 A.2d 
175, 220 (2006)).  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 163, 178, 152 A.3d at 702, 711 (emphasis added).  
 122.  Id.   
 123.  Id.  
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which, if any, constitutional provision the above-quoted124 amendment 
violated, and (B) which part of the amendment was unconstitutional, if 
either.125  The plurality believed both part (1) and part (2) of the 
amendment126 unconstitutionally usurped the governor’s power.127  The 
plurality believed each action independently violated article II, section 15 of 
the Maryland constitution.128  The plurality further explained, though, that if 
the General Assembly were to amend the law defining a commission’s 
membership to reconstitute or restructure the commission, then there would 
be no constitutional violation even if this resulted in the early termination of 
the existing gubernatorial members of that commission.129 
The concurring opinion agreed with the plurality that what the General 
Assembly had done was unconstitutional, but disagreed that part (1) of the 
amendment, ending the appointees’ terms early, independently violated 
article II, section 15.130  The concurrence believed instead that because the 
General Assembly had (1) ended gubernatorial appointees to a statutory 
commission’s terms early; (2) vested itself with the authority to interfere with 
the governor’s still existing statutory authority to appoint their replacements; 
and (3) otherwise left the commission “intact,” these circumstances taken 
together violated article 8 of the Maryland declaration of rights and article II, 
sections 1 and 9 of the Maryland constitution.131  Disagreeing with the 
plurality, the concurrence stated that it would have been permissible for the 
General Assembly to have merely ended the appointees’ terms early, as such 
                                                          
 124.  See supra text accompanying note 121. 
 125.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08. 
 126.  See supra text accompanying note 121.  
 127.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 164–67, 171–72, 152 A.3d at 703–04, 707 (discussing the plurality 
opinion in Schisler). 
 128.  Id.; MD. CONST. art. II, § 15 (granting the governor the power to remove “civil officers 
who received appointment from the Executive for a term of years.”).  Only the dissent doubted that 
gubernatorial appointees to a statutorily created commission counted as “civil officers” under article 
II, section 15, but only the plurality believed that ending the appointees’ terms early implicated 
article II, section 15.  See Falcon, 451 Md. at 165–71, 152 A.3d at 703–07 (discussing the different 
opinions in Schisler).  The Falcon court declined to resolve whether the appointees were civil 
officers because it was able to use the all opinions approach to find that, under the circumstances in 
Falcon, no member of the Schisler court would have found a constitutional violation regardless.  Id. 
at 142–43,171–73, 152 A.3d at 690, 707–08; supra notes 88, 106 (explaining how the court’s 
analysis of the precedential value of Schisler constituted an application of the “all opinions 
approach”).   
 129.  Id. at 167, 152 A.3d at 704 (citing Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 598, 907 A.2d 175, 222 
(2006) (plurality opinion)). 
 130.  Id. at 167–68, 172, 152 A.3d at 704–05, 707 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 605–06, 907 A.2d 
at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring)).  
 131.  Id. at 167–68, 152 A.3d at 704–05 & n.5 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 605–06, 907 A.2d at 
226 (Wilner, J., concurring)) (“It is the entirety of the legislative assault that runs afoul of Article 
8.”); MD. CONST., DECL. OF RTS., art. VIII (“[T]he Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of 
Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the 
functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.”);  MD. 
CONST. art. II, § 1 (vesting the executive power of the state with the governor); MD. CONST. art. II, 
§ 9 (“[The governor] shall take care that the Laws are faithfully executed.”).   
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an action, in and of itself, would not have separately violated article II, 
section15.132   
The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part disagreed with the 
plurality that part (1) of the amendment, ending the terms early, was 
unconstitutional, but agreed that part (2), restricting whom the governor 
could appoint as a replacement, was unconstitutional.133  The dissenting 
opinion believed neither were unconstitutional.134 
In Falcon, what the General Assembly had done was somewhat 
analogous to part (1) and part (2) of the amendment135 in Schisler, and also 
somewhat different, in important ways.  The General Assembly’s action in 
Falcon was similar to Schisler in that the action only affected gubernatorial 
appointees.136  The action was different in that, in Falcon, there were other 
members of the commission whom had never been gubernatorial appointees, 
and who were, therefore, not terminated.137  Furthermore, unlike in Schisler, 
the General Assembly in Falcon actually amended the law that created the 
commission to remove the governor’s statutory authority to appoint the five 
members who were terminated.138  Similar to Schisler, however, the General 
Assembly had only focused on removing the gubernatorially appointed 
members, as the amendment left who appoints the other members 
unchanged.139  But, unlike in Schisler, the General Assembly in Falcon had 
not quite left the membership of the commission “otherwise intact.”140  In 
Schisler, the lead opinion and concurrence thought ending gubernatorial 
terms while leaving the membership of the commission otherwise intact 
pointed toward a constitutional violation.141  In Falcon, the General 
Assembly left the current membership otherwise intact,142 but the 
amendment also made other changes to the overall membership of the 
commission.143   
Therefore, in Schisler, the General Assembly had terminated the 
members of a commission comprised entirely of gubernatorial appointees 
                                                          
 132. Falcon, 451 Md. at 167–68, 152 A.3d at 704–05 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 605–06, 907 
A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring)). 
 133.  Id. at 168–69, 152 A.3d at 705–06 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 606–07, 907 A.2d at 227 
(Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting)). 
 134.  Id. at 169–70, 152 A.3d at 705–06. (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 615, 907 A.2d at 232 
(Battaglia, J., dissenting)). 
 135.  See supra text accompanying note 121. 
 136. Falcon, 451 Md. at 141–43, 163–66, 152 A.3d at 689–90, 701–04 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. 
at 596, 907 A.2d at 220).  
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 163–64, 152 A.3d at 702. 
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id. at 173, 152 A.3d at 708.  
 141.  Id. at 167, 152 A.3d at 704; see supra text accompanying note 131. 
 142.  See supra text accompanying note 139.  
 143.  Such as adding two new members, comprising the commission of thirteen members rather 
than eleven.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 173, 152 A.3d at 708. 
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and restricted the governor’s still-existing statutory authority to appoint their 
replacements, but otherwise left the commission intact.144  In Falcon, 
however, only five of the eleven members of the commission were 
gubernatorial appointees, but the legislature had only changed who appoints 
those five seats, thereby only terminating the gubernatorial appointees’ terms 
early, while leaving who appoints the other six seats intact.145  
The plaintiffs in Falcon argued that the General Assembly had not 
restructured the commission such that the General Assembly could end the 
plaintiffs’ terms early.146  The plaintiffs argued that, similar to Schisler, the 
legislature had singled out governor-appointed commission members, only 
changing who appoints those five positions.147  The plaintiffs did not dispute 
that the legislature could change who appoints the members as it sees fit, they 
just argued that the legislature could not end the existing appointees’ terms 
early through such an action.148  The plaintiffs argued that although the 
General Assembly had, unlike in Schisler, actually amended the law that 
created the commission to alter how its membership is determined, the 
General Assembly had clearly singled out only the gubernatorial appointees 
and terminated them early after changing the rules only for the gubernatorial 
positions.149  The plaintiffs argued that such a focused change only impacting 
the gubernatorial appointees could not fairly be viewed as “reconstituting” a 
commission whereby the General Assembly could then permissibly end the 
incumbent members’ terms early.150  Rather, the plaintiffs argued, this was 
clearly the legislature singling out only those members appointed by the 
governor and terminating only those members while leaving the rest of the 
current membership intact, similar to what the General Assembly had done 
in Schisler.151   
Thus, the relevant disagreement in Schisler that the Court of Appeals 
sought to square with the facts in Falcon was the following: The Schisler 
plurality believed it is unconstitutional for the General Assembly to terminate 
the existing gubernatorial appointees of a commission before their terms are 
up, unless such termination results from a restructuring or reconstituting of 
the commission itself.152  Alternatively, all the other judges in Schisler 
disagreed with the plurality that such a qualification was necessary.153  Those 
judges believed, instead, that the court does not need to concern itself with 
                                                          
 144.  Id. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08; supra notes 138–143.  
 145.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08; supra notes 138–143.  
 146.  Id. at 142, 159, 152 A.3d at 689–90, 699–700.  
 147.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 142, 159, 152 A.3d at 689–90, 699–700.  
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. at 172, 152 A.3d at 707.  
 151.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 159, 152 A.3d at 699–700. 
 152.  Id. at 172, 152 A.3d at 707. 
 153.  Id.; supra text accompanying notes 130–134. 
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whether the termination results from a restructuring.154  They thought such 
an analysis was unnecessary because they believed there is nothing 
unconstitutional in the first place about the General Assembly prematurely 
ending the terms of gubernatorial appointees on a statutorily created 
commission.155 
After “careful examination” of all the opinions in Schisler, the Falcon 
court explained that regardless of their other disagreements, all seven judges 
in Schisler would apparently agree, at least, that no matter who appointed the 
members, a constitutional violation does not automatically occur when the 
General Assembly ends statutory-commission members’ terms early.156  The 
Falcon court explained that the lead opinion simply believed that the 
termination of gubernatorially appointed members must be incidental to 
reconstituting the membership of a commission to be constitutional, while 
the other opinions did not think there needed to be any such rule because the 
termination would be constitutional regardless.157  Thus, the Falcon court 
held that, under Schisler, the General Assembly’s restructuring of the School 
Board Nominating Commission of Anne Arundel County did not violate the 
Maryland Constitution simply because that restructuring incidentally resulted 
in the early termination of only the governor-appointed members.158 
It is clear that the court did not apply the Marks rule, as the court did not 
decide that either the lead opinion or the concurring one reached the result on 
the narrowest grounds and was therefore the single binding opinion.159  
Rather, the court looked at all the opinions, including the dissents, to see if a 
majority would have agreed on whether there was a constitutional violation 
just because the legislature terminated only the gubernatorially appointed 
members.160  The court found that the answer was yes—a majority of the 
judges, in fact all seven, would have agreed that just because all the 
terminated members were appointed by the governor does not mean there 
was a constitutional violation.161  It was on this basis—that a majority of the 
                                                          
 154.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.    
 155.  Id.  Strictly speaking, the concurrence only believed that there was nothing unconstitutional 
in and of itself about terminating the members but did believe terminating the members was 
unconstitutional in Schisler, only because of additional facts in that case that did not exist in Falcon.  
See id.; supra text accompanying notes 130–132.   
 156.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.   
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Id.  But see infra Section I.B.2.b. (critiquing Falcon’s use of the all opinions approach and 
its conclusion based on that approach).   
 159.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08; see supra notes 99–100 and 
accompanying text (explaining the difference between the Marks rule and the all opinions 
approach). 
 160.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.  But see infra notes 179–180 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the all opinions approach was only ever proposed as a way for 
lower courts to predict how a higher court would rule, not for courts of last resort to apply to their 
own plurality decisions); infra Section I.B.2.b (explaining why it is troubling for a court of last 
resort to apply the all opinions approach to its own plurality decisions). 
 161.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.   
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judges would have necessarily agreed on a particular point—that the Falcon 
court decided that, under Schisler, the State prevails.162  Therefore, while 
some seem to take for granted that Maryland uses the Supreme Court’s Marks 
rule,163 this is incorrect.  Maryland apparently uses the all opinions approach, 
not the Marks rule, to afford precedential weight to Maryland plurality 
decisions.164  Answering the question of how silent concurrences impact the 
precedential value of plurality decisions in Maryland, then, depends on the 
effect of silent concurrences when applying the all opinions approach. 
2.  The Potential Impact of Silent Concurrences on the Precedential 
Value of a Plurality Decision in Maryland and a Closer Look at 
Falcon 
Silent concurrences can confound the precedential value of a Maryland 
plurality decision,165 but they would not have done so in Falcon.166  It turns 
out, though, the fact that silent concurrences in Schisler would not have 
mattered in Falcon makes clear that the all opinions approach, particularly as 
applied in Falcon, seems oddly detached from why stare decisis exists in the 
first place.167 
a.  How Silent Concurrences Complicate Plurality Decisions but 
Would Not Have Changed the Outcome in Falcon 
None of the concurrences in Schisler were silent.168  Thus, the Falcon 
court had every judge’s alternative reasoning available to help determine how 
Schisler applied.169  If the concurrences had been silent, it would not have 
mattered in Falcon because the plurality and either of the dissenters in 
Schisler (four of seven judges) could still be said to have “agreed” about the 
relevant proposition the Falcon court extracted from Schisler.170  
                                                          
 162.  Id.   
 163.  See supra note 89 (providing an example of an organization believing Falcon meant 
Maryland uses the Marks rule); infra note 349 (citing two pre-Falcon Court of Special Appeals 
cases where the court seemed to believe Maryland uses the Marks rule). 
 164.  See supra Section I.B.1.  The Court of Appeals using the all opinions approach is odd for 
many reasons, see infra Section I.B.2.b., not the least of which being that the all opinions approach 
was only ever proposed as a tool for lower courts to predict how a higher court would rule based on 
a plurality decision from the higher court.  See infra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. 
 165.  See, e.g., Section I.E.2. 
 166.  See supra Section I.B.2.a. 
 167.  See supra Section I.B.2.b.  
 168.  Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 907 A.2d 175 (2006).   
 169.  State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 161–73, 152 A.3d 687, 700–08 (2017). 
 170.  See supra note 106 (providing a quote from Falcon where the court cited to a Maryland 
case that combined two concurring opinions and two dissenting ones to find a single precedential 
proposition because all that is needed is a majority); supra text accompanying notes 156–158 
(explaining that the Falcon court found all seven of the judges in Schisler would have agreed on the 
relevant point).  But see infra Section I.B.2.b. (discussing why finding precedent by combining 
separate opposing opinions based on what they technically “agreed” about is problematic).  
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Hypothetically, though, if it had been unclear whether the lead opinion and 
the dissents agreed on the relevant point (and had the concurrences been 
silent), then the Falcon court would have had no binding precedent to 
apply.171  There would only have been five judges who explained their 
reasoning at all, and only three in agreement, thus no majority.172   
Therefore, while swing-vote concurrences always disrupt the flow of 
precedent by preventing a majority opinion, swing-vote silent concurrences 
complicate matters even further.173  They complicate matters further because 
even though Maryland can afford precedential weight to a plurality decision 
via the all opinions approach, this enterprise relies on judges writing 
separately so future courts can examine their opinions.174  When the 
concurrences are silent, a later court is left with nothing but a lead opinion 
and a dissent(s), which may or may not have any points of overlap, implicit 
or otherwise.175 
b.  Falcon Reveals a Disconnect Between the Court of Appeals’s Use 
of the All Opinions Approach and the Point of Stare Decisis 
This subsection is a slight diversion from the discussion of silent 
concurrences in and of themselves, but there is something essential to note 
about the all opinions approach, particularly as applied in Falcon.  Focusing 
on how silent concurrences would not have altered Falcon’s application of 
Schisler fleshes out how the court’s use of the all opinions approach, while 
using the language of stare decisis, has little to do with why stare decisis 
exists.176  Again, the Falcon court found that all seven of the judges in 
Schisler implicitly agreed on a particular point and that this point was 
therefore precedential because a majority would have agreed with it.177  Such 
a rule is concerning because (1) it seems to allow courts to mix and match 
                                                          
 171.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 162, 152 A.3d at 701 (explaining that the precedential weight of a 
Maryland plurality decision depends on finding something a majority of the judges could be said to 
have agreed about); supra note 106 (quoting the relevant language from this part of Falcon).  
 172.  See supra note 171. 
 173.  See, e.g., Wright v. State, 2016 WL 2944069, at *3 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 17, 2016) 
(noting the difficulty the court had in applying Barnes v. State, 423 Md. 75, 31 A.3d 203 (2011) 
(plurality decision) because of a swing-vote silent concurrence); Feaster v. State, 2015 WL 
9590659, at *2 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 30, 2015) (same); see also infra Section I.E.2. 
 174.  See supra Section I.B.1. (explaining the all opinions approach, which necessarily requires 
having opinions to examine); infra Section I.E.2. (providing examples of Maryland plurality 
decisions with silent concurrences resulting in legal ambiguity).  Of course, the Marks rule also 
relies on concurring judges writing separately.  See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text 
(explaining the Marks rule).   
 175.  See, for example, the cases discussed infra in Section I.E.2.  Besides the notion of 
extracting actual precedent from plurality decisions, silent concurrences also deprive the court of 
opinions that could at least aid the court as persuasive authority in developing and adopting rules in 
the future.  See supra notes 9, 52 and accompanying text; infra note 205.  
 176.  See infra notes 197–206 and accompanying text.  
 177.  State v. Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08 (2017); see supra text 
accompanying notes 156–158. 
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opinions authored by judges who deliberately wrote separately rather than 
form a majority and (2) this mixing and matching seems to enable courts to 
extract precedential propositions those judges would likely have disagreed 
with based solely on the notion that the separate opinions “agree” in some 
technical sense.178 
Before continuing, it is worth noting that proponents of the all opinions 
approach only ever proposed it as a methodological tool for lower courts to 
predict how a higher court would rule in a case under review by the lower 
court, when the only case from the higher court addressing a similar question 
is a plurality decision.179  The all opinions approach was not intended for 
courts of last resort to apply to their own plurality decisions as if theoretical 
areas of overlap between opposing opinions were necessarily binding on 
those courts.180 
Issues with the all opinions approach are clearest when one considers 
how the Falcon court could have applied Schisler the same way based only 
on the lead opinion and either one of the dissents.181  While the Falcon court 
found all seven judges in Schisler “agreed” on the relevant point, that point 
would still have been precedential even if only the lead opinion and either of 
the dissents had “agreed.”182 
As an initial matter, intuitively, one would think an opinion explaining 
the result and an opinion dissenting in that result183 do not “agree,” but rather, 
by definition, disagree.184  When the Falcon court stated the lead opinion and 
the dissent “agreed,” it meant the following: The lead opinion in Schisler held 
there was a constitutional violation because the termination of the 
gubernatorial appointees had not been incidental to a restructuring of the 
commission.185  Conversely, the dissents did not believe there was a 
constitutional violation because they believed the General Assembly had the 
power to terminate early the members of a statutorily created entity, 
regardless of who appointed the members, and regardless of whether the 
                                                          
 178.  See infra note 210 and accompanying text.   
 179.  Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89 (“The idea is to view all the opinions in a . . . [plurality] 
decision, including the dissents, as contributing to the rule of decision for future cases, at least in 
lower courts.” (emphasis added)); see id. at 1988–93 (explaining in more detail how lower courts 
would use the all opinions approach). 
 180.  See id. at 1988–93 (explaining the all opinions approach as only a tool for lower courts, 
thus not considering the notion that a court of last resort could use the all opinions approach on its 
own plurality decisions).  Even the Supreme Court applies the Marks rule to its own opinions 
sparingly, with the rule being more a creature of lower courts trying to interpret Supreme Court 
plurality decisions.  Id. at 1951–54; see also infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 181.  See supra note 106 (quoting Falcon explaining that the Court of Appeals can find precedent 
in a plurality decision by combining dissents with other opinions).  
 182.  State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 172, 152 A.3d 687, 701 (2017); see supra note 106 
(providing a quotation from Falcon citing another case that found a precedential point of agreement 
between two concurring opinions and two dissenting ones).  
 183.  And, for that matter, an opinion concurring only in the result. 
 184.  See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 185.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 172, 152 A.3d at 707.  
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termination was incidental to a restructuring.186  Thus, technically, both 
opinions would agree that nothing unconstitutional occurs when the General 
Assembly amends the law defining who appoints members of a statutorily 
created commission, and in so doing, ends the current terms of only the 
governor-appointed members early.187  The Falcon court reasoned that 
neither the Schisler plurality nor the dissenters would have found a 
constitutional violation in Falcon.188 
While examining implicit areas of overlap between opinions might be a 
useful intellectual exercise, it is worrisome that a hypothetical opinion 
stitched together from separate disagreeing opinions could be considered a 
pre-existing precedent that a court of last resort must follow.189  The 
dissenters in Schisler190 fundamentally disagreed with the lead opinion, 
which is presumably why those judges dissented rather than help create a 
precedential majority opinion.191  The lead opinion believed the rule should 
be that, even if the only thing at issue is whether the General Assembly can 
terminate gubernatorial appointees on a statutorily created commission, the 
dispositive question is whether the termination is incidental to a restructuring 
of the commission itself.192  If not, the termination is unconstitutional.193  The 
plurality could not convince a fourth judge of this.194  Conversely, the 
dissents believed such an analysis is irrelevant because the General Assembly 
has the power to end the terms early, whether incidental to a restructuring or 
not.195  Thus, although it may be true that the lead opinion and the dissents 
would have agreed no constitutional violation occurred in Falcon, they had 
very different constitutional interpretations that led them to that 
conclusion.196  Still, though, the opinions were lumped together as if they 
formed a binding majority under the maxim of stare decisis.197 
From a doctrinal standpoint, the problem is that a court of last resort 
“careful[ly]” stitching together precedent based on what disagreeing judges 
in a plurality decision would have theoretically agreed about has little to do 
with why we subscribe to the maxim of stare decisis in the first place.198  
Forming precedent under the maxim of stare decisis traditionally requires (1) 
                                                          
 186.  Id. at 172–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08. 
 187.  Id.   
 188.  Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 156–158. 
 189.  See infra notes 190–226 and accompanying text.  
 190.  And the concurrence, actually. 
 191.  See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See supra notes 125–134, 152–155.   
 193.  See supra notes 125–134, 152–155.   
 194.  See supra notes 153–162 and accompanying text.  
 195.  State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 161–73, 152 A.3d 687, 700–08 (2017); see supra notes 125–
134, 152–155. 
 196.  See supra notes 125–134, 152–155. 
 197.  See supra notes 125–134, 152–155. 
 198.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08; see supra text accompanying note 107; 
infra note 212 and accompanying text.   
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that the majority of an appellate panel, (2) explicitly agrees on, (a) a particular 
result, and (b) the legal reasoning that dictates that result.199  Stare decisis 
literally means “to stand by things decided,”200 the idea being that when a 
court has the chance to consider a particular set of facts, whatever reasoning 
a majority can agree dictates the result in that case is binding on future cases 
with similar facts.201 
The basic justification for basing our legal system on the principle of 
stare decisis is two-fold.  First, we assign inherent authority to a rule when 
the majority of an appellate panel, faced with the same set of facts, could 
agree on that rule, and applied it to those facts, to reach the same result.202  
Second, stare decisis aids in predictability of the law, promotes fairness, and 
“contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,” by 
ensuring that the rules explained and applied in one case will apply to similar 
cases in the future.203 
Yet, the all opinions approach, as applied in Falcon, allows a court of 
last resort to give all the weight of a precedent to the notion that at least four 
judges, who did not even agree on the result in one case, would hypothetically 
agree, technically, with a proposition relevant to a new case with different 
facts.204  Having done so, a court can dispense with any discussion of the 
merits of the rule and simply state there is a binding rule that shall now be 
applied under the maxim of stare decisis.205  Thus, under the reasoning of 
                                                          
 199.  BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–6, 10, 135–136; Re, supra note 42, at 1948 n.28, 1966; supra 
text accompanying notes 40–43.  
 200.  Stare Decisis, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis (last 
updated Mar. 2017) (emphasis added).  
 201.  See supra note 199. 
 202.  HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR THE 
SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 3–6 (1912); see id. at 3 (“The authoritative force of judicial precedents rests 
partly on the legal presumption that what has previously been decided by a court of competent 
jurisdiction was correctly decided and therefore should not be reconsidered.”); id. at 5–6 (“The 
operation of precedents is based on the legal presumption of the correctness of judicial decisions.” 
(quoting JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 171 (2d ed. 1907))). 
 203.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015); accord BLACK, supra note 
202 (“[I]t is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in 
litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every 
new judge’s opinion, as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, 
what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule.” (quoting SIR 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS 69 
(1753))). 
 204.  See supra Section I.B.1. 
 205.  Compare Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (“We think it not useful 
to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and 
divided the lower courts that have considered it.  This degree of confusion following a splintered 
decision . . . is itself a reason for reexamining that decision.”), and id. at 746–47 (acknowledging 
the Court was in fact adopting new rules based on the persuasive authority of various opinions in a 
plurality decision, without insisting the plurality decision was somehow binding precedent under 
the principle of stare decisis), with State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 171–79, 152 A.3d 687, 707–12 
(2017) (basing its legal analysis almost entirely on how Schisler could technically be said to stand 
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Falcon, a court can proceed as if there is authoritative precedent that dictates 
a certain result—while at the same time contrivedly synthesizing that 
precedent in a manner unrelated to what it means to “stand by things 
decided.”206  Stare decisis means standing by rules a majority previously 
applied to a particular set of facts to reach a particular result—not standing 
by complicated extrapolations of what four of seven judges, who did not even 
agree on the result, would have, technically, agreed on given the chance to 
opine on a new case with different facts.207 
In addition to the general doctrinal issues, the logic of Falcon is 
potentially confusing for two reasons.  First, no majority in Schisler could 
agree whether the legislature’s early termination of governor-appointed 
members needed to be incidental to be constitutional, and yet Falcon, 
purporting to be following what all the judges agreed on in Schisler, found 
that the termination in Falcon was constitutional because it was incidental.208  
Second, even if the concurrence had been silent, the Falcon court could have 
done the same thing with only the lead opinion and a dissent, even though 
the dissents quite clearly would have disagreed with the court undertaking an 
analysis of whether the termination was incidental.209 
University of California-Los Angeles Law Professor Richard Re points 
out that the all opinions approach could be considered problematic because 
judges who write separately rather than join the lead opinion “prefer that no 
precedent be established,” and so “they should be able to act on that wish 
rather than having to join (and make precedential) views diametrically 
contrary to their own” via subsequent application of the all opinions 
approach.210  A court treats the rule that it pieces together from separate 
                                                          
for a binding proposition, and then applying that proposition without further discussion of its 
merits).  
 206.  Stare Decisis, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis (last 
updated Mar. 2017); cf. Re, supra note 42, at 1951 (explaining that the Marks rule itself was 
established when “the clear precedential authority of a [Supreme Court] majority opinion indirectly 
blessed the more dubious authority of a [Supreme Court] plurality”).  If the above description of 
why stare decisis exists in the first place is correct, then picking one opinion that is decided on what 
a court deems “the narrowest grounds” and treating it as binding, i.e. the Marks rule, also seems to 
have little to do with why the principle of stare decisis exists.  See infra text accompanying notes 
212–213; infra note 225 and accompanying text.   
 207.  See supra notes 202–206 and accompanying text; see also Re, supra note 42, at 1992–93 
(making a similar point, although in the context of lower courts applying the approach to a higher 
court’s plurality decision, as lower courts trying to predict how a higher court might rule is the only 
purpose for which the all opinions approach was ever proposed).  
 208.  See supra notes 125–134, 152–155. 
 209.  Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 606–14, 907 A.2d 175, 226–31 (2006) (Harrel, J., and 
Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 614–32, 907 A.2d at 231–42 (Battaglia, 
J., dissenting).  
 210.  Re, supra note 42, at 1973 n.168; see also id. at 1990 (“Some judges and commentators 
object to . . . giv[ing] binding force to dissents.  Because they do not adjudicate rights or establish 
precedent, dissents tend to be less inhibited than the sober majority opinions that they criticize.  
Dissenters let off steam, offer visionary meditations, and otherwise act in ways that the dissenters 
themselves would view as inappropriate in a ruling with the force of law.”).  
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opinions as binding precedent, even though “not a single [judge from the 
plurality decision] would necessarily approve of the resulting combination of 
rules.”211  Re ultimately argues that “[n]o approach to the Marks rule finds 
footing in logic, prudence, or tradition,”212 for reasons that are beyond the 
scope of this Comment.213 
Exemplifying the concerns Professor Re notes above, the Falcon court 
explained that its decision was dictated by what all the judges implicitly 
“agreed” on in Schisler, while applying the very same analysis the Schisler 
judges could not agree was necessary—an analysis of whether the early 
termination was incidental to a restructuring.214  The non-lead opinions’ 
authors apparently felt strongly enough that no such analysis was necessary 
that they wrote separately—rather than allowing the case to result in a 
precedential majority opinion whereby a future court would undertake that 
analysis.215  The Falcon court performed that very analysis, though, while 
concluding that its decision was based on a precedential point of agreement 
between all the judges in Schisler.  
The all opinions approach allowed the Falcon court to read Schisler as 
standing for the binding proposition that there was no constitutional violation 
in Falcon—on the grounds that the “termination of the [gubernatorial] 
Appointees’ terms was incidental to the General Assembly’s restructuring 
and reconstituting of the Nominating Commission.”216  The court, purporting 
to follow stare decisis, could “[a]pply[] the rationale of Schisler here” to 
determine “that, under Schisler, according to a majority of this [c]ourt, such 
action does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”217  The court 
proceeded to explain and analyze why what the General Assembly did could 
rightly be considered “restructuring,” and why the termination was incidental 
to this restructuring, even though undertaking such an analysis is something 
the concurrence and the dissents did not think future courts need to do—
                                                          
 211.  Id. at 1993. 
 212.  Id. at 1997. 
 213.  For a thorough analysis of the difficulties in extracting precedent from plurality opinions 
via the Marks rule and its variants, and criticism on these grounds of both the rule, and of judges 
failing to compromise sufficiently to reach a majority decision, see Richard M. Re, Beyond the 
Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942 (2019).   
 214.  See supra text accompanying notes 125–134, 156–158. 
 215.  See supra text accompanying notes 125–134, 156–158; cf. supra notes 210–211 and 
accompanying text (explaining why forming precedent by combining disagreeing separate opinions 
could be considered ill-advised).  
 216.  State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 171–74, 152 A.3d 687, 707–08 (2017).  
 217.  Id. (emphasis added).  But see supra note 205 and accompanying text (pointing out that 
when a court of last resort faces a legal question that previously divided that court resulting in 
confusion over what the rule is or should be, it is probably preferable for the court to explore and 
discuss the merits of whatever rule it adopts—which is why it is concerning that the all opinions 
approach can reduce a court’s analysis to declaring that the court is applying some pre-existing 
binding precedent).   
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which is presumably why they wrote separately rather than allowing Schisler 
to set such a precedent.218 
Furthermore, had the concurrences in Schisler been silent, the Falcon 
court, under its own logic, could still have reached the same conclusion based 
only on the lead opinion and either of the dissents.219  The Falcon court 
interpreted the dissents as agreeing with the lead opinion that incidental 
termination of only the gubernatorial appointees on a statutorily created 
commission is not a constitutional violation.220  While the notion that the lead 
and dissenting opinions agreed about this is technically true, it ignores the 
fact that the dissents’ point was that it should not matter whether the 
termination is incidental to anything.221  The Falcon court may be technically 
correct that both the plurality and the dissenters in Schisler would not have 
found a constitutional violation in Falcon.222  Still, it seems odd that even 
based on the most diametrically opposed opinions in Schisler, the court could 
have proceeded as if the relevant analysis “under Schisler”223 is whether the 
termination was incidental, when the relevance of such an analysis is 
essentially what no majority could agree on in Schisler.224  
3.  Summarizing the Effect of Silent Concurrences on the 
Precedential Value of Plurality Decisions 
Based on Sections I.B.1 and I.B.2, the following two propositions are 
true.  First, when a failure to reach a compromise results in a plurality 
decision, the precedential value of the case is left uncertain, and it will take 
further litigation that is likely to be complex and unpredictable to sort out 
these ambiguities in the law.225  Second, when a swing-voter concurs silently, 
it can be even more difficult, if not impossible, to sort out these 
ambiguities.226  The silently concurring judge both disrupts the establishment 
of precedent and offers no assistance to future courts or litigants in using the 
Marks rule, or a technique such as the all opinions approach, to resolve 
                                                          
 218.  Id. at 172–74, 152 A.3d at 707–08; see supra notes 125–134, 152–155; cf. supra note 210 
(offering criticism that would seem to apply to Falcon of the general notion of combining dissents 
with concurring and lead opinions to form precedent). 
 219.  See supra notes 89, 106 and text accompanying notes 156–163. 
 220.  See supra text accompanying notes 156–163. 
 221.  Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 606–14, 907 A.2d 175, 226–31 (2006) (Harrel, J., and 
Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 614–32, 907 A.2d at 231–42 (Battaglia, 
J., dissenting).  Contra supra note 210 and accompanying text (explaining that judges probably do 
not want their separate opinions to be mixed with diametrically opposed opinions to form precedent, 
since they specifically chose to write separately rather than form precedent). 
 222.  See supra text accompanying notes 156–163. 
 223.  Falcon, 451 Md. at 172–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08. 
 224.  See supra note 221.  
 225.  For a thorough analysis of why litigation that requires applying plurality decisions can be 
particularly complex and unpredictable post-Marks, see Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 1942 (2019). 
 226.  See infra note 227. 
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questions of law left confounded by the plurality decision.227  Furthermore, 
aside from the notion of actually extracting precedent from a plurality 
decision, a swing-vote silent concurrence generally deprives future courts of 
additional persuasive authority to help resolve questions left unanswered by 
a plurality decision.228 
C.  A Survey of the Criticisms of Silent Concurrences 
Critics take particular issue with swing-vote silent concurrences because 
they lead to plurality decisions, but also criticize the practice generally, 
regardless of whether there is still a majority opinion.  When a judge’s silent 
concurrence results in a plurality decision, one criticism is the judge caused 
there to be ambiguities in the law but did not explain why.229  Rather than the 
case settling a legal question, future litigants will need to re-litigate the same 
issue before a clear legal rule can emerge.230  While this is a criticism that 
could be directed at a court as a whole when the judges’ inability to 
compromise results in a plurality decision,231 the key point is that with a silent 
concurrence, there is no hint as to what the disagreement even was or what 
legal principles the concurring judge thinks should have decided the case.232 
Furthermore, there is concern about the unilateral nature of a swing-vote 
silent concurrence.233  When a court as a whole leaves ambiguities in the law, 
either by failing to find a compromise that allows for a majority opinion,234 
issuing a summary disposition that does not explain the court’s reasoning, or 
                                                          
 227.  See Robbins, supra note 55, at 161–65 (explaining that swing-vote silent concurrences 
leave ambiguities in the law that it will take further litigation to sort out definitively); infra note 349 
and accompanying text (providing two examples where the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
noted particular difficulty in applying a Court of Appeals plurality decision because of a silent 
concurrence); infra Section I.E.2; see also infra note 494 (addressing the potential argument that 
the all opinions approach may in fact make silent concurrences more justifiable in Maryland).  
 228.  See supra note 175 (explaining that silently concurring judges have also deprived future 
courts of additional persuasive authority to help further develop the law even in the absence of rules 
like the Marks rule, or where plurality-precedent-extracting rules are of no help in a given instance). 
 229.  See Robbins, supra note 55, at 161–65 (criticizing swing-vote judges in particular for 
issuing silent concurrences because they leave ambiguities in the law that will require further 
litigation); see also supra text accompanying note 76 (explaining that plurality decisions leave 
ambiguities in the law).   
 230.  Robbins, supra note 55, at 161–65. 
 231.  See supra note 225.  
 232.  See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining how a silent concurrence tells 
us nothing more than that a judge refused to join the main opinion); supra Section I.B.3; infra note 
349 (citing two Maryland Court of Special Appeals cases where the court noted particular difficulty 
applying a Court of Appeals plurality decision because of a silent concurrence, as it provided no 
insight into the disagreement or alternative grounds for the result); infra Section I.E.2 (discussing 
five Court of Appeals plurality decisions with one or more silent concurrences and the resulting 
legal ambiguities from those cases); supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that one of 
the reasons disagreeing judges should write separate opinions is to contribute to the development of 
the law).  
 233.  See infra notes 237, 240, 252. 
 234.  See supra note 225. 
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issuing an unpublished opinion,235 this is at least the court acting as a 
collective body.236  A silent concurrence, however, allows a single judge to 
stand in the way of precedent, for whatever reason the judge may have, and 
not provide any rationale.237  For example, a single judge may not want a 
particular rule to become precedent for personal or political reasons.238  If 
that judge happens to be the swing voter, then the silent concurrence allows 
that judge to exercise their will independently, unlike when the court acts 
collectively, and without writing separately to explain their decision to the 
public.239 
When the silently concurring judge is not a swing voter disrupting the 
establishment of precedent, the general criticism of silent concurrences is 
essentially that “[j]udges have a duty to write and to provide reasoning for 
their decisions.”240  Critics do not necessarily argue that a judge must write a 
lengthy and detailed separate opinion.241  Rather, the criticism is that a judge 
ought to at least give some indication that they in fact considered the case 
carefully before casting a vote in favor of a given result,242 and some 
statement as to why the judge is choosing not to join the main opinion.243  
This statement may be as simple as explaining that the judge agreed with the 
lower court’s reason for reaching the result rather than the reasoning in the 
                                                          
 235.  Robbins, supra note 55, at 118, 161–62 (describing these sorts of situations as comparable 
to a silent concurrence insofar as the reasoning is left unstated). 
 236.  Id. at 161, 163–64; see infra note 237.  
 237.  Robbins, supra note 55, at 161, 163–64; see also Platt supra, note 4, at 160 (“Critics might 
argue that silent concurrences are more subject to inappropriate use than other [methods by which 
a court as a whole might withhold its reasoning] because they are exercised unilaterally.”).  As will 
be addressed in the Analysis, see infra notes 419–437 and accompanying text, Platt argues that the 
unilateral nature of a silent concurrence is not a concern.  Platt, supra note 4, at 160. 
 238.  See Robbins, supra note 55, at 163–64 (stating that disrupting precedent without providing 
any rationale “rais[es] the specter of arbitrariness”). 
 239.  Id. at 161, 163–64; infra note 252; see also infra note 240. 
 240.  Id. at 161 n.16; accord Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten opinions provide 
a measure of public accountability. . . .   Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task 
of maintaining or building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on 
Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))); infra note 247 and accompanying text.  
 241.  See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352 (“[Silent concurrences are] puzzling because Justices 
have several low-cost alternatives . . . .  As an initial matter, Justices might issue perfunctory 
opinions that offer a brief explanation for staking out a separate position.”).  This is worth noting 
because a principle defense of the silent concurrence is that judges have limited time, and there can 
be situations where a judge disagrees with the main opinion’s reasoning, but it would be a poor use 
of limited judicial resources for the judge to write a full opinion explaining why.  See infra notes 
294–300 and accompanying text.  But see infra Section II.B.1; infra note 441 (citing examples of 
brief statements supplied in lieu of full separate opinions).  
 242.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352; see infra notes 247, 252–253 and accompanying text.   
 243.  Robbins, supra note 55, at 162; see also Platt, supra note 4, at 141 (“The unexplained vote 
is commonly understood to be the province of the legislator; judicial power is customarily exercised 
through reasoned, written opinions.”). 
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majority opinion.244  Critics argue that a judge who agrees with the result 
should only refuse to join the main opinion if the judge has substantial 
concerns about the reasoning in the main opinion, and that if a judge has such 
substantial concerns, the judge has a duty to explain them—“If the 
disagreement is not substantial, the main opinion ought to be signed; if the 
disagreement is substantial, the reason should be stated.”245 
In addition, “separate opinions may help foster public confidence in the 
judiciary and promote institutional legitimacy,”246 as “separate opinions help 
demonstrate that legal conclusions are the ‘product of independent and 
thoughtful minds.’”247  The criticism, then, is that a judge who silently 
concurs (for all anyone knows) may have no sound legal reason for voting in 
favor of the result, which is precisely why our system presumes judges should 
explain their decisions.248 
Another criticism in this same vein is that it is unfair to the parties of a 
case for judges to be partly responsible for the result, but not explain their 
reasoning.249  One can imagine that it would be troubling to a party that loses 
an appeal when one or more of the judges250 responsible for providing the 
vote(s) necessary for that party to lose does not explain why they voted for 
that result.251  Not only is the party unsure why the judge who silently 
concurred voted for their side to lose, but they also have no assurance that 
the judge’s decision is based on sound rational consideration of the merits of 
the case.252  That is, one function of written opinions in general is that they 
assure not only the public, but also the litigants for whom the decision 
impacts directly, that the judges responsible for the court’s ultimate decision 
considered the litigants’ case and reached a reasoned result based on sound 
                                                          
 244.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352; Robbins, supra note 55, at 163; see also infra note 441 
(citing examples from the Court of Appeals of brief statements in lieu of full opinions accompanying 
concurrences in the judgment).  
 245.  ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (citing B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT 
OPINIONS 223 (1977)); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 246.  Fife, supra note 12, at 172.  
 247.  Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 35 (1999)); 
accord ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 149–50 (noting that one function of a concurring opinion is 
“[t]o assure counsel and the public that the case has received careful consideration” (citing R. Dean 
Moorehead, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 821, 823 (1952))); 
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56. 
 248.  See supra note 247 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.A.  
 249.  See infra notes 250–254 and accompanying text.  
 250.  Sometimes more than one judge silently concurs in a given case.  See App. Tb. 1.  
 251.  Robbins, supra note 55, at 118, 163 (“Concurring in result without providing reasons 
undermines the judicial process and can be fundamentally unfair to litigants.”). 
 252.  Id. at 163 (“By raising the specter of arbitrariness, this unchecked decision making seems 
repugnant to the deeply rooted notions of justice and ordered liberty that due process undoubtedly 
protects.”).  Professor Robbins’ article goes so far as to argue that deciding for or against a party 
without giving even a cursory explanation could violate due process, at least when the judge casts 
a swing vote.  Id. 
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legal principles:253  “[A]s Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone once explained, 
separate opinions provide ‘some assurance to counsel and to the public that 
[the] decision has not been perfunctory, which is one of the most important 
objects of opinion writing.’”254 
In summary, critics argue that there does not appear to be any legitimate 
reason for a silent concurrence since judges voting for the ultimate result are 
supposed to explain their reasoning.  If a judge does not think their reasons 
are worth explaining, then the judge should simply join the main opinion 
rather than cast doubt on it.  Or, the judge should, at the very least, give some 
cursory explanation rather than no explanation at all.255   
D.  Potential Reasons Judges Use Silent Concurrences 
In his article Silent Concurrences, Associate Professor of Political 
Science at Utah State University Greg Goelzhauser examined “the private 
papers of several” Supreme Court Justices from the Burger Court to try to 
explain why a judge might silently concur.256  He found that a silent 
concurrence might be due to any one of the following: “time constraints, 
perceptions about case importance or the importance of a prospective 
concurring opinion, vote switching, uncertainty about the proper disposition 
or legal rule, a desire to maintain a consistent voting record and withhold 
support for disfavored precedents, and bargaining failures over opinion 
language and scope.”257 
Appellate judges write separate opinions “on [their] own time,” on top 
of their mandatory workload, so limited time could lead an appellate judge to 
concur silently if the judge believes the case, or their issue with the opinion, 
                                                          
 253.  BLACK, supra note 8, at 4–6; Robbins, supra note 55, at 163–64; see supra note 247. 
 254.  Fife, supra note 12, at 172 (quoting Harlan F. Stone, Dissenting Opinions are not Without 
Value, 26 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 78, 78 (1942)).  But see Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have 
Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 514–
25 (2015) (explaining the potential downsides of separate opinions, including that too many may 
actually decrease rather than increase the public’s confidence in the legitimacy of a court).  
 255.  See supra note 241 and accompanying text.  
 256.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 353.  
 257.  Id. at 357–58; accord Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1127 (Cal. 1995) 
(“[A silent concurrence] is equivocal.  ‘It could mean that the concurring justice does not agree with 
the principles; or that [the justice] agrees with the principles or some of them but not with the manner 
of their statement or the reasoning or authorities set forth in support of them; or that [the justice] 
neither agrees nor disagrees but wishes to stay aloof and keep himself [or herself] intellectually free 
to examine the question anew at some later date (perhaps as the author of an opinion); or that [the 
justice] objects to something in the opinion—a quotation, reliance on an authority that is anathema 
to him [or her], humor or satire, or castigation of a litigant or counsel—and withholds his [or her] 
signature because the author would not take it out.’” (second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations 
in original) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); see 
also infra note 401 (providing another potential reason for silent concurrences suggested by Judge 
Richard Posner that did not warrant full discussion in this Section, while explaining why that reason 
does not negate this Comment’s argument).  
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is not important enough to warrant the time expenditure.258  For example, 
Justice Blackmun once told Justice O’Connor, via notes on her draft, that he 
took issue with a single footnote259 in her majority opinion in Engle v. 
Isaac.260  Justice O’Connor indicated in her response that she would not be 
deleting the footnote and urged Justice Blackmun to join the opinion and note 
his concerns separately.261  Justice Blackmun responded asking Justice 
O’Connor to simply put at the end of her next draft “Justice Blackmun 
concurs in the result.”262  Professor Goelzhauser supposes that it is 
“plausible” that Justice Blackmun simply found “it too tedious” to write even 
a perfunctory opinion about his disagreement with one footnote.263 
Judges may also switch their votes multiple times during the 
deliberation process, ultimately deciding that they are so uncertain that they 
do not think it is prudent to go so far as to dissent, but nonetheless do not 
want to give their support to the main opinion, nor are they confident enough 
about what the best rule should be to author a separate opinion.264  Time 
                                                          
 258.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 358 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing 
Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 142 (1990)); accord Robbins, supra note 55, at 160 & n.11 
(“One reason that judges might [concur silently] is that their dockets are large and 
unmanageable. . . .   In short, over-worked judges may be using [silent concurrences] simply as a 
technique to avoid spending time articulating disagreement with the majority’s or plurality’s 
rationale.”). 
 259.  Justice Blackmun also took issue with the language on one page, although in subsequent 
correspondences with Justice O’Connor, he said his main concern was with footnote 32.  
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359.  The sentence to which the footnote is attached explains that a 
writ of habeas corpus “undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation,” and the footnote 
states:  
Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this absence of finality also frustrates 
deterrence and rehabilitation.  Deterrence depends upon the expectation that ‘one 
violating the law will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just 
punishment.’  Rehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant realize that ‘he is 
justly subject to sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation.’  
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 & n.32 (1982) (first citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal 
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV 441, 452 (1963); then citing 
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 142, 146 (1970)). 
 260.  456 U.S. 107 (1982) (reversing the Sixth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief to several state 
prisoners because they had not raised their constitutional claims properly at the state level, holding 
that prisoners must show “cause” and “actual prejudice” to overcome such procedural defaults); 
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 358–59.  
 261.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359.  That is, Justice O’Connor asked that Justice Blackmun 
issue a regular concurrence.  Id.; see supra note 10 (explaining the difference between a special 
concurrence and a regular concurrence).  
 262.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359 (quoting Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Sandra Day 
O’Connor, No. 80-1430 (Mar. 12, 1982), 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/80-1430.pdf). 
 263.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359.  But see infra text accompanying notes 460–463 
(arguing that Professor Goelzhauser’s explanation is dubious).  In addition to the disagreement 
between Justices O’Connor and Blackmun being an example where time pressures could have been 
a factor, it is also an example of “bargaining failures over opinion language and scope.”  See 
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 353, 357–58, 373–74.  
 264.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 363–68.  
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pressures can also be a factor in such situations, especially near the end of a 
term.265  Additionally, even if a judge does not switch votes during the 
process, it is possible that a judge might “hedge” their bets with a silent 
concurrence when they are simply puzzled by what the proper rule should be 
and are unpersuaded by the majority opinion.266 
 Issuing a silent concurrence due to general uncertainty is odd, though, 
considering there is a less ambiguous mechanism by which a judge can 
express amorphous doubts about the majority opinion.267  A judge can join 
the majority opinion dubitante, or author a “dubitante opinion.”268  While 
joining dubitante is rare,269 it signifies that a judge has some doubts about 
whether the majority opinion is correct but is not prepared to declare it is 
wrong or refuse to join it. 270  If the judge would prefer to explain their doubts 
rather than simply join dubitante, the judge can instead write a dubitante 
opinion.271  A dubitante opinion functions as a middle ground between a 
concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion.272  The judge is not claiming 
the main opinion is wrong, the judge is just noting general doubts they have 
about whether it is right.273  Essentially, “these opinions can serve as a signal 
to lawyers that a better, but not yet conceived, legal argument may exist.”274  
Furthermore, “[d]ubitante opinions can also be brief and do not connote a 
high level of disagreement with fellow judges.”275  Thus, whether a judge 
joins the main opinion dubitante or instead issues a dubitante opinion, the 
judge is still officially supporting the majority opinion, unlike with a silent 
concurrence.276 
                                                          
 265.  Id. at 360–62.  
 266.  Id. at 367.  
 267.  See id. (explaining that judges can also express uncertainty by writing a dubitante opinion). 
 268.  Jason J. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1, 1–5 (2006).  
 269.  As of 2006, the term dubitante had only been used in 626 opinions in in the United States.  
Id. at 1–2.  Interestingly, the first appearance of the word dubitante in a court opinion in the United 
States was a Maryland case.  Id. (citing Fulton v. Wood, 3 H & McH. 99, 100 (Md. 1792)). 
 270.  Id. at 1–5 (explaining the meaning of dubitante mainly in the context of dubitante 
opinions); id. at 5 (“[A] judge can [also] join a majority opinion dubitante without a writing.”). 
 271.  Id. at 1–5. 
 272.  Id. at 4 (“The term dubitante can best be seen as a level of agreement between fully joining 
the majority opinion and a concurrence.”); see id. at 2 (“A dubitante (pronounced d[y]oo-bi-tan-
tee) opinion indicates that ‘the judge doubted a legal point but was unwilling to state that it was 
wrong.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 515 (7th ed. 1999))).   
 273.  Id. at 4 (citing as examples Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 358 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(Easterbrook, J., dubitante); Kartell, v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1195 (1st Cir. 
1979) (Coffin, J., dubitante); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(Friendly, J., dubitante)).  
 274.  Id. at 5.  
 275.  Id. 
 276. Id. at 4 (“[T]he [dubitante] judge can be seen as agreeing with the rationale in the majority 
opinion, but having reservations about the very same rationale.”); id. at 6 (“While issuance of a 
dubitante opinion by a judge expresses reservations with the majority's holding, the dubitante 
opinion nevertheless, by design, also indicates a judge’s (possibly reluctant) agreement with the 
majority's rationale.  Thus, an opinion issued dubitante should be considered to represent a vote 
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Justice Burger apparently considered at least one of his silent 
concurrences to be akin to voting dubitante, although if not for the records of 
his letters, no one would ever know that vague doubts were why he concurred 
silently in that case.277  A more transparent example of a concurrence 
functioning as a dubitante vote is Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Cudahy’s 
regular278 concurrence in World Outreach Conference Center v. City of 
Chicago,279 which reads in its entirety: “Cudahy, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
Unfortunately; and I think the opinion must be stamped with a large 
‘MAYBE.’”280  Commentators noted that, technically, the concurrence 
expressed the same meaning as having had the word dubitante next to Judge 
Cudahy’s name instead of “concurring.”281 
Similar to having ill-defined doubts, a judge just might not be ready to 
establish law on a certain point.282  The judge might think it is best to 
withhold support for an opinion setting a particular precedent, but not to vote 
against the result.283  The judge may prefer to have more than the factual 
scenario at hand to base a definitive rule on, i.e. the judge would like to wait 
for more cases to come along with other facts before settling on a binding 
rule.284  Preferring no precedent at all could be the reason a judge decides to 
                                                          
with the majority and does become binding precedent (i.e., not a plurality) where the dubitante 
opinion is the deciding vote.”); supra Section I.B.3 (explaining that a swing-vote silent concurrence 
prevents a precedential majority and results in a plurality decision). 
 277.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 367 (“[T]he best I can do is join the judgment.  In that 
‘dubitante’ status!, I am more comfortable joining only the judgment.” (quoting Letter from Warren 
E. Burger to William J. Brennan, No. 78-740 (Nov. 19, 1979) 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/78-740.pdf)).  This was in 
reference to the majority opinion in Andrus v. Allard, 441 U.S. 51 (1979). Id.  Professor Goelzhauser 
also notes that without access to a judge or judges’ private information, “[the use of a silent 
concurrence in a given instance] cannot be explained . . . .   [As] ‘the Justice has not revealed why 
he or she is concurring, one is left to speculate regarding the possible reason.’” Id. at 357 (quoting 
PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 19 (2010)).  
 278.  See supra note 10 (explaining that a silent concurrence is just a “special” concurrence (i.e. 
a concurrence in the judgment only) without opinion, while a regular concurrence is when a judge 
does not refuse to join the main opinion but simply chooses to also write separately, which means a 
regular concurrence necessarily could never be “silent”).  
 279.  787 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015).  
 280.  Id. at 845 (Cudahy, J., concurring).  
 281.  David Lat, The Greatest Concurrence Ever? Maybe False, ABOVE THE LAW (July 2, 
2015), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/06/the-greatest-concurrence-ever-maybe/?rf=1; Debra 
Cassens Weiss, 7th Circuit Judge Writes One-Sentence ‘Maybe’ Concurrence; Was it a ‘Dubitante’ 
Opinion?, AM. BAR ASS’N  J. (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/7th_circuit_judge_writes_one_sentence_maybe_concurr
ence_was_it_a_dubitante; see also supra note 271 (providing the legal definition of dubitante).  
 282.  Cappalli, supra note 13, at 355 (“The ‘silent concurrence’ may mean: ‘I am thinking, but I 
am not ready to establish law.’”). 
 283.  Id.   
 284.  Id.; see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 
(2006) (describing a principle Professor Sunstein dubs “Burkean minimalism,” explaining that 
“Burkean minimalists believe that constitutional principles must be built incrementally and by 
analogy, with close reference to long-standing practices”).  The author highly recommends the 
Burkean Minimalism article for anyone interested in a thorough discussion of competing 
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withhold their crucial swing vote and cause a plurality decision, thereby 
thwarting the precedent that would have otherwise been set.285  Similarly, a 
judge might believe a rule is too broad to make for a prudent precedent at that 
time, or believe the language used to explain the rule is too ambiguous or 
problematic.286  Of course, this is all still just a deductive guess based on 
situations where it seemed reasonable to some commentators that this could 
have been why a swing-vote judge silently concurred.287 
A judge may also concur silently when they dissented in a previous case 
and the same issue arises in a new case.288  The judge might prefer to adhere 
to stare decisis by acknowledging that precedent dictates a certain result, i.e. 
vote for a result that the judge’s preferred rule would not have reached.289  
Still, though, the judge might want to concur in the judgment only rather than 
lend their name in support of a rule the judge previously explained they think 
is incorrect, or maybe even that the judge detests.290  The judge does not write 
separately, then, because the judge does not have any alternative legal rules 
to offer that would reach the same result, as the judge’s preferred alternative 
would actually reach a different result.291  The judge is only voting for the 
result out of respect for precedent.292  The judge could of course issue another 
dissent instead, but it is possible the judge does not wish to fight the same 
battle again and would simply rather vote in accordance with precedent, at 
least as it pertains to the result, while maintaining their distaste for the rule 
itself.293 
Alexander I. Platt argues that silent concurrences can be a legitimate 
judicial technique because judges have limited time, and a judge may need to 
save time by not writing an opinion in one case so the judge can spend more 
time on another, presumably more consequential case.294  Platt compares a 
judge concurring silently to a federal court refusing to decide certain issues 
in a case, the Supreme Court denying a petition for certiorari, or a court 
issuing an unpublished (non-precedential) opinion.295  In those situations, a 
court is not necessarily explaining the reasoning behind its decision, but is 
                                                          
philosophies that often underlie judicial decisionmaking and how judges might find compromises 
that allow for a majority opinion when a court is divided.  
 285.  Cappalli, supra note 13, at 355–56; Robbins, supra note 55, at 161.   
 286.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 372–78.  But see supra text accompanying notes 61–62 
(giving an example where a disagreement over language that led to a silent concurrence seemed 
inconsequential from a legal standpoint). 
 287.  See, e.g., Cappalli, supra note 13, at 355–56; see also supra note 277 and accompanying 
text.   
 288.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 368–72. 
 289.  Id.  
 290.  Id.  
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id.  
 294.  Platt, supra note 4, at 143, 149–62.  
 295.  Id. at 151–54, 158, 160–62. 
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just using its discretion to efficiently manage the limited judicial resources 
available.296  Platt argues that because courts must selectively focus their 
attention on cases and issues that are the most efficient expenditure of time, 
criticisms of the silent concurrence are “overstated,” as it is just one of several 
“negative agenda-setting” techniques that are necessary to cope with the 
reality of limited judicial resources.297  Platt takes the time-saving 
explanations described previously and goes so far as to affirmatively argue 
that this is a legitimate reason to issue a silent concurrence: 
Silent concurrences ought to be evaluated alongside other 
instruments of negative judicial agenda-setting.  A federal 
appellate judge with doubts about an opinion by a colleague 
(particularly an opinion that has already attracted a [majority] vote) 
may dispense with the otherwise time-consuming process of trying 
to resolve those doubts while drafting a concurring or dissenting 
opinion, and instead issue a silent concurrence.  This leaves the 
doubting judge with surplus time to allocate to other opinions.298 
Platt’s argument is based on his examination of federal courts of 
appeals, where he found data showing a correlation between silent 
concurrences and workload.299  That correlation bolstered his hypothesis that 
silent concurrences are mainly used as a “negative agenda-setting” technique, 
i.e. as a way for judges to choose what cases not to spend time on so that they 
can use their time more efficiently.300   
So far, all of these potential explanations have related to some 
substantive disagreement or issue with the main opinion itself,301 but judges 
can also have reasons for refusing to sign opinions authored by a particular 
judge that are unrelated to any substantive issues with those opinions.302  As 
Judge McDonald implies in the quote that opens this Comment, a silently 
concurring judge may very well have no substantive reason for refusing to 
join the main opinion.303  For example, former Supreme Court Justice 
McReynolds, who was openly anti-Semitic, refused to join any opinion 
Justice Brandeis, who was Jewish, authored.304  Also, as suggested by 
                                                          
 296.  Id. at 143, 149–62. 
 297.  Id. at 142, 162. 
 298.  Id. at 154.   
 299.  Id. at 142, 155. 
 300.  Id.  The data for silent concurrences in Maryland, however,  show no such correlation.  See 
infra Sections I.E.1, II.C; see also App. Tb. 1. 
 301.  But see supra text accompanying notes 61–62 (giving an example where a disagreement 
over language that led to a silent concurrence seemed inconsequential from a legal standpoint).  
 302.  See infra notes 303–305 and accompanying text. 
 303.  State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in 
judgment only). (“When a judge on [the Court of Appeals] concurs in the judgment only, it is helpful 
to explain why.  Then the reader knows whether there is a substantive reason for that judge’s 
reticence and can assess whether that reason has any merit.” (emphasis added)). 
 304.  John Fox, Biographies of the Robes: James Clark McReynolds, THIRTEEN, 
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/capitalism/robes_mcreynolds.html.  
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Bernard E. Witkin in the Manual of Appellate Court Opinions, and quoted 
by the California Supreme Court, a judge may silently concur because they 
prefer to remain “intellectually free” to author an opinion themselves that 
addresses the same legal question in the future.305 
Again, the potential explanations for silent concurrences are educated 
guesses based on the surrounding circumstances and whatever private 
information may be available, since a silent concurrence, by definition, tells 
us nothing.306  Thus, one can do nothing more than speculate as to whether 
something other than substantive legal disagreements may be the reason a 
judge silently concurred, at least where there is some reasonable basis for 
such speculation.307  While Justice McReynolds “made no secret” of why he 
refused to join Justice Brandeis’s opinions,308 there could, of course, be 
situations where a judge silently concurs and one can only reasonably guess 
that, perhaps, the judge’s reasons for doing so were not necessarily 
substantive disagreement with the legal reasoning of the main opinion.309  
While the author believes that speculation in the absence of authority is 
generally ill-advised, silent concurrences compel one to speculate based on 
whatever other information is available, since there is no opinion to 
consider.310  For example, this Comment posits that it is not unreasonable to 
suppose Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge William B. Traxler might 
have silently concurred in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump 
because Judge Traxler did not want to be the lone conservative judge to join 
an opinion otherwise joined exclusively by the liberal judges in a high-
profile, politically sensitive, en banc case.311  In the absence of a separate 
opinion explaining why he refused to join the main opinion, one might 
speculate that Judge Traxler concurred in the result because he agreed with 
the majority, but refused to join the majority opinion because Judge Traxler 
did not want the opinion to read “Chief Judge Gregory authored the majority 
opinion, joined by Judges Motz, King, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, Harris, and 
Traxler.”312 
                                                          
 305.  Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1127 (Cal. 1995); see supra note 257 
(providing a longer quotation from this portion of Amwest Sur. Ins. Co.). 
 306.  Czarnezki, supra note 268, at 5. 
 307.  Id.  
 308.  James C. McReynolds, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/james_c_mcreynolds 
(“McReynolds made no secret of his anti-Semitism by refusing to speak to fellow justices Louis 
Brandeis and Benjamin Cardozo.”); see supra note 304 and accompanying text.  
 309.  See infra note 310.  
 310.  Czarnezki, supra note 268, at 5.  The fact that silent concurrences compel guesswork and 
speculation is perhaps one more reason, in addition to those discussed supra in Section I.C., to be 
critical of silent concurrences. 
 311.  See supra text accompanying notes 63–70 (discussing Judge Traxler’s concurrence in 
International Refugee in more detail).  
 312.  See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining how a silent concurrence tells 
us nothing more than that a judge refused to join the main opinion, meaning one can only speculate 
as to why they refused).  
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E.  The Silent Concurrence in Maryland: Silent Concurrences from 
1990 to Present 
Having discussed the criticisms of, and potential reasons for, silent 
concurrences, this Section focuses on the use of silent concurrences in 
Maryland from January 1, 1990, to August 31, 2019.  Section I.E.1 discusses 
noteworthy trends from the 175 cases with a silent concurrence during that 
period.  Section I.E.2 discusses the five cases from that set that were plurality 
decisions leaving no clear precedent. 
1.  Trends of Note 
From January 1, 1990, to August 31, 2019, there were 175 appellate 
cases in Maryland where one or more judges issued a silent concurrence.313  
Four cases were from the Court of Special Appeals, and the rest were from 
the Court of Appeals.314  With the departure of Judge Greene in 2019, the 
only sitting Court of Appeals judge who has issued a silent concurrence is 
Judge Watts.315  Judge Watts issued the last ten silent concurrences,316 and in 
the first nine of those ten cases,317 Judge Hotten authored the majority 
opinion.318  While the data suggest that Court of Appeals judges over the 
years have been more likely to silently concur when certain judges write the 
main opinion, the trend with Judge Watts silently concurring when Judge 
Hotten authors the opinion is by far the strongest and most obvious.319  As 
                                                          
 313.  For all statements in this section about silent-concurrence trends in Maryland, see the two 
tables in the Appendix.  Table 1 lists all the cases in Maryland (both by the Court of Appeals and 
the Court of Special Appeals) that had a silent concurrence(s) from January 1, 1990, to August 31, 
2019.  See App. Tb. 1.  All cases in Table 1 of the Appendix were found by running the following 
Westlaw searches and manually checking the results to confirm which cases had a silent 
concurrence(s): advanced: (concur! /4 only) & DA(aft 12-31-1989 & bef 09-01-2019); advanced: 
(join! /3 judgment /2 only) & DA(aft 12-31-1989 & bef 09-01-2019); advanced: (join! /3 result /2 
only) & DA(aft 12-31-1989 & bef 09-01-2019).  It is of course possible that this did not capture 
every single silent concurrence.  Table 2 shows the number of cases decided each year by the Court 
of Appeals along with the number of silent concurrences that year.  See App. Tb. 2.  
 314.  See App. Tb. 1.  
 315.  See App. Tb. 1. 
 316.  Including one case in which Judge Watts and (retired) Judge Adkins silently concurred.  
See App. Tb. 1.  
 317.  See infra note 322. 
 318.  See App. Tb. 1.  What to make of this trend is anyone’s guess, as a silent concurrence by 
definition tells us nothing, inviting one to speculate.  See supra notes 10, 257, 277; supra text 
accompanying notes 55–59; see also supra text accompanying note 2 (suggesting that in the absence 
of explanation, one does not know why a silently concurring judge refused to join a main opinion, 
including whether that reason was “substantive”); supra text accompanying notes 61–62, 301–312 
and accompanying text (explaining that sometimes judges have reasons for refusing to join opinions 
authored by a particular judge or judges that have nothing to do with the legal reasoning of those 
opinions and providing examples); supra Section I.D. (presenting the findings of academics and 
courts that speculate on why judges issue silent concurrences in general or in a given instance).  This 
Comment further discusses this trend in the Analysis.  See infra text accompanying notes 481–487.  
 319.  See App. Tb. 1.  For example, former Chief Judge Bell issued the most silent concurrences 
(by far) during the period studied, with fifty-one.  See App. Tb. 1.  The breakdown of these fifty-
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for the four silent concurrences on the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, 
this is too small of a data set to examine for clear trends.  The only “trend” to 
speak of is that in two of the four cases, Judge Graeff silently concurred 
where Judge Moylan wrote the opinion.320  
Unlike the data Platt found supporting his hypothesis that silent 
concurrences are mainly used as a “negative agenda-setting” technique on 
the federal courts of appeals,321 there does not appear to be a similar 
correlation on the Court of Appeals based on workload, nor on time 
constraints as the term deadline approaches.322  The use of silent 
concurrences has increased over the years, with the Court of Appeals 
averaging about five per year from 1990 to 1999, about six per year from 
2000 to 2009, and about seven per year from 2010 to 2019.323  The only years 
in which the number of silent concurrences reached double digits were 2006 
(10), 2010 (18), and 2011 (13).324  
2.  Swing-Vote Silent Concurrences 
Of the 175 cases with a silent concurrence from the period studied, five 
of them are swing-vote situations resulting in a plurality decision, i.e. no clear 
precedent.325  Each case and the uncertainty resulting from it are discussed 
below. 
In Bible v. State,326 the Court of Appeals reversed a Court of Special 
Appeals decision, which reversed the convictions of a defendant convicted 
                                                          
one by the author of the majority opinion is: Raker (11), Harrell (10), J. Murphy (6), Karwacki (4), 
Wilner (3), Barbera (3), Battaglia (3), R. Murphy (3), Adkins (2), Cathell (2), Chasanow (2), Greene 
(1), Rodowsky (1).  See App. Tb. 1.  
 320.  See App. Tb. 1. 
 321.  See supra text accompanying notes 294–300 (explaining that correlations with workload 
and term deadlines indicated that federal circuit judges use silent concurrences to save time so they 
can focus on writing opinions in more consequential cases).  
 322.  See App. Tbs. 1–2.  The Court of Appeals did not even have a term deadline until 2014 
when Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera instituted one.  Michael Wein, Maryland Court of Appeals 
to Follow SCOTUS Policy of Deciding Argued Cases by Term’s End, MD. APP. BLOG (Oct. 11, 
2013), https://mdappblog.com/2013/10/11/maryland-court-of-appeals-to-follow-scotus-policy-of-
deciding-argued-cases-by-terms-end/.  Before that, decisions could, and sometimes did, come years 
after a case was argued.  Id.  Since 2014, though, the court has been required to decide cases argued 
between September and June by August 31.  Id.  The rate of silent concurrences on the court has 
not increased since this deadline was established (any more than it was already increasing), nor does 
the rate increase as the deadline approaches.  See App. Tbs. 1–2.  Thus, there is no correlation to 
suggest that time pressures due to the nearing end of a term explain silent concurrences on the Court 
of Appeals.  The only potential exceptions are: (1) the most recent silent concurrence, which was 
issued by Judge Watts in a case where Judge Getty authored the majority opinion, as this case was 
decided August 29, 2019, two days before the term deadline; and (2) one of the nine silent 
concurrences Judge Watts issued when Judge Hotten wrote the majority opinion in a case that was 
also decided August 29 (2017).  See App. Tbs. 1–2. 
 323.  See App. Tb. 1. 
 324.  See App. Tb. 2.  
 325.  See supra Section I.B.  
 326.  411 Md. 138, 982 A.2d 348 (2009).  
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of third- and fourth-degree sexual offenses.327  Judges Battaglia and Eldridge 
silently concurred.328  The lead opinion’s reasoning was that the State had 
failed to produce evidence proving the defendant touched the victim’s 
buttocks “for the purposes of sexual gratification or arousal.”329  The dissent 
argued that the buttocks are an “intimate area,” meaning additional evidence 
of purpose was not required, as purpose could be inferred from context.330  
Judges Battaglia and Eldridge’s silent concurrences mean it is unsettled 
whether the State can convict someone of those sexual offenses based solely 
on evidence that the defendant touched the victim’s buttocks or whether the 
State must present additional evidence that the defendant touched the 
victim’s buttocks “for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal.”331 
In Agurs v. State,332 Judge Battaglia silently concurred in a plurality 
decision that reversed a conviction because the police officer’s use of a 
deficient warrant did not meet the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule, and thus the evidence from that search should have been suppressed.333  
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Murphy, in an opinion joined 
by Judge Adkins (who also joined Chief Judge Barbera’s dissenting opinion), 
explained that he believed the case was so “close” that remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on the good faith issue alone was appropriate, even 
though this had never been done before.334  The dissenting opinion by Chief 
Judge Barbera argued that “[u]nless and until” the Court of Appeals 
recognizes both that (1) there is an exclusionary rule under article 26 of the 
Maryland declaration of rights and (2) this exclusionary rule does not 
recognize the “good faith” exception, facts like those in Agurs require finding 
the good faith exception applies.335  Therefore, because Judge Battaglia 
silently concurred, the issues left unanswered by this case are: (1) whether 
remand for a good faith hearing is appropriate (or possible) in a “close” case, 
and (2) whether there is an exclusionary rule under article 26 of the Maryland 
declaration of rights.336 
In Smith v. County Commissioners of Kent County,337 Judge Battaglia 
silently concurred.338  The court vacated the Court of Special Appeals 
judgment and remanded the case on procedural grounds to the Court of 
Special Appeals, “with directions [that the Court of Special Appeals] dismiss 
                                                          
 327.  Id. at 138, 143, 160, 982 A.2d at 348, 351, 361. 
 328.  Id. at 161, 982 A.2d at 348. 
 329.  Id. at 160, 982 A.2d at 360–61.  
 330.  Id. at 161–62, 982 A.2d at 361–62 (Harrell, J., dissenting).  
 331.  Id. at 138, 143, 160, 982 A.2d at 348, 351, 361 (plurality opinion).  
 332.  415 Md. 62, 998 A.2d 868 (2010).  
 333.  Id. at 66, 99, 998 A.2d at 870, 890.  
 334.  Id. at 99–102, 998 A.2d at 890–91 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 335.  Id. at 102–13, 998 A.2d at 891–98 (Barbera, J., dissenting).  
 336.  See supra notes 332–335. 
 337.  418 Md. 692, 18 A.3d 16 (2011).  
 338.  Id. at 720, 18 A.3d at 32 (stating that Battaglia, J., “join[ed] in the judgment only”). 
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the appeal, vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Kent County, and 
remand the case to the circuit court with directions that it dismiss petitioners’ 
petition for judicial review.” 339  The plurality opinion explained this was 
proper because the case “raise[d] more questions than may (or should) be 
answered on its record and briefs.”340  Judge Adkins’ dissenting opinion, 
joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judge Greene, argued that “[t]he appropriate 
disposition of a prematurely filed review action depends, at least in part, on 
the reason that action is premature.”341  The dissent further argued that in 
situations like Smith, where the reason the action is premature is “not because 
of a jurisdictional defect,” but because the petitioner has not exhausted other 
available administrative remedies, a stay of judicial review, rather than 
dismissal, is appropriate.342  Therefore, Judge Battaglia’s silent concurrence 
makes it unclear whether in similar situations a dismissal is necessarily the 
right outcome as opposed to a stay of judicial review.343 
In Barnes v. State,344 Judge Greene silently concurred.345  The plurality 
opinion held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 4-345(a)346 
should be dismissed as moot if the sentence has been served.347  Both 
dissenters argued the case should not have been dismissed as moot.348  
Therefore, Judge Greene’s silent concurrence makes it unclear from this case 
whether there is a strict delineation between motions to correct an illegal 
sentence and equitable writs to correct an illegal sentence.349  It now remains  
unclear whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 4-345(a) is 
proper after the defendant’s prison term has ended, or whether the defendant 
must instead file a post-conviction action or seek a declaratory judgment.350  
In State v. Bircher,351 Judge Harrell silently concurred.352  Bircher, who 
had been convicted in a criminal case, argued that a supplemental jury 
instruction given after closing arguments that introduced a new theory of the 
case was prejudicial because the defense would have made different strategic 
                                                          
 339.  Id. at 718–19, 18 A.3d at 32.  
 340.  Id. at 718–19, 18 A.3d at 32.  
 341.  Id. at 720, 18 A.3d at 32–33 (Adkins, J. dissenting).  
 342.  Id. at 720–32, 18 A.3d at 32–40.  
 343.  See supra notes 337–342. 
 344.  423 Md. 75, 31 A.3d 203 (2011).  
 345.  Id. at 88, 31 A.3d at 211 (stating that “Greene, J., join[ed] [in the] judgment only”). 
 346.  MD. R. 4-345(a) (“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”).  
 347.  Barnes, 423 Md. at 87–88, 31 A.3d at 210–11.  
 348.  Id. at 89, 31 A.3d at 211 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 89–91, 31 A.3d at 211–12 
(Eldridge, J. dissenting).  
 349.  Id. at 85–88 & n.4, n.5, 31 A.3d at 209–11 & n.4, n.5; see also Wright v. State, 2016 WL 
2944069, at *3 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 17, 2016) (noting the difficulty the court had in 
applying Barnes because of the silent concurrence); Feaster v. State, 2015 WL 9590659, at *2 n.4 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 30, 2015) (same). 
 350.  See supra note 349.   
 351.  446 Md. 458, 132 A.3d 292 (2016).  
 352.  Id. at 482, 132 A.3d at 306 (stating Harrell, J., “join[ed] in the judgment only”). 
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decisions during trial had the defense known the instruction would be 
given.353  Bircher further argued that the trial court’s allowance for additional 
closing arguments did not cure this prejudice.354  The plurality held that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the supplemental instruction 
because: (1) the instruction was generated by the evidence (and was a correct 
statement of the law) and (2) did not prejudice Bircher because (a) Bircher 
never specifically conceded anything that would have “walked into” the issue 
raised by the supplemental instruction, and (b) the trial court allowed the 
defense to make additional closing remarks.355  The dissent from Judge 
Watts,356 joined by Chief Judge Barbera and Judge Adkins, argued that 
notwithstanding any of this, a supplemental instruction can still be prejudicial 
(and was in this case), and that supplemental instructions are judged by “a 
higher standard.”357  Judge Watts explained, for example, that  
[a]lthough a group of judges may be able to determine that neither 
Bircher nor his counsel made an explicit concession [that would 
have made it so the supplemental instruction undermined Bircher’s 
legal argument], it is less clear that a jury of lay people would 
necessarily have discerned the same.358   
 Therefore, Judge Harrell’s silent concurrence makes it unclear 
from this case whether a supplemental jury instruction introducing a 
new theory of the case can ever be prejudicial to a defendant if the 
instruction is generated by the evidence (and a correct statement of the 
law), the defendant does not specifically concede anything during trial 
that directly “walk[s] into” the issue raised by the supplemental 
instruction, and the trial court allows for additional closing remarks.359 
Thus, these five cases represent instances in which silent concurrences 
left ambiguities in Maryland law that now require further litigation to 
resolve.360  Furthermore, that litigation will require litigants to try to make 
sense of these difficult-to-interpret plurality decisions rather than applying a 
clearer, more predictable rule.361 
                                                          
 353.  Id. at 477, 132 A.3d at 303.  
 354.  Id. at 478–82, 132 A.3d at 304–06.  
 355.  Id. 
 356.  Which the author believes makes an excellent point.  
 357.  Id. at 482–90, 132 A.3d at 306–11 (Watts, J., joined by Barbera, C.J., and Adkins, J., 
dissenting). 
 358.  Id. at 489, 132 A.3d at 311 (Watts, J., joined by Barbera, C.J., and Adkins, J., dissenting).  
 359.  Id. at 482–90, 132 A.3d at 304, 306–11 (Watts, J., joined by Barbera, C.J., and Adkins, J., 
dissenting).  
 360.  See infra notes 514–516 and accompanying text. 
 361.  See supra Section I.B.3; supra note 349.  
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II.  ANALYSIS 
This Analysis explains why the criticisms of silent concurrences 
outweigh their potential justifications, how the negative impacts of silent 
concurrences could be mitigated, and how to reduce their use in general.  
While commentators have offered potential explanations and justifications 
for silent concurrences, no one seems to argue that they are an ideal practice 
in their own right.362  Furthermore, commentators who are not outright critics 
of the practice mainly offer potential explanations for why judges sometime 
concur silently, presumably for scholars and appellate advocacy wonks who 
might be curious, but the commenters offer few, if any, normative judgments 
about whether these explanations are satisfactory.363  The exception is 
Alexander I. Platt, who affirmatively argues that silent concurrences are 
justifiable (i.e. excusable) insofar as limited judicial resources sometimes 
make them necessary.364  Otherwise, judgments about the practice come 
mainly from those who are critical of it.365  
Section II.A gives a brief overview of why this Comment argues we 
should generally discourage silent concurrences and question their use.  
Section II.B explains why the potential justifications for why judges concur 
silently are unsatisfactory in light of the criticisms.  These justifications are 
unsatisfactory because a judge could always explain something rather than 
nothing at all, and parties and the public have the right to expect judges to do 
so.366  Section II.C argues that (1) regardless of whether these justifications 
are valid, the data suggest they do not apply to the most recent uses of the 
silent concurrence on the Court of Appeals; and (2) swing-vote silent 
concurrences are even less defensible in Maryland because Maryland uses 
the all opinions approach to determine the precedential value of Maryland 
                                                          
 362.  See Platt, supra note 4, at 162 (stating, while defending silent concurrences, that “[s]ilent 
concurrences are surely flawed, and may impose significant costs on both the parties to an individual 
case and the legal system in general.  But any unfavorable evaluation of this technique must account 
for the persistence of parallel techniques of negative agenda-setting that seem to pose similar 
cost/benefit ratios and yet remain deeply entrenched in judicial practices”); supra notes 12–13 and 
accompanying text; supra Section I.D.   
 363.  See, e.g., Goelzhauser, supra note 4.  Professor Goelzhauser does refer to the potential 
explanations he lists as “[j]ustifications for [s]ilent [c]oncurrences”; however, he does not 
affirmatively argue that any of the potential explanations he offers are satisfactory explanations in 
light of the criticisms of silent concurrences.  Id. at 357–80.  Rather, Professor Goelzhauser lists and 
explains the potential reasons a judge might silently concur based on what he discovered examining 
the private papers of Justices who served during the Burger Court.  Id.   
 364.  See supra note 362.   
 365.  See, e.g., supra notes 13, 55, 245; infra note 497 and accompanying text.  
 366.  Put another way, the explanations offered for why a judge might silently concur are really 
just (potentially valid) reasons a judge might not wish to join the main opinion, but this still leaves 
the question of why the public, and the parties in a given case, should consider it acceptable for a 
judge who concurs only in a judgment to leave everyone guessing as to which of these possible 
reasons was the actual reason the judge refused to join the main opinion in that particular case.  See 
supra Sections I.A–C; infra Sections II.A–B.  Not to mention what led the judge to vote for the 
result at all.  See supra text accompanying notes 247–252. 
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plurality decisions.  Finally, Section II.D argues that the Court of Appeals 
should promulgate a rule that would (1) prevent a swing-vote silent 
concurrence from impacting the precedential value of a plurality decision, 
and, by extension, (2) discourage the use of silent concurrences altogether.  
Section II.D further argues that the legal community should pay more 
attention to silent concurrences and hold judges accountable for issuing them, 
thereby supporting the expectation of transparency in judicial 
decisionmaking that is central to our legal system. 
A.  Why Silent Concurrences Should Be Questioned and Discouraged 
This Section provides the basic structure of the argument that will then 
be expanded and relied upon in subsequent Sections.  The practice of issuing 
silent concurrences is generally unsound, and silent concurrences are 
particularly indefensible when they result in a plurality decision.  The reasons 
not to issue silent concurrences outweigh the potential justifications for them, 
considering that judges have better options.367 
The general expectation in our legal system is that judges who vote for 
a result explain their reasoning.368  Appellate cases are decided when the 
majority of an appellate panel votes for a particular result, and opinions are 
how those judges explain why they voted for that result.369  Opinions 
supporting the ultimate result are not only central to stare decisis but also 
provide transparency and promote institutional legitimacy.370  Usually, the 
judges responsible for the result join a single binding opinion that both 
announces the result and explains why those judges voted for that result.371  
When a judge concurs in the judgment only, that judge votes for the result, 
but does not join that opinion.372  The general assumption is that judges 
concur only in the judgment because they have alternative reasons for 
reaching the result, and we expect judges who concur only in the judgment 
to write separately.373  We expect them to write separately both to serve the 
goals of transparency and institutional legitimacy noted above, but also 
because a judge’s role is ultimately to contribute to the development of the 
law by either joining an opinion or writing separately, not to take part in 
results for reasons unstated.374 
                                                          
 367.  See infra Section II.B; see also infra Sections II.C–D; cf. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 
352, 355–56 (“[Silent concurrences are] puzzling because Justices have several low-cost 
alternatives . . . .”). 
 368.  See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; infra note 
497; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C. 
 369.  See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.  
 370.  Id.; see supra notes 240, 252; see also supra Section I.C. 
 371.  See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 372.  See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.  
 373.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 374.  See Fife, supra note 12, at 172 (explaining that Justice William J. Brennan believed judges 
have an “obligation” to explain their legal conclusions because it “serv[es] a function within the 
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Silent concurrences undermine all those principles.375  When a judge 
concurs only in a judgment without writing separately, i.e. concurs silently, 
there is no explanation for why the judge voted for that result.376  
Additionally, when a swing-vote judge concurs silently resulting in a 
plurality decision, the situation is even worse because the judge, while 
offering no explanation, stands in the way of precedent.377  In either case, no 
one really knows whether the judge had what people would consider 
legitimate reasons for refusing to join the main opinion.378  Since 
transparency is one of the reasons judges are expected to explain their votes 
by either joining or writing an opinion, it is worth questioning whether judges 
should have the unilateral power to issue a silent concurrence.379  Silent 
concurrences allow judges to refuse to join an opinion for reasons litigants 
and the public might consider questionable, unprofessional, or illegitimate.380  
For example, judges sometimes silently concur over inconsequential matters 
related to language preferences in an opinion,381 personal disagreements with 
the author of the main opinion,382 or possibly even political optics.383 
Moreover, even though judges sometimes issue silent concurrences 
when they do not substantively disagree with the main opinion, a silent 
concurrence nonetheless casts doubt on the main opinion.384  Silent 
concurrences cast doubt on the main opinion precisely because people 
incorrectly assume that judges do not refuse to join main opinions for trivial 
                                                          
judicial process similar to that served by the electoral process with regard to the political branches 
of government” (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 435 
(1985))); ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“If the disagreement is not substantial, the main opinion 
ought to be signed; if the disagreement is substantial, the reason should be stated.” (citing B.E. 
WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); supra note 52 (citing multiple 
authorities describing how judges ought to contribute to the development of the law by explaining 
why they did not join the main opinion); supra note 240 and accompanying text (explaining that 
judges have a duty to explain their votes, and that not doing so detracts from public accountability 
and institutional legitimacy (citing Robbins, supra note 55, at 161 n.16; Goelzhauser, supra note 4, 
at 355–56)); supra note 252; supra Section I.C; infra Section II.B.   
 375.  See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic statement, ‘I concur in the judgment,’ 
[without a separate opinion] has bothered many readers. . . .   It produces all the evils of a concurring 
opinion with none of its values, i.e., it casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion 
without indicating why they are wrong or questionable.” (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON 
APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); supra note 240 and accompanying text; supra notes 
251, 252; supra Section I.C; infra Section II.B. 
 376.  See supra note 10 and notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining how a silent 
concurrence tells us nothing more than that a judge refused to join the main opinion); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 2, 61–62; supra notes 301–312 and accompanying text. 
 377.  Robbins, supra note 55, at 163; see supra Section I.B.3.  
 378.  Robbins, supra note 55, at 163; see supra Section I.B.3. 
 379.  See infra Section II.B.1. 
 380.  See supra Section I.C; supra note 376.  
 381.  See supra text accompanying notes 61–62; supra note 257.   
 382.  See supra text accompanying notes 304–305. 
 383.  See supra notes 311–312. 
 384.  See supra note 375.  
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reasons.385  The assumption is that a concurrence only in the judgment means 
a judge had substantive disagreements with the legal reasoning of the main 
opinion.386  Silent concurrences, therefore, give people the impression they 
should treat the main opinion’s reasoning as suspect, because it seems as 
though a judge had some worthwhile disagreement with that opinion.387  This 
ambiguity causes litigants, courts, and academics (and law students) to puzzle 
over silent concurrences, trying to make sense of what a judge’s silence 
meant.388  In this way, silent concurrences also compel speculation based on 
trends, context, and anything else that might shed light on why a judge voted 
for a result but refused to join the main opinion.389  Of course, educated 
guesses and speculation based on trends can lead to inaccurate conclusions, 
which is why a separate opinion that renders speculation unnecessary is 
preferable.390 
The crux of this Comment’s argument against silent concurrences is that 
there is no good reason to accept the ambiguity silent concurrences cause, 
nor their potential for abuse, when a judge could instead write a brief 
statement if they are unable to write a full opinion, or just join the main 
opinion, if only dubitante.391  This Comment recognizes that time constraints 
can sometimes make it impractical for a judge to write a full separate 
opinion.392  Furthermore, sometimes a judge does not actually disagree with 
the main opinion, but has amorphous doubts, or is otherwise uncertain as to 
what the precise rule should be.393  These situations preclude writing a full 
separate opinion explaining any alternative legal reasoning for the result.394  
Time constraints and uncertainty do not justify silent concurrences, though, 
because a silent concurrence is ambiguous and could just as easily mean the 
judge does not care for the author of the main opinion’s writing style, or even 
                                                          
 385.  See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining that people tend to assume a 
silent concurrence means the judge actually disagreed with the main opinion and why they are 
incorrect to do so); see also supra text accompanying notes 2, 61–62; supra notes 9, 301–312 and 
accompanying text. 
 386.  See supra notes 9, 55–59 and accompanying text; see also Robbins, supra note 55, at 163 
(“[S]ilence indicates that the judge failed either to find common ground with his or her colleagues 
or to reach an independent basis for decision.”). 
 387.  See supra notes 2, 9–10, 55–59, 61–62, 301–312 and accompanying text; notes 257 and  
277. 
 388.  See, e.g., supra note 257 (providing a quotation from the California Supreme Court 
discussing the ambiguous nature of silent concurrences); supra note 349 (citing two cases from the 
Court of Special Appeals that struggled to interpret a plurality decision with a silent concurrence); 
supra Section I.D (discussing attempts to explain silent concurrences).  
 389.  See supra Section I.D; infra Section II.C.  
 390.  See infra text accompanying notes 460–463, 481–487; supra text accompanying notes 63–
70, 308–312. 
 391.  See infra Sections II.B–D; cf. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352, 355–56 (“[Silent 
concurrences are] puzzling because Justices have several low-cost alternatives . . . .”). 
 392.  See infra Sections II.B.1, II.D; see also supra notes 258–263 and accompanying text 
(discussing how time constraints can be a factor when a judge decides to issue a silent concurrence).  
 393.  See supra notes 264–287. 
 394.  See supra notes 264–287.  
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the author themselves.395  This ambiguity is unacceptable when the judge has 
simple, less ambiguous options than a silent concurrence, which are joining 
the main opinion anyway, concurring while at least writing a brief statement, 
or joining dubitante.396 
If a judge has disagreements that are not worth the time it would take to 
explain, or a judge has doubts they cannot articulate, one option could be to 
just join the main opinion anyway, as no opinion is perfect.397  In the event a 
judge cannot bring themselves to do that, though, a judge could still write a 
brief statement indicating something about what led the judge to vote for the 
result but refuse to join the main opinion.398  A judge can also express vague 
doubts and uncertainty by joining the main opinion dubitante, meaning the 
judge had doubts about the main opinion but was unwilling to declare it as 
wrong, as opposed to refusing to join the main opinion altogether.399  
Therefore, while this Comment stops short of making a blanket assertion that 
there can never be a legitimate reason for a silent concurrence,400 it is 
exceedingly difficult to think of one.401 
                                                          
 395.  See supra notes 55–62, 302–313 and accompanying text. 
 396.  See infra Sections II.B–D; supra note 391. 
 397.  See Cohen, supra note 254, at 514–25 (explaining the potential downsides of separate 
opinions, including that too many may actually decrease rather than increase the public’s confidence 
in the legitimacy of a court); id. at 515–16 (explaining that it is unlikely appellate panels regularly 
all agree with every single aspect of a single opinion, but single binding opinions without separate 
disagreeing ones are more efficient and legally certain); see also supra text accompanying note 245.  
 398.  See infra note 402, see also infra Section II.B.  
 399.  See supra notes 268–281 and accompanying text; infra notes 532–535 and accompanying 
text; see also infra Section II.B. 
 400.  See infra note 497 and accompanying text.  
 401.  See infra Sections II.B–D; cf. Cappalli, supra note 13, at 380 (“The ‘silent concurrence’ is 
a debilitating practice with no visible redeeming value.”).  But see Fife, supra note 12, at 172 
(explaining that Judge Richard Posner thought silent concurrences (and silent dissents) were 
indefensible until he realized they could be a way to maintain collegiality and promote legal 
certainty, as opposed to separate opinions attacking the main opinion and introducing multiple 
potential legal arguments).  In response to Judge Posner’s point, one could argue that it promotes 
collegiality and legal certainty even more if judges join the main opinion when they do not wish to 
articulate any disagreement with it.  See supra notes 378–390, 397 and accompanying text 
(explaining that judges sometimes silently concur over personal disagreements, and that silent 
concurrences cast doubt on the main opinion); infra note 402 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, 
the problem is that because silent concurrences are ambiguous, no one really knows whether a judge 
silently concurred in a given instance to maintain collegiality and promote legal certainty, or if 
instead the judge was obscuring some less “edifying” reason for voting for the result while refusing 
to join the main opinion.  Fife, supra note 12, at 172 (explaining that Judge Posner “c[a]me to realize 
that there are other, more edifying explanations” for silent concurrences such as collegiality and 
legal certainty) (alteration in original) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 174–75 (1999)); see Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten 
opinions provide a measure of public accountability. . . .   Obscuring justifications for votes may 
complicate the task of maintaining or building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))); supra Sections 
I.A, I.C; supra notes 378–390 and accompanying text; infra notes 402–404 and accompanying text; 
infra Sections II.A–D.  Nonetheless, this Comment does appreciate the fact that its author is a mere 
law student, while Judge Posner is an esteemed judge, and two other esteemed judges who are 
harshly critical of silent concurrences only go so far as to state that silent concurrences should be 
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Lastly, this Comment should not be interpreted as suggesting judges 
should write separately or join opinions dubitante whenever they have minor 
doubts or disagreements with the main opinion.402  Ideally, judges with 
relatively inconsequential concerns about a main opinion would, as they 
often do, just join the opinion anyway since their disagreement is not 
substantial.403  This Comment merely asserts that when a judge votes for the 
result but refuses to join the main opinion, remaining silent about why is an 
unsound way to proceed.404 
B.  Why Criticisms of the Silent Concurrence Outweigh Their Potential 
Justifications 
As explained in Section I.D, the substantive reasons405 a judge might 
concur silently are: (1) time constraints and perceptions about the importance 
of the case (i.e. negative agenda-setting), (2) “vote switching” and 
“uncertainty about the proper disposition or legal rule,” (3) “a desire to 
maintain a consistent voting record and withhold support for disfavored 
precedents,” and (4) “bargaining failures over opinion language and 
scope.”406  As explained in Section I.C, the criticisms boil down to that in our 
legal system, appellate judges who vote for a result are expected to be 
transparent and explain their reasoning to assure litigants and the public that 
the merits of the case were properly considered, and to contribute to the 
development of the law.407  As such, if a judge does not think their reasons 
are worth explaining, then the judge should simply join the main opinion 
rather than cast doubt on it.408  Or, the judge should, at the very least, give 
                                                          
used “sparingly.”  See infra note 497 and accompanying text.  Thus, this Comment assumes there 
are some things its author just might not know or appreciate having never been a judge, and so rather 
than argue silent concurrences can never be legitimate and must be banned altogether, this Comment 
only argues silent concurrences should be questioned and discouraged, and that their impacts on 
plurality decisions should be negated.  See infra Section II.D. 
 402.  See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“If the disagreement is not substantial, the main 
opinion ought to be signed; if the disagreement is substantial, the reason should be stated.” (citing 
B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); Cohen, supra note 254, at 
514–25 (explaining the potential downsides of frequent separate opinions—they can lessen the 
degree of collegiality among the judges on a panel, decrease judicial efficiency and legal certainty, 
and decrease the public’s confidence in the legitimacy of a court); Fife, supra note 12, at 173 (noting 
the same concerns (citing Cohen, supra note 254, at 514–25)); see also infra note 514 (suggesting 
that compromises that achieve majority opinions are preferable to frequent use of separate opinions).  
 403.  See supra notes 397, 402; infra note 497. 
 404.  See infra Sections II.B–D. 
 405.  As in reasons related to the substance of the legal analysis in the main opinion, as opposed 
to personal differences or inconsequential disagreements.  See supra text accompanying notes 61–
62; supra notes 301–312 and accompanying text (providing examples of non-substantive reasons a 
judge might silently concur).  
 406.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 357–58; see supra notes 257, 294–300 and accompanying 
text.  
 407.  See supra notes 240–254 and accompanying text. 
 408.  See supra notes 240–254 and accompanying text.  
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some cursory explanation rather than no explanation.409  The additional 
criticism levied at swing-vote silent concurrences is that a judge is 
unilaterally standing in the way of precedent, leaving ambiguities in the law 
that may adversely impact the public, while offering the public no 
explanation (i.e. written opinion) for why the judge thought this to be 
appropriate.410 
Platt’s “[l]imited [d]efense” of the silent concurrence is based solely on 
the grounds that limited judicial resources require appellate courts to use 
multiple time-saving techniques, such as issuing unpublished summary 
dispositions, declining to decide all issues in a case, and denying petitions for 
review altogether.411  Platt argues that silent concurrences are no different 
from these other time-saving techniques.412  His argument, then, does not 
consider whether the non-time related reasons a judge might silently concur 
are justifiable.413  Section II.B.1 addresses Platt’s argument, ultimately 
concluding that, even assuming arguendo that judges can have legitimate 
reasons for refusing to join a main opinion that are not worth the time it would 
take explain, (1) silent concurrences are not as legitimate as other time-saving 
techniques because they are exercised unilaterally, and (2) even if parties and 
the public must accept the reality of limited judicial resources, they still have 
the right to expect judges who vote for a result without joining the main 
opinion to give some indication of why, however brief.  Sections II.B.2 
through II.B.4 discuss, respectively, each of the remaining potential 
explanations listed above,414 ultimately concluding that these are not 
satisfactory justifications either.  
1.  Silent Concurrences Are Not as Legitimate as Other Judicial 
Time-Saving Techniques 
Harvard Fellow and Lecturer Platt argues that “any unfavorable 
evaluation of [silent concurrences] must account for the persistence of 
parallel techniques of negative agenda-setting415 that seem to pose similar 
cost/benefit ratios and yet remain deeply entrenched in judicial practices.”416  
Disagreeing with Platt’s underlying assumption that silent concurrences are 
a “parallel technique[]” to other techniques courts as a whole use to save 
                                                          
 409.  See supra note 242 and accompanying text.  
 410.  See supra notes 229–239 and accompanying text.  
 411.  See Platt, supra note 4, at 141, 160–62; supra note 362. 
 412.  See Platt, supra note 4, at 141, 160–62; supra note 362. 
 413.  See Platt, supra note 4, at 141 (defending silent concurrences only insofar as they can be 
used as a time-saving technique).  
 414.  See supra text accompanying note 406. 
 415.  By parallel techniques, Platt means techniques such as summary dispositions, unpublished 
opinions, declining to decide all issues in a case, and denying a petition for certiorari.  See Platt, 
supra note 4, at 141, 160–62; supra note 362. 
 416.  Platt, supra note 4, at 162; see supra note 362.  
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time,417 this Comment argues that the silent concurrence is not a parallel 
technique, but is in fact inherently less legitimate than these other 
techniques.418  Silent concurrences are inherently less legitimate because (1) 
silent concurrences are exercised unilaterally rather than by the court as a 
collective body, and (2) a lone judge could save time by writing a brief 
statement indicating the judge’s specific concerns rather than writing nothing 
at all.419  
Platt offers only three sentences to counter the notion that silent 
concurrences are less legitimate than other “negative agenda-setting 
practices”420 because they are exercised unilaterally: 
Critics might argue that silent concurrences are more subject to 
inappropriate use than other negative agenda-setting practices 
because they are exercised unilaterally.  But unilateralism is a 
feature, not a bug: A silent concurrence does not deprive the parties 
(or the legal system) of anything except the opinion of the single 
judge who deploys it.  The majority opinion, fully reasoned and 
published, is binding on the parties and on future panels.421 
There are three major interrelated issues with Platt’s reasoning.  First, 
Platt purports to address the argument “that silent concurrences are more 
subject to inappropriate use . . . because they are exercised unilaterally,”422 
but his argument does not address the fact that a power exercised unilaterally 
is more subject to abuse than one exercised collectively.  Platt argues instead 
that depriving litigants and the public of a lone judge’s reasoning is simply 
not that big of a concern regardless of whether the silent concurrence is more 
subject to inappropriate use.423  Thus, Platt’s argument does not address 
whether the fact that silent concurrences are more subject to inappropriate 
use makes the silent concurrence inherently less legitimate than other judicial 
time-saving techniques.  Other time-saving techniques, however, require 
multiple judges to agree to use the technique.  This prevents individual judges 
who do not want to explain themselves from exercising their will 
independently of a collective judicial decisionmaking process.424  
As an analogy, imagine the common scene in modern war movies where 
two people have to simultaneously turn two separate keys at a terminal to 
                                                          
 417.  Platt, supra note 4, at 162. 
 418.  See infra notes 420–447 and accompanying text. 
 419.  See infra notes 420–447 and accompanying text. 
 420.  Platt uses the term “negative agenda-setting practices” to mean any technique by which 
courts choose what not to spend time on so that they can efficiently focus their limited time on the 
most pressing matters, e.g., denying a petition for certiorari.  Platt, supra note 4, at 142, 154; see 
supra text accompanying note 300.   
 421.  Platt, supra note 4, at 160.  
 422.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 423.  Id.   
 424.  See supra notes 239, 252 and accompanying text.  
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launch a nuclear missile.425  Imagine further, for the sake of argument, that a 
separate terminal existed that only launched a firecracker, and only needed 
one person to turn a key.  That means one person can launch the firecracker 
without having to convince a second person there are legitimate reasons to 
do so.  If someone pointed out that one-key terminals are more subject to 
inappropriate use because one person can decide to turn their key whenever 
they want, then Platt’s argument is akin to countering that firecrackers are 
not as destructive as nuclear missiles.426  That is a fair point to make.  This 
Comment still takes issue with Platt’s suggestion that a process requiring two 
people to turn two keys can be a “parallel technique[]” to a process that only 
requires one person to turn their own key.427  Operating a two-key terminal 
is not a “parallel technique[]” to operating a one-key terminal because a 
power that requires multiple people to agree to its use is an altogether 
different sort of thing than a power one person can exercise unilaterally.   
Second, Platt’s unilaterality argument does not address swing-vote 
silent concurrences.  Platt argues that a lone silent concurrence only deprives 
the legal system and the parties of one judge’s opinion because a binding 
majority opinion still exists.428  This ignores the fact that one of the criticisms 
of the silent concurrence is that it allows a judge to unilaterally deprive the 
legal system of a binding precedent, without writing separately to explain 
why, if that judge happens to be the swing voter.429  Thus, a silent 
concurrence can deprive the public of a precedent.  Unlike a court’s collective 
decision to issue an unpublished opinion or deny certiorari, a lone judge can 
issue a silent concurrence unilaterally any time they happen to be the swing 
voter and do not want to explain their reasons.430  While a swing-vote judge 
can always unilaterally disrupt precedent by concurring in the judgment only, 
when a judge does so without writing a separate opinion, then the swing-
voter has also unilaterally deprived the legal system of any indication as to 
what the proper rule should be when the issue arises again, including any help 
with applying a Marks inquiry or similar test to extract precedent from the 
case.431   
Third, our legal system presumes judges generally explain their judicial 
decisions,432 so the fact that a silent concurrence’s unilateral nature makes it 
                                                          
 425.  See, e.g., WAR GAMES (MGM 1983). 
 426.  See supra text accompanying note 421. 
 427.  Platt, supra note 4, at 162; see supra notes 294–297, 415–420 and accompanying text.  
 428.  See supra text accompanying note 421. 
 429.  See supra text accompanying notes 229–239, 245. 
 430.  See supra Sections I.A–B. 
 431. See supra Sections I.A–B, I.E.2.  Furthermore, unlike a swing voter who concurs in the 
judgment only and writes separately, a silently concurring swing-vote judge has neglected to give 
the public any indication as to why the judge thought disrupting the establishment of precedent was 
a prudent course of action.  See supra notes 240, 252.  
 432.  See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; infra note 
497; see also supra Sections I.A., I.C. 
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more subject to inappropriate use is a concern in the abstract.433  Judges are 
generally expected to join or provide written explanations when they vote for 
a result—in large part to promote fairness and transparency—so we should 
automatically question the validity of a technique that allows judges to 
unliterally decide to vote for a result without explaining why.434  Moreover, 
since a silently concurring judge is partly responsible for the result, the losing 
party certainly has a right to expect some indication that this judge 
thoughtfully considered the case.435  Platt supposes that the parties have been 
deprived of nothing of import, when really, the losing party is deprived of 
any indication why that judge voted for that party to lose, which a litigant has 
the right to expect a judge to provide.436 
Therefore, contrary to Platt’s argument, the fact that silent concurrences 
are exercised unilaterally and are thus more subject to inappropriate use does 
in fact distinguish silent concurrences from other judicial time-saving 
techniques that require the court to act collectively.437  There is more reason 
to be critical of silent concurrences than there is to be critical of other 
negative agenda-setting techniques used by courts as a whole,438 even 
assuming, arguendo, Platt is correct that negative agenda-setting is the main 
reason judges concur silently.  
Furthermore, even if Platt is right that judges sometimes have legitimate 
reasons for withholding their name from a main opinion that are not worth 
the time it would take to write a full separate opinion, this does not explain 
why a judge could not write something rather than nothing, however brief.439  
As noted previously,440 judges can, and sometimes do, concur only in a 
judgement while writing (or authorizing the author of the main opinion to 
write) a brief statement that gives an indication of where the disagreement 
lies.441  Some, such as former Third Circuit Judge Ruggiero Aldisert and 
                                                          
 433.  See supra Sections I.A., I.C.  
 434.  See supra Sections I.A., I.C. 
 435.  See supra notes 246–254 and accompanying text.  
 436.  See supra notes 246–254 and accompanying text. 
 437.  See supra note 252; cf. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten opinions provide 
a measure of public accountability. . . .   Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task 
of maintaining or building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on 
Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))). 
 438.  See supra note 437.  
 439.  See supra note 51; notes 241–245 and accompanying text. 
 440.  See supra note 51; notes 241–245 and accompanying text.  
 441.  See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 434 Md. 209, 245, 73 A.3d 1108, 1129 (2013) (McDonald, J., 
concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion with the exception that I join in the judgment only as to the 
Confrontation Clause issue, for the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in Derr v. State, No. 
6. September Term 2010 (August 22, 2013).”); Mayor of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 
277, 916 A.2d 324, 356–57 (2007) (“Judge Raker and Judge Harrell authorize [the author of the 
majority opinion] to state that they join in the analysis and conclusion regarding immediacy in this 
opinion and, therefore join the judgment; however, they do not join the analysis or conclusion 
regarding public purpose”); Chesapeake Publ’g Corp. v. Williams, 339 Md. 285, 304, 661 A.2d 
1169, 1179 (1995) (Chasanow, Bell, and Raker, JJ., concurring in the result only) (“Judges 
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former California Supreme Court Judge B.E. Witkin, argue that if a 
disagreement does not merit explanation, then the disagreement is not 
substantial enough to justify refusing to join the main opinion in the first 
place.442  This Comment agrees, but adds that even if a disagreement is not 
substantial enough to warrant thorough explanation, the judge should either 
join the main opinion or provide some explanation.443  Consider that even if 
a judge only writes “I concur in the judgment only for reasons that are not 
substantial enough to warrant thorough explanation,” such a minimal 
statement still provides more information than a silent concurrence.  At least 
then people know that time constraints and a lack of particularly substantial 
concerns were the reasons the judge refused to join the main opinion, rather 
than having to guess whether the judge’s refusal was due to any other 
potential reason.444  This is not to imply that such a bare statement should be 
considered acceptable.  Ideally, a judge’s brief statement would touch on the 
reasons they did not want to join the main opinion.445  This type of 
transparency is the expectation in the American legal system, so judges 
should offer some explanation as to why they refused to join the main 
opinion, even if they do not write a full separate opinion.446 
Therefore, silent concurrences are not simply one more unfortunate, but 
equally valid and necessary, “negative agenda-setting” technique used by 
courts to efficiently focus limited judicial resources.447  Other techniques, like 
denying certiorari or issuing summary disposition, require a court to act 
collectively, while silent concurrences used as a time-saving technique allow 
a single judge to obscure the reasoning behind their vote whenever a judge 
                                                          
Chasanow, Bell, and Raker concur in the result only because we believe the action is barred by the 
statute of limitations.  Maryland Rule 2–101(b) should not be applied retrospectively to toll 
limitations where the time for filing the action has run years before the tolling rule was adopted by 
this Court in 1992.”); Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 383, 605 A.2d 103, 111 (1992) (“Murphy, 
C.J., and Chasanow, J., concur in the result only.  They believe that the test enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington . . . is that there must be a ‘reasonable 
probability’ that counsel’s deficient conduct affected the result.” (parallel citations omitted)); see 
supra note 51 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, there is at least one instance where there was 
a brief statement by the author of a majority opinion that stated, “[c]onsistent with their positions in 
[J.P. Delphey Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor of Frederick, 396 Md. 180, 913 A.2d 28 (2006)], Judges Cathell 
and Harrell join in the judgment only.”  River Walk Apartments v. Twigg, 396 Md. 527, 550, 914 
A.2d 770, 783 (2007).  What makes this odd is that Judges Cathell and Harrell also silently 
concurred in Delphey, so this is a somewhat more elaborate than usual silent concurrence that seems 
to point the reader to more information—but does not.  Id.; Delphey, 396 Md. at 202, 913 A.2d at 
41.   
 442.  ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (citing B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT 
OPINIONS 223 (1977)); see supra text accompanying note 245; infra text accompanying notes 532–
535. 
 443.  See supra note 441 for examples of brief statements when concurring in the judgment only. 
 444.  See supra notes 10, 257, 277; supra text accompanying notes 55–59. 
 445.  See, for example, the brief opinions quoted in note 441.  
 446.  See supra Sections I.A, I.C; see supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and 
accompanying text; infra note 497; see also supra Sections I.A., I.C. 
 447.  See Platt, supra note 4, at 142. 
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does not wish to spend even the minimal time it would take to provide a brief 
explanatory statement.448 
2.  Vote Switching/Uncertainty About the Proper Legal Rule Does 
Not Justify Silent Concurrences 
If a judge is uncertain about the proper legal rule, the judge could concur 
in the judgment only and simply state, for example, the judge is uncertain 
about the legal rule and would prefer to withhold support for the main opinion 
without having had more time, or factual scenarios, to consider.  Or, join the 
main opinion dubitante.449  The judge could explain, for example, that they 
were more persuaded by the main opinion’s result than the dissent’s, so they 
concurred in the result, but as to the legal rule, the judge is not comfortable 
lending support to one at this time.  A silent concurrence, though, leaves 
everyone guessing as to why the judge refused to join the main opinion—
even though the American legal system generally expects judges to explain 
their votes.450  Therefore, uncertainty about the proper rule might explain 
why a judge cannot write a separate opinion explaining an alternative rule, 
but it does not justify a judge explaining nothing at all. 
For example, as noted in Section I.D., especially in a plurality decision, 
one potential explanation for the silent concurrence is that “[t]he ‘silent 
concurrence’ may mean: ‘I am thinking, but I am not ready to establish 
law.’”451  The operative words here are “may mean,” i.e. no one really knows 
what a silent concurrence means in a given case, and can only guess.452  This 
is unacceptable when the judge could write something akin to “I am thinking, 
but I am not ready to establish law.”  Then, at least, people know that 
uncertainty about the proper legal rule is the reason that judge concurred only 
in the judgment in that case.  If a judge prefers not to publicly state that they 
concur only in the judgment because they are unsure what the legal rule 
should be, then the judge could always join the main opinion, if only 
dubitante.453  Furthermore, the notion that silent concurrences are justifiable 
because a judge might not want to join a main opinion for reasons they would 
                                                          
 448.  See supra notes 294–300, 412 and accompanying text.  
 449.  See supra notes 268–277 and accompanying text; infra notes 532–535 and accompanying 
text (explaining that unlike a silent concurrence, joining an opinion dubitante allows a judge to note 
uncertainty without implying, unfairly, there is something seriously wrong with the main opinion).  
 450.  See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; infra note 
497; see also supra Sections I.A., I.C.  
 451.  See Cappalli, supra note 13, at 355; see supra notes 282–287 and accompanying text. 
 452.  See supra notes 277, 282–287 and accompanying text. 
 453.  See supra notes 268–277 and accompanying text; infra notes 532–535 and accompanying 
text (explaining that unlike a silent concurrence, joining an opinion dubitante allows a judge to note 
uncertainty without implying, unduly, there is something seriously wrong with the main opinion). 
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prefer not to state publicly is at odds with the general expectation in our legal 
system that judges explain why they voted for a given result.454   
Therefore, uncertainty is not a satisfactory explanation for a silent 
concurrence.  A judge has other options besides deviating from the general 
expectation that judges explain their votes, namely: (1) noting that 
uncertainty about the proper legal rule is the reason the judge did not join the 
main opinion (and perhaps what specifically, if anything, made the judge so 
uncertain), (2) joining the main opinion anyway, or (3) joining the main 
opinion dubitante.455  The fact that judges have more preferable options than 
a silent concurrence is why the next two Sections argue the potential 
justifications those Sections address are also unsatisfactory.456  
3.  Bargaining Failures over Opinion Language and Scope Are an 
Unsatisfactory Explanation for Silent Concurrences 
If bargaining failures over language and scope are the issue, the judge 
could simply state as much.  To explain nothing at all is to leave litigants and 
the public puzzled only because the judge prefers not to publicly state that 
the judge did not join the opinion, for example, because of a concern about a 
single footnote’s language.457  Litigants and the public should not be expected 
to accept a mechanism enabling judges to vote for a result, refuse to join the 
main opinion, and decline to explain why, simply because judges might 
sometimes prefer not to explain why they are doing what they are doing.458   
Furthermore, in the example where a Supreme Court justice silently 
concurred because he disagreed with the language in a single footnote,459 
Professor Goelzhauser believes that perhaps the Justice thought it was “too 
tedious” to write even a perfunctory opinion about a single footnote.460  This 
is dubious.  It takes no time at all to write “I concur in the judgment only 
because I take issue with the language in footnote 32.”  Even though the judge 
                                                          
 454.  See supra notes 432–436 and accompanying text; supra note 437; see also supra Sections 
I.A., I.C. 
 455.  See supra Section II.A.; see also supra note 241. 
 456.  See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352 (“[Silent concurrences are] puzzling because Justices 
have several low-cost alternatives . . . .”).  
 457.  See, e.g., supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text.   
 458.  See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten opinions provide a measure of public 
accountability. . . .   Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task of maintaining or 
building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 
WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))); see also ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 149–50 (“[One function of 
a concurring opinion is] [t]o assure counsel and the public that the case has received careful 
consideration.” (citing R. Dean Moorehead, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 AM. B. ASS’N 
J. 821, 823 (1952))); Fife, supra note 12, at 172 (“[S]eparate opinions may help foster public 
confidence in the judiciary and promote institutional legitimacy. . . . ‘[S]eparate opinions help 
demonstrate that legal conclusions are the ‘product of independent and thoughtful minds.’” (quoting 
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 35 (1994))); supra text 
accompanying notes 61–62; supra Sections I.A, I.C.  
 459.  See supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text. 
 460.  Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359; see supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text.   
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is not explaining why they take issue with the footnote, at least the judge is 
only casting doubt on footnote 32, rather than the entire opinion.461  If a judge 
does not wish to admit that disagreement with some aspect of the language 
or scope of an opinion is the issue, then the judge should simply join the main 
opinion,462 as opposed to making a judicial decision for reasons the judge is 
not willing to stand by publicly and then obscuring that reason.463 
4.  A Desire to Maintain a Consistent Voting Record and Withhold 
Support for Disfavored Precedents Does Not Justify Concurring 
Silently 
Sometimes a judge might silently concur because they agree the result 
is dictated by precedent, but they dissented in the case establishing that 
precedent, so they do not want to support the rule by signing their name to 
the majority opinion.464  In this situation, however, a judge could write, “I 
concur in the judgment only because, while I concede that precedent dictates 
this result, I dissented in that precedent, and so do not wish to lend support 
to the main opinion’s exposition of a rule I disagree with.”  Since it takes 
almost no time to write this, it seems the only reason a judge concurs silently 
in this situation is that the judge prefers not to publicly state that they agree 
an opinion is legally correct, but refuse to join it, because they wish it was 
not legally correct.465  While it might be understandable that judges might 
prefer not to explain why they withheld their name from an opinion when 
they do not want people to know the reason, this is an insufficient justification 
for silent concurrences.466  Judges in the American legal system are expected 
                                                          
 461.  See supra notes 75, 384–387 and accompanying text.  
 462.  See supra note 245 and accompanying text.  
 463.  See supra Sections I.A, I.C (demonstrating that hiding reasons would be at odds with the 
general principles and assumptions upon which our system is based); supra note 458.  
 464.  See supra text accompanying notes 288–293. 
 465.  See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 368 (“In the ongoing empirical debate over the extent to 
which precedent influences judicial decision making, one of the key tests has been whether Justices 
change their voting behavior after dissenting in previous cases.  The logic behind this test is that a 
precedent becomes binding once decided and should therefore be followed in subsequent cases even 
by those who initially dissented. . . .   [S]ilent concurrences can serve as a type of middle ground 
between joining an opinion that follows the previous precedent and writing a dissenting opinion 
revisiting settled principles.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).  Another way of putting 
this is that silent concurrences enable judges to obscure the reasoning behind their vote whenever: 
(1) a judge would personally prefer the precedent were not what it is; (2) as a result of said 
preference, the judge does not want to sign opinions that properly apply that precedent; (3) the judge 
cannot bring themselves to openly suggest the result is incorrect, since the result is clearly dictated 
by law as explained in the main opinion; and (4) the judge would also prefer no one knew that 
numbers (1), (2), and (3) are why the judge nonetheless refused to join the main opinion.  But cf. 
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten opinions provide a measure of public 
accountability. . . .   Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task of maintaining or 
building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 
WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))).  
 466.  See supra note 465.  
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to explain their judicial decisions precisely because transparency in judicial 
decisionmaking is one of our system’s ideals.467 
C.  The Justifications for Silent Concurrences Do Not Seem to Apply to 
the Use of Silent Concurrences in Maryland 
Without access to judges’ private information, the potential explanation 
for silent concurrences that can most confidently be assessed is whether their 
use correlates with workload, i.e. whether time constraints are a likely 
explanation.468  Time constraints do not appear to be a likely explanation for 
silent concurrences in Maryland.469  Unlike Platt’s analysis of federal 
courts,470 the most recent silent concurrences in Maryland do not correlate 
with term deadlines or caseloads.471  The only clear trend that stands out from 
the data is that nine of the last ten silent concurrences were issued by Judge 
Watts in cases where Judge Hotten wrote the majority opinion.472 
In Maryland, there is no discernable trend based on the number of cases, 
nor the approaching end of a term.473  Also, the use of silent concurrences 
was increasing in Maryland even before Chief Judge Barbera instituted the 
term deadline in 2014.474  Therefore, even if one agrees with the argument 
that silent concurrences are a legitimate “negative agenda-setting” 
technique,475 the Court of Appeals of Maryland does not appear to use silent 
concurrences mainly, if at all, as a “negative agenda-setting” technique.476  
Furthermore, it is important to note that federal circuit courts, which 
may use silent concurrences as a “negative agenda-setting” technique, do not 
have the same control over their workload that a court of last resort, like the 
Court of Appeals, does.477  The Court of Appeals can control its workload by 
denying petitions for certiorari,478 while federal circuit courts must review 
appeals of final decisions by federal district courts.479  Therefore, even if one 
                                                          
 467.  See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277and accompanying text; infra note 
497; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C.  
 468.  See supra note 277; supra note 300 and accompanying text.  The assertion that time 
constraints can be more confidently assessed than other possibilities means that a correlation based 
on workload and deadlines would at least be hard data, rather than pure conjecture about what was 
inside a judge’s head.  
 469.  See App. Tbs. 1–2 (showing that silent concurrences in Maryland from 1990 to 2019 did 
not correlate with workload or the nearing end of a term). 
 470.  See supra text accompanying notes 294–300.   
 471.  See App. Tbs. 1–2.  But see supra note 322 (providing two potential exceptions where a 
silent concurrence was issued two days before the term deadline).  
 472.  See notes 313–319 and accompanying text; App. Tb. 1.  
 473.  See Section I.E.1; App. Tbs. 1–2.  
 474.  See supra text accompanying note 323. 
 475.  Platt, supra note 4, at 142; see supra text accompanying note 300.   
 476.  Platt, supra note 4, at 142. 
 477.  Id.  
 478.  MD. R. 8-303(f).  
 479.  28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).  
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agrees with Platt’s argument as it pertains to federal courts of appeals, that 
argument does not necessarily extend to the Court of Appeals, which has far 
more control over its workload.480 
Since the only recent trend in the Court of Appeals is that Judge Watts 
often silently concurs when Judge Hotten authors the majority opinion,481 
some discussion of this correlation is warranted.  As noted previously, 
however, one can only speculate,482 and this Comment argues that is the real 
point.483  Judge McDonald points out that when a Court of Appeals judge 
concurs silently, no one knows “whether there [was] a substantive reason for 
that judge’s reticence.”484  Also, judges can have other reasons for refusing 
to join opinions authored by a particular judge unrelated to any substantive 
concerns with the legal reasoning of those opinions.485  Is it reasonable to 
suppose something other than substantive legal disagreement might explain 
nine silent concurrences in a row by one judge when another judge wrote the 
majority opinion?  The more pressing point is silent concurrences leave the 
public with nothing but educated guesses, compelling people to speculate 
based on trends and whatever other information is available, which may or 
may not lead to accurate conclusions.486  Such problems can be avoided by 
adhering to the general expectation that judges voting for a result offer some 
explanation for that vote.487 
Lastly, since Maryland (appears to)488 use the all opinions approach to 
determine the precedential value of Maryland plurality decisions, which 
looks to all the opinions in a plurality decision to extract individual points of 
law a majority agreed on,489 swing-vote silent concurrences are particularly 
indefensible in Maryland.490  This is because the swing judge can, instead of 
concurring silently, at least note which parts of the lead opinion they take 
issue with, which would allow precedent to be easily extracted from the rest 
                                                          
 480.  See supra text accompanying notes 477–479. 
 481.  See App. Tb. 1.  
 482.  See supra note 318 and accompanying text.  
 483.  See supra Section II.A; infra text accompanying notes 486–487. 
 484.  State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in 
judgment only) (emphasis added).  
 485.  See supra text accompanying notes 61–62; supra notes 301–312 and accompanying text.   
 486.  See supra note 310–312 and accompanying text (arguing that the fact that silent 
concurrences compel speculation because there is no official explanation is perhaps an additional 
criticism that could be levied at silent concurrences).  
 487.  See supra note 450 and accompanying text.  
 488.  See supra Section I.B.1 (explaining that while the Maryland Court of Appeals has not 
explicitly labeled its approach the “all opinions approach,” the way the court extracts precedent 
from Maryland plurality decisions appears to be identical to a technique known as the “all opinions 
approach,” a “related principle” of the Marks rule that differs in important ways).  
 489.  See supra Section I.B.1.  
 490.  See infra text accompanying notes 514–519 (explaining how the Maryland cases discussed 
in Section I.E.2 demonstrate why silently concurring in a plurality decision is problematic, while 
discussing this Comment’s suggested solution to prevent those problems). 
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of the lead opinion.491  While the judge might not offer lengthy explanations 
for why they disagree with those parts of the lead opinion or alternative rules, 
at least a future court (and litigants) could easily determine that the rest of the 
lead opinion is binding.492  They could easily determine the rest of the lead 
opinion is binding because a majority of the court (four of the seven, i.e. the 
plurality plus the judge concurring in the judgment only) agreed on 
everything in the lead opinion except those parts with which the concurring 
judge noted disagreement.493  A Maryland appellate judge who silently 
concurs when they are the swing voter, resulting in a plurality decision, is 
unilaterally disrupting the establishment of precedent and neglecting to spend 
the minimal time it takes to make the precedential value of the case 
significantly easier for future courts and litigants to determine.494 
Thus, silent concurrences are difficult to defend for a number of reasons, 
but are even more difficult to defend in Maryland specifically, because: (1) 
in Maryland, silent concurrences do not appear to be used as a “negative 
agenda-setting”495 technique (assuming arguendo that this would be 
legitimate in the first place); and (2) a swing-vote judge in Maryland can 
reduce the inherent ambiguity of a plurality decision with only a few 
sentences.496  
                                                          
 491.  See, e.g., supra note 441 and accompanying text; see supra notes 78–227 and 
accompanying text (explaining how the court extracts precedent from plurality decisions).  
 492.  Cf. supra note text accompanying note 203 (explaining that how our legal system works is 
that prior decisions are followed so that the law is more predictable and fair).  
 493.  See supra Section I.B.1 (explaining that the all opinions approach allows the Court of 
Appeals to combine opinions from their plurality decisions to find precedent where there are 
propositions that a majority of the judges could be said to have agreed on).  
 494.  See supra Section I.B.  One might make the counterargument that because Maryland uses 
the all opinions approach, supra Section I.B.1, a judge might be justified in using a silent 
concurrence if they prefer no precedent be established because they do not want to write anything 
that would allow a future court to mix their opinion with others to form precedent.  See supra Section 
I.B.2.b (explaining how the all opinions approach can combine separate opinions in a plurality 
decision to form a precedential rule even though the judges chose to write separately rather than 
help form a precedential majority).  Given that silent concurrences are generally an unsound practice 
in their own right, see supra Section II.A, that argument is more a critique of the all opinions 
approach than a justification for silent concurrences.  See supra Section I.B.2.b (critiquing 
Maryland’s use of the all opinions approach).  If the all opinions approach leads to more silent 
concurrences by discouraging judges from explaining themselves, this Comment’s response is that 
is one more reason besides the reasons presented in Section I.B.2.b to be critical of Maryland’s use 
of the all opinions approach.  Furthermore, the situation still does not justify concurring silently 
when the judge could instead just write “I concur in the judgment only for reasons I will not 
elaborate on, lest parts of my opinion later be merged with parts of other opinions to form 
precedential propositions.  See, e.g., State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 152 A.3d 687 (2017).”  See supra 
Section I.B.2.b (discussing how Falcon combined separate opinions in a plurality decision to extract 
a precedential rule).  
 495.  Platt, supra note 3, at 142. 
 496.  A concurring judge can simply note which parts of the lead opinion the judge disagrees 
with, allowing the rest of the lead opinion to remain precedential, even if there is no explanation as 
to why the concurring judge disagrees with those parts.  See supra text accompanying notes 488–
512; see also supra note 441 (providing examples of concurring judges in Maryland briefly noting 
particular points of disagreement).  
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D.  The Court of Appeals Should Promulgate a Rule that Nullifies the 
Precedential Effect of a Silent Concurrence in Plurality Decisions 
This Comment does not argue that silent concurrences should be banned 
altogether because its author is simply not prepared to suppose that there can 
never be a legitimate instance where a silent concurrence is appropriate or 
reasonable.497  Nonetheless, silent concurrences are always indefensible 
when they result in plurality decisions because the swing-vote judge is 
unilaterally disrupting the creation of precedent without offering any 
explanation, and silent concurrences are at least generally indefensible 
otherwise.498  This Comment, then, argues only for a rule that would nullify 
the effect of a silent concurrence on the precedential value of a plurality 
decision, and that would, by extension, at least discourage silent 
concurrences generally. 
While the manner in which precedent is extracted from plurality 
decisions is a matter of case law,499 the Court of Appeals could use its 
authority to create procedural rules500 to: (1) nullify the precedent-disrupting 
effect of a swing-vote silent concurrence,501 and, by extension, (2) discourage 
judges from issuing silent concurrences in general.  The rule would be 
something to the effect of:  
When an appellate judge concurs only in a judgment because the 
judge has significant substantive disagreement(s) with the legal 
reasoning of the main opinion, such a judge shall file a separate 
opinion explicitly indicating that substantive disagreement with the 
legal reasoning of the main opinion is the reason the judge did not 
join the main opinion.502 
Under this rule, a judge who notes nothing more than that they “concur 
in the judgment only” (i.e., concurs silently) does not imply any substantive 
disagreement with the rules, legal principles, or tests announced in the main 
opinion, nor any issues with the main opinion’s application of those rules, 
                                                          
 497.  Even two textbooks on opinion writing by two former appellate judges who are strong 
critics of the silent concurrence only go so far as to state that “[the silent concurrence] should be 
used sparingly.”  ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE 
COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977)); See also supra note 401 (elaborating on why this Comment stops 
short of arguing for a blanket ban on silent concurrences).  But see ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 152 
(“The second type of improper concurrence is the naked statement, ‘I concur in the result.’  This is 
the kind of thing that prompts the young to scoff, ‘Big deal!’ I scoff at the ‘concurrence in the result’ 
practice as an abomination.  What is being served?  Very little, except, perhaps—to use the 
vernacular again—an ego trip.”).   
 498.  See supra Section II.A.  
 499.  See supra Section I.B.  
 500.  MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a).  
 501.  See supra Sections I.B.3, I.E.2. 
 502.  See infra text accompanying notes 511–515 (describing how California happened upon a 
similar rule for plurality decisions via the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of a provision 
in California’s constitution requiring that decisions be in writing with reasons stated).  
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legal principles, or tests to the facts of that case.503  Since a silent concurrence 
would not imply any substantive disagreement, a silent concurrence could 
only mean a judge had some esoteric reason for refusing to join the main 
opinion unrelated to the main opinion’s legal reasoning.504  Thus, Maryland 
courts applying a plurality decision with a silent concurrence (that is decided 
after the proposed rule is promulgated) can, and in fact must, treat the lead 
opinion as binding.505  Under the suggested rule, the swing-voter’s silence 
would necessarily mean that the swing-voter substantively agreed with the 
lead opinion, i.e. that a majority of the court agreed with the law and its 
application as explained in the lead opinion.506  Practically speaking, this rule 
would make it impossible for a silent concurrence to result in a plurality 
decision at all, since there is necessarily a majority in agreement about what 
is written in a single opinion.507  Thus, a judge could no longer unilaterally 
stand in the way of precedent by “cryptic[ally]” writing nothing more than 
that they “concur in the judgment only.”508  Under the suggested rule, if a 
swing-vote judge wants to disrupt precedent, the judge has to at least write 
something. 
The suggested rule is loosely similar to the California rule, where the 
California Supreme Court held in Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson 
that because California’s Constitution requires “that the decision of an 
appellate court be in writing ‘with reasons stated,’” and that a “decision” 
requires the majority of the court, a swing-vote silent concurrence resulting 
in a plurality decision renders a decision invalid altogether.509  When there is 
a swing-vote silent concurrence, a majority of the court agreed on the result, 
but this majority did not state its reasons because there was only a lead 
opinion and a silent concurrence.510  Thus, if a swing-voter wants to concur 
in the judgment only, the judge must write separately so that a majority of 
                                                          
 503.  See supra text accompanying note 502; see, e.g., Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 373 
(describing when former Chief Justice Burger silently concurred in a case only because he preferred 
the term “plea . . . negotiations” to “plea bargain,” and the author of the majority opinion (Justice 
Blackmun) would not make the change (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 61–62; supra notes 301–312 (describing other non-legally-substantive reasons 
judges silently concur).   
 504.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 61–62; supra notes 301–312 (describing other 
non-legally-substantive reasons judges silently concur).   
 505.  See supra Sections I.A, I.B. 
 506.  See supra Sections I.A, I.B.  
 507.  See supra Sections I.A, I.B. 
 508.  See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic statement, ‘I concur in the judgment,’ 
has bothered many readers. . . .   It produces all the evils of a concurring opinion with none of its 
values; i.e., it casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion without indicating why 
they are wrong or questionable.” (emphasis added) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE 
COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); see also supra Section I.B.3. 
 509.  Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1126–28 (Cal. 1995); Robbins, supra 
note 55, at 160 (discussing California’s rule).  
 510.  Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1126–28 (Cal. 1995); Robbins, supra 
note 55, at 160 (discussing California’s rule).  
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the court has both rendered a result in writing, and, as required by California’s 
Constitution, “with reasons stated.”511  Maryland’s Constitution has no such 
provision.512 
Creating a rule that nullifies the effect of a silent concurrence in a 
plurality decision is important because it would prevent situations like the 
five cases discussed in Section I.E.2.513  These five cases, like all plurality 
decisions, represent the failure of an appellate court to reach a compromise 
that allows for a majority opinion.514  The fact that the concurrences are silent, 
however, further leaves us with no insight as to what issues the concurring 
judges had with their respective lead opinions.515  These five cases, therefore, 
represent examples of the worst case scenario, where silently concurring 
judges not only leave the public guessing as to why they refused to join the 
main opinion (as all silent concurrences do), but also disrupt the setting of a 
precedent without explaining why (via an opinion), let alone any alternative 
rules.516  Under the suggested rule, a judge who silently concurs is not 
indicating any substantive legal disagreement with the lead opinion, and so 
the lead opinion is binding.  It is a given under the rule that the silently 
concurring judge only has some esoteric reason for not joining the main 
opinion that is unrelated to the validity of the rules, principles, or tests 
announced or discussed in that opinion.  Thus, under the suggested rule,517 it 
would be impossible for a judge to disrupt precedent without any explanation, 
as a swing-vote judge has to give some explanation rather than none at all if 
the judge wishes to actually impact the precedential value of a case.518  
Furthermore, the rule would discourage judges from issuing a silent 
concurrence except in those limited instances (if they exist) where a judge is 
prepared to defend the fact that they refused to join a main opinion even 
though they did not substantively disagree with the main opinion’s reasoning. 
The suggested rule not only discourages silent concurrences generally, 
but also directly neutralizes the use of silent concurrences in situations where 
a judge uses one because the judge agrees the main opinion is legally correct, 
                                                          
 511.  Amwest Sur. Ins. Co., 906 P.2d at 1128 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14). 
 512.  See MD. CONST (containing no such provision).  
 513.  See supra Section I.B.3 (providing a concise explanation of why silent concurrences in 
plurality decisions cause problems).  
 514.  Assistant Professor at UCLA School of Law Richard Re argues that the Marks rule actually 
encourages appellate judges to refuse to compromise rather than reach consensus.  Re, supra note 
42, at 1971–75.  University of Chicago Law Professor Cass Sunstein suggests that when appellate 
panels are divided, the judge authoring the opinion could alter the opinion to make it “shallow[er]” 
or “narrow[er],” see Sunstein, supra note 284, at 362–66 (defining what Sunstein means by 
“shallower” and “narrower”), to reach consensus (i.e. secure a majority opinion), rather than 
refusing to compromise and issuing a plurality decision, see id. at 362–408. 
 515.  See supra Section I.B.3; supra notes 229–239 and accompanying text. 
 516.  See supra Section I.B.3; supra notes 229–239 and accompanying text. 
 517.  See supra text accompanying note 502. 
 518.  See supra text accompanying notes 503–504. 
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but wishes the law were different.519  Sometimes, a judge dissents in Case A, 
and then later, in Case B, Case A is the applicable precedent.520  The 
previously dissenting judge may accept that Case A is now precedent and thus 
dictates a certain result, but the judge still disagrees with Case A’s rule.521  
Such situations represent one of the potential reasons a judge might silently 
concur rather than join the main opinion.522  This Comment argues that there 
is no reason to consider such a practice acceptable when the judge can easily 
provide a simple explanation—or instead just join the main opinion, since 
Case A is the precedent regardless of what the judge prefers.523  Under the 
suggested rule, such a judge cannot use a silent concurrence to withhold 
support for the main opinion in Case B, as the silent concurrence does not 
actually indicate the judge has any substantive issues with the rules applied 
in Case B.524  Again, under the suggested rule, it is a given that a silent 
concurrence only means a judge has some unique reason for refusing to join 
the main opinion unrelated to the rules cited and applied in the main 
opinion.525 
If the judge still wants to vote for the result while indicating they have 
some real point of contention, the judge would simply need to do what judges 
normally do and are expected to do—write separately explaining why the 
judge voted for the result but refused to join the main opinion.526  For 
example, the judge could easily write, “For the reasons expressed in my 
dissent in Case A, I do not join the majority opinion.  I accept that Case A is 
now the applicable precedent and dictates the result in this case.”527  This is 
much more informative, and is in line with the general expectation that judges 
who vote for a result either join the main opinion, or write separately to 
provide some explanation for why they voted for the result.528  
Although a judge could still comply with the suggested rule by stating 
no more than, “I concur in the judgment only because I have substantive 
disagreements with the majority’s (or plurality’s) legal reasoning,” this is by 
                                                          
 519.  See supra Section II.B.4. 
 520.  See supra Section II.B.4. 
 521.  See supra Section II.B.4. 
 522.  See supra Section II.B.4. 
 523.  See supra Section II.B.4. 
 524.  See supra text accompanying notes 502–503.   
 525.  See supra text accompanying notes 502–503; see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 61–
62 (describing when former Chief Justice Burger silently concurred in a case only because he 
preferred the term “plea . . . negotiations” to “plea bargain,” and the author of the majority opinion 
(Justice Blackmun) would not make the change (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra notes 
301–312 (describing other non-legally-substantive reasons judges silently concur).   
 526.  See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; supra 
note 497; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C. 
 527.  Cf. supra note 441 (providing examples of short statements in lieu of full separate opinions, 
one of which points the reader to a previous separate opinion by that judge rather than restate the 
judge’s argument in full).  
 528.  See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; supra 
note 497; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C. 
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design.  While such an opaque statement may seem no better than a silent 
concurrence,529 a judge has to call attention to the fact they have issues with 
the main opinion they think are worth withholding their support over, but not 
worth explaining.530  This Comment posits that if judges were generally 
willing to do this so explicitly, the silent concurrence would not exist in the 
first place.  More likely, a judge would at least give some indication of what 
their concerns are, e.g., that the judge has substantive disagreements about 
the scope of the rule being announced or a particular footnote’s language.531  
Additionally, the judge could always join the main opinion dubitante, 
which allows the judge to note that they have vague doubts or concerns 
without actually withholding their support for the main opinion.532  Since the 
judge is not actually refusing to join the main opinion, there is less concern 
about the judge not explaining their doubts.533  There is less concern because 
the judge is not giving the impression they think the main opinion is wrong, 
and it is a given when joining dubitante that the judge’s concerns must not 
be very strong.534  Joining the main opinion dubitante is unlike a silent 
concurrence, where the judge does imply there is something seriously wrong 
with the main opinion, going so far as to refuse to join it, but gives no hint as 
to what is so wrong with that opinion.535  The practice of voting dubitante 
pre-dates the United States, but, interestingly, the first appearance of the word 
dubitante in a court opinion in the United States was a Maryland case.536 
Moreover, the fact that a cursory statement can satisfy the rule is part of 
the point, as there can be no accusation that the rule requires judges to spend 
time that they do not have writing lengthy opinions.537  If a judge agrees with 
                                                          
 529.  In that the judge is casting doubt on the main opinion without offering any explanation as 
to what the judge’s concerns are.  See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic statement, ‘I 
concur in the judgment,’ has bothered many readers. . . .   It produces all the evils of a concurring 
opinion with none of its values; i.e., it casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion 
without indicating why they are wrong or questionable.” (emphasis added) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, 
MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); supra notes 384–389 and accompanying 
text.  
 530.  Cf. ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“If the disagreement is not substantial, the main 
opinion ought to be signed; if the disagreement is substantial, the reason should be stated.” (quoting 
B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))). 
 531.  This can be done in a way similar to the examples cited in note 441. 
 532.  See supra text accompanying notes 268– 277 and accompanying text. 
 533.  Cf. supra notes 240–245 (explaining that a criticism of the silent concurrence is that a judge 
should explain why they did not join the main opinion).  
 534.  See supra text accompanying notes 268–275 (explaining that a judge can also issue a 
dubitante opinion noting their doubts, and that dubitante opinions are typically brief and do not 
signify substantial disagreement with the majority opinion).  
 535.  ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153; supra note 276 and accompanying text (explaining that 
whether a judge simply joins the main opinion dubitante or writes a separate dubitante opinion, the 
judge is still seen as supporting the majority opinion).  
 536.  See supra note 269. 
 537.  See supra text accompanying note 502 (the suggested rule).  Time constraints are the 
principal basis of Platt’s “limited defense” of the silent concurrence.  Platt, supra note 4; see supra 
notes 294–300 and accompanying text; see also supra Section II.B.1. 
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a result, but not the main opinion’s reasoning, and the time it would take to 
write separately could be better spent on other matters, the judge is still free 
to save time by writing only a brief statement that still gives the reader more 
information than a silent concurrence.538 
Lastly, announcing the new rule would draw attention to the existence 
of silent concurrences and make the legal community better able to hold 
judges more accountable for issuing them.  Ultimately, it is up to the legal 
community to notice silent concurrences and question their use because 
judges are less likely to issue them if they think their peers notice, and care.539  
However, lawyers, law students,540 and professors are often unfamiliar with 
silent concurrences.  Or, if they are familiar, they are unaware of the potential 
impact silent concurrences can have on precedent-setting, and that there is 
significant criticism of the practice in general.  Certainly, the general public 
was not aware of the silent-concurrence trends in Maryland noted 
previously.541  The conspicuous announcing of a new rule would make the 
legal community in general more aware of what silent concurrences are and 
that there is reason to be critical of them, which is also largely the ultimate 
aim of this Comment.  It is the legal community’s duty to uphold the 
principles and assumptions under which our legal system operates, namely 
that judges are generally expected to explain their votes, and should not take 
part in a result without giving the parties, and the public, some indication of 
the reasoning behind their vote.542 
III.CONCLUSION 
Silent concurrences are a generally unsound practice that should be 
questioned, discouraged, and officially defined as meaning only that a judge 
had some idiosyncratic reason for refusing to join a main opinion.543  Silent 
concurrences cast doubt on main opinions544 and confound the precedential 
value of plurality decisions.545  Judges, however, sometimes issue them for 
trivial reasons even when they do not substantively disagree with the main 
                                                          
 538.  See, e.g., supra note 441.  
 539.  Robbins, supra note 55, at 165.  
 540.  Including the author before stumbling upon the topic. 
 541.  See supra Section I.E.1. 
 542.  See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; supra 
notes 497, 539; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C. 
 543.  See supra Sections II.A–D. 
 544.  See supra notes 384–390; see also ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic 
statement, ‘I concur in the judgment,’ [without a separate opinion] has bothered many 
readers. . . .   It produces all the evils of a concurring opinion with none of its values; i.e., it casts 
doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion without indicating why they are wrong or 
questionable.” (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))). 
 545.  See supra Sections I.B, I.E.2.  
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opinion.546  The fact that most nonetheless assume silent concurrences 
indicate substantive disagreement causes ambiguity, confusion, and 
speculation.547  Furthermore, to promote transparency, fairness, institutional 
legitimacy, and the development of the law, our legal system expects judges 
to explain their votes through written opinions, particularly when they vote 
for the ultimate result.548  Yet a judge can unilaterally decide to issue a silent 
concurrence whenever a judge, for whatever reason, wants to vote for the 
result, not join the main opinion, and not explain why.549 
There is no reason to accept the ambiguity and confusion silent 
concurrences cause, nor their potential for inappropriate use, when judges 
who are short on time, or only have vague or relatively inconsequential 
disagreements, could either (1) write a brief statement indicating where the 
disagreement lies if a full opinion is not feasible, (2) join the main opinion 
dubitante, or (3) join the main opinion anyway despite their relatively minor 
concerns.550  In short, silent concurrences do not appear to serve any function 
so worthwhile that we should expect litigants and the public to ignore that 
silent concurrences undermine the overall principles and ideals of our legal 
system.551  Attempts to explain silent concurrences boil down to the notion 
that judges sometimes do not have enough time to write separately, or they 
cannot really articulate their concerns because they only have vague doubts 
about the main opinion or are just altogether uncertain about what the rule 
should be.552  While these guesses may sometimes be true, it also turns out 
that judges sometimes silently concur even when they do not disagree with 
the substance of the main opinion at all.553  Furthermore, in Maryland, time 
                                                          
 546.  See supra note 257; see also ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 152 (“[One] type of improper 
concurrence is the naked statement, ‘I concur in the result.’  This is the kind of thing that prompts 
the young to scoff, ‘Big deal!’  I scoff at the ‘concurrence in the result’ practice as an abomination.  
What is being served?  Very little, except, perhaps—to use the vernacular again—an ego trip.”); 
supra text accompanying notes 61–62, 301–312 (providing examples of reasons other than 
substantive disagreement that judges silently concur).  Judge McDonald, in the quotation that opens 
this Comment, explains that when a Court of Appeals judge concurs silently, no one knows “whether 
there [was] a substantive reason for that judge’s reticence.”  State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 
A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in judgment only); see supra note 2 and 
accompanying text.  
 547.  See supra text accompanying notes 385–390; supra notes 309–312, 481–487 and 
accompanying text; see also State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) 
(McDonald, J., concurring in judgment only) (implying that when a Maryland Court of Appeals 
Judge concurs silently, no one knows “whether there [was] a substantive reason for that judge’s 
reticence”); supra Section I.D (presenting numerous scholars trying to make sense of what silent 
concurrences mean). 
 548.  See supra Sections I.C, II.A–D.  
 549.  See supra Sections II.B.1–4. 
 550.  See supra Section II.A; see also supra Sections II.B–D.  
 551.  See supra Sections II.A–D; cf. Cappalli, supra note 13, at 380 (“[Silent concurrences are] 
a debilitating practice with no visible redeeming value.”).  
 552.  See supra Section I.D. 
 553.  See supra note 546.  
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constraints do not even appear to be a reasonable guess as to why judges issue 
silent concurrences.554 
Regardless, the point is we should not have to guess.555  Where time is 
a concern, a judge can write briefly, even just noting what they disagreed 
with without elaborating at length, and this is at least more in line with the 
expectations of our legal system.556  The same is true where a judge only has 
vague doubts or is simply uncertain.557  Furthermore, a judge also has the 
option of indicating general uncertainty by joining the main opinion 
dubitante, which is less ambiguous than a silent concurrence, and avoids the 
problems caused by silent concurrences.558  Better still, a judge can always 
join the main opinion in full if they cannot conjure a substantive or articulable 
point of disagreement.559  All of these options are better than refusing to join 
the opinion without explaining why, which leaves everyone confused as to 
what level of skepticism the silent concurrence should imbue on the main 
opinion, if any.560 
Therefore, not only should members of the legal community consider 
silent concurrences a generally unsound practice and question their use,561 
but the Court of Appeals should also adopt a rule that would mean, officially, 
silent concurrences do not indicate any substantive disagreement with the 
main opinion.562  If a judge has some other reason for refusing to join the 
main opinion, then, under this rule, at least people would know there was not 
a legal disagreement.563  Not only would that discourage silent concurrences 
generally, but it would also prevent swing-vote judges from using silent 
concurrences to disrupt precedent by causing a plurality decision.564  A 
swing-vote judge can still disrupt precedent if they wish, they just would have 
to do what judges normally do and are expected to do—write separately to 
explain why—as silence would not indicate they disagree with the lead 
opinion in any legal sense under the suggested rule.565  Thus, the rule would 
make silent concurrences in Maryland less ambiguous, less damaging, and 
less common.566  Reducing the frequency and impact of silent concurrences 
is worthwhile because our legal system calls for judges to explain their votes, 
                                                          
 554.  See supra Section II.C.  
 555.  See supra Sections II.A–D.  
 556.  See supra Section II.B.1; see also supra Section II.A. 
 557.  See supra Section II.B.2.  
 558.  See supra notes 268–281, 532–536 and accompanying text; see also supra Sections II.A–
D. 
 559.  See supra notes 402–404 and accompanying text; see also supra Sections II.A.–II.D. 
 560.  See supra Sections I.C, I.D, I.E.2, II.A–D. 
 561.  See supra Section II.A. 
 562.  See supra Section II.D.  
 563.  See supra Section II.D. 
 564.  See supra Section II.D. 
 565.  See supra Section II.D. 
 566.  See supra Section II.D. 
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and in the absence of a satisfactory justification for deviating from that 
principle, silence is unsound.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1.  SILENT CONCURRENCES IN MARYLAND FROM JANUARY 1, 1990, 






Ademiluyi v. Egbuonu, 466 Md. 80, 215 A.3d 329 
(2019) Aug. 29 Getty, J. Watts, J. 
Comm’r of Labor Indus. v. Whiting-Turner 
Contracting Co., 462 Md. 479, 200 A.3d 844 (2019) Jan. 23 Hotten, J. Watts, J. 
Cagle v. State, 462 Md. 67, 198 A.3d 209 (2018) Dec. 13 Hotten, J. Adkins, J., Watts, J. 
Owusu v. M.V.A, 461 Md. 687, 197 A.3d 35 (2018) Nov. 20 Hotten, J. Watts, J. 
Collins v. State, 238 Md. App. 545, 192 A.3d 920 
(2018) Aug. 30 Moylan, J. Graeff, J. 
C & B Constr., Inc. v. Dashiell, 460 Md. 272, 190 A.3d 
271 (2018) July 30 Hotten, J. Watts, J. 
Otto v. State, 459 Md. 423, 187 A.3d 47 (2018) June 21 Hotten, J. Watts, J. 
Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 179 A.3d 1006 (2018) Feb. 21 Hotten, J. Watts, J. 
Burak v. Burak, 455 Md. 564, 168 A.3d 883 (2017) 
 Aug. 29 Hotten, J. Watts, J. 
Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 164 A.3d 265 (2017) 
 July 12 Hotten, J. Watts, J. 
State v. Bey, 452 Md. 255, 156 A.3d 873 (2017) 
 Mar. 27 Hotten, J. Watts, J. 
Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 156 A.3d 940 (2017) 
 Mar. 27 Watts, J. Greene, J. 
Assateague Coastal Tr. v. Schwalbach, 448 Md. 112, 
136 A.3d 866 (2016) 
 May 23 
McDonald, 
J. Battaglia, J. 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Chanthunya, 446 
Md. 576, 133 A.3d 1034 (2016) 
 Mar. 25 Watts, J. Harrell, J. 
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Sharp v. State, 446 Md. 669, 133 A.3d 1089 (2016) 
 Mar. 25 Watts, J. Battaglia, J. 
Toms v. Calvary Assembly of God, Inc., 446 Md. 543, 
132 A.3d 866 (2016) 
 Feb. 29 Greene, J. Harrell, J. 
State v. Bircher, 446 Md. 458, 132 A.3d 292 (2016) 
 Feb. 23 
Battaglia, 
J. Harrell, J. 
Varriale v. State, 444 Md. 400, 119 A.3d 824 (2015) 
 Aug. 11 Greene, J. Watts, J. 
State v. Norton, 443 Md. 517, 117 A.3d 1055 (2015) 
 July 9 
Battaglia, 
J. Harrell, J. 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Mixter, 441 Md. 
416, 109 A.3d 1 (2015) 
 Feb. 2 
Battaglia, 
J. Harrell, J. 
Burson v. Capps, 440 Md. 328, 102 A.3d 353 (2014) 
 Oct. 23 Harrell, J. Watts, J. 
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. DCW Dutchship 
Island, LLC, 439 Md. 588, 97 A.3d 135 (2014) 
 Aug. 4 Adkins, J. Harrell, J. 
Balt. City v. Fraternal Order of Police, 439 Md. 547, 
96 A.3d 742 (2014) 
 July 29 Harrell, J. Watts, J. 
Morgan v. State, 438 Md. 11, 89 A.3d 1149 (2014) 
 Apr. 23 Adkins, J. Watts, J. 
State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 
Md. 451, 92 A.3d 400 (2014) 
 
Mar. 27 Harrell, J. Battaglia, J. 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Mahone, 435 Md. 
84, 76 A.3d 1198 (2013) 
 
Sept. 30 Bell, J. Harrell, J. 
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jayden G., 433 Md. 
50, 70 A.3d 276 (2013) 
 
July 16 Adkins, J. Bell, J., Harrell, J. 
Georgia-Pac., LLLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 69 A.3d 
1028 (2013) 
 
July 8 Wilner, J. Bell, J. 






State v. Fennell, 431 Md. 500, 66 A.3d 630 (2013) 
 May 17 Harrell, J. Battaglia, J. 
Haile v. State, 431 Md. 448, 66 A.3d 600 (2013) 
 Apr. 25 Bell, J. Raker, J. 
Bd. of Dirs. of Cameron Grove Condo., II v. State 
Comm’n on Human Res., 431 Md. 61, 63 A.3d 1064 
(2013) 
 
Mar. 28 Battaglia, J. Harrell, J. 
Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 63 A.3d 582 
(2013) 
 
Mar. 26 Harrell, J. Battaglia, J. 
Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 85, 55 A.3d 10 (2012) 
 Oct. 22 Greene, J. Battaglia, J. 
State v. Harris, 428 Md. 700, 53 A.3d 1171 (2012) 
 Sept. 27 Bell, J. Harrell, J. 
Ingram v. State, 427 Md. 717, 50 A.3d 1127 (2012) 
 Aug. 21 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 42 A.3d 27 (2012) 
 Apr. 23 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
Montgomery Pres., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Planning 
Bd., 424 Md. 367, 36 A.3d 419 (2012) 
 
Jan. 24 Adkins, J. Eldridge, J. 
Stoddard v. State, 423 Md. 420, 31 A.3d 603 (2011) 
 Nov. 3 Raker, J. Battaglia, J., Harrell, J. 
Barnes v. State, 423 Md. 75, 31 A.3d 203 (2011) 
 Oct. 27 Adkins, J. Greene, J. 
Harrod v. State, 423 Md. 24, 31 A.3d 173 (2011) 
 Oct. 27 
Battaglia, 
J. J. Murphy, J. 
Stevenson v. State, 423 Md. 42, 31 A.3d 184 (2011) 
 Oct. 27 
J. Murphy, 
J. Bell, J., Greene, J. 
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Chaden M., 422 Md. 
498, 30 A.3d 935 (2011) 
 
Oct. 25 Barbera, J. J. Murphy, J. 
Briscoe v. State, 422 Md. 384, 30 A.3d 870 (2011) 
 Oct. 24 Barbera, J. Bell, J. 






Thomas v. State, 422 Md. 67, 29 A.3d 286 (2011) 
 Sept. 22 Barbera, J. Eldridge, J. 
Miller v. State, 421 Md. 609, 28 A.3d 675 (2011) 
 Sept. 20 
J. Murphy, 
J. Harrell, J. 
Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp. v. Annapolis Towne Ctr., 
421 Md. 94, 25 A.3d 967 (2011) July 20 Adkins, J. Bell, J. 
Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 20 A.3d 765 
(2011) 
 
May 23 Adkins, J. Battaglia, J. 
In re Shirley B., 419 Md. 1, 18 A.3d 40 (2011) 
 Apr. 25 Adkins, J. Harrell, J. 
Smith v. Cty. Comm’rs of Kent Cty., 418 Md. 692, 18 
A.3d 16 (2011) 
 
Apr. 25 Harrell, J. Battaglia, J. 
Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 12 A.3d 153 (2011) 
 Jan. 24 Harrell, J. Battaglia, J. 
Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413, 10 A.3d 761 (2010) 
 Dec. 21 Greene, J. Adkins, J. 
State v. Harding, 196 Md. App. 384, 9 A.3d 547 
(2010) 
 
Dec. 10 Moylan, J. Graeff, J. 
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Cadence B., 417 Md. 
146, 9 A.3d 14 (2010) 
 
Nov. 22 Adkins, J. Harrell, J. 
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 
90, 8 A.3d 745 (2010) 
 
Nov. 22 Adkins, J. Greene, J. 
Monmouth Meadows Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Hamilton, 416 Md. 325, 7 A.3d 1 (2010) 
 
Oct. 25 Adkins, J. Battaglia, J. 
State v. Pair, 416 Md. 157, 5 A.3d 1090 (2010) 
 Oct. 7 Barbera, J. R. Murphy, J. 
State v. DiGennaro, 415 Md. 551, 3 A.3d 1201 (2010) 
 Aug. 31 
J. Murphy, 
J. Bell, J. 
Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 399, 2 A.3d 360 (2010) 
 Aug. 23 Harrell, J. 
Battaglia, J., Bell, J., 
J. Murphy, J. 






Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 248, 999 A.2d 1029 (2010) 
 July 27 Eldridge, J. Adkins, J. 
State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 999 A.2d 1050 
(2010) 
 
July 27 Battaglia, J. Harrell, J. 
Caldes v. Elm St. Dev., 415 Md. 122, 999 A.2d 956 
(2010) 
 
July 22 J. Murphy, J. Bell, J. 
Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 998 A.2d 868 (2010) 
 May 19 Greene, J. Battaglia, J. 
Prince George’s Cty. v. Brent, 414 Md. 334, 995 A.2d 
672 (2010) 
 
May 17 Rodowsky, J. J. Murphy, J. 
Smith v. State, 414 Md. 357, 995 A.2d 685 (2010) 
 May 17 Greene, J. J. Murphy, J. 
120 W. Fayette St., LLP v. Mayor of Balt., 413 Md. 
309, 992 A.2d 459 (2010) 
 
Apr. 13 Barbera, J. Battaglia, J., Bell, J. 
Henriquez v. Henriquez, 413 Md. 287, 992 A.2d 446 
(2010) 
 
Apr. 13 Battaglia, J. J. Murphy, J. 
Mirjafari v. Cohn, 412 Md. 475, 988 A.2d 997 (2010) 
 Feb. 16 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
Flanagan v. Dep’t of Human Res., 412 Md. 616, 989 
A.2d 1139 (2010) 
 
Feb. 9 Harrell, J. J. Murphy, J. 
Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45, 
985 A.2d 565 (2009) 
 
Dec. 22 Adkins, J. J. Murphy, J. 
Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 982 A.2d 348 (2009) Oct. 14 Adkins, J. Battaglia, J., Eldridge, J. 
McQuitty v. Spangler, 410 Md. 1, 976 A.2d 1020 
(2009) July 24 
Battaglia, 
J. Greene, J. 
Master Fin. Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51, 972 A.2d 
864 (2009) June 9 Wilner, J. Eldridge, J. 






Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Beatty, 409 Md. 
11, 972 A.2d 840 (2009) June 8 
J. Murphy, 
J. Bell, J. 
Decker v. State, 408 Md. 631, 971 A.2d 268 (2009) May 13 Barbera, J. Bell, J. 
Johnson v. State, 408 Md. 204, 969 A.2d 262 (2009) Apr. 8 J. Murphy, J. Bell, J. 
In re Deontay J., 408 Md. 152, 968 A.2d 1067 (2009) Apr. 7 J. Murphy, J. Bell, J. 
McDowell v. State, 407 Md. 327, 965 A.2d 877 (2009) Feb. 19 Wilner, J. Eldridge, J. 
Jones v. State, 407 Md. 33, 962 A.2d 393 (2008)  Dec. 23 Raker, J. Bell, J., Eldridge, J. 
La Belle Epoque, LLC v. Old Europe Antique Manor, 
LLC, 406 Md. 194, 958 A.2d 269 (2008) 
 
Oct. 8 Greene, J. Harrell, J., Raker, J. 
Wildwood Med. Ctr. v. Montgomery Cty., 405 Md. 
489, 954 A.2d 457 (2008) 
 
Aug. 22 per curiam Cathell, J. 
Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 935 A.2d 421 (2007) 
 Nov. 8 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
Arrington v. Dep’t of Human Res., 402 Md. 79, 935 
A.2d 432 (2007) 
 
Nov. 8 Wilner, J. Bell, J. 
Boyd v. State, 399 Md. 457, 924 A.2d 1112 (2007) 
 June 7 Eldridge, J. Cathell, J. 
Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 398 Md. 611, 
921 A.2d 799 (2007) 
 
Apr. 11 Wilner, J. Eldridge, J. 
Brown v. State, 397 Md. 89, 916 A.2d 245 (2007) 
 Feb. 7 Raker, J. Battaglia, J., Greene, J. 
River Walk Apartments, LLC v. Twigg, 396 Md. 527, 
914 A.2d 770 (2007)568 
 
Jan. 10 Battaglia, J. Cathell, J., Harrell, J. 
                                                          
 568.  Although the opinion states that “[c]onsistent with their positions in [J.P. Delphey Ltd. 
P’ship v. Mayor of Frederick, 396 Md. 180, 913 A.2d 28 (2006)], Judges Cathell and Harell join in 
the judgment only,” River Walk, 396 Md. at 550, 914 A.2d at 783, Judges Cathell and Harrell also 
silently concurred in Delphey (a month earlier), J.P. Delphey Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor of Frederick, 396 
Md. 180, 202, 913 A.2d 28, 41 (2006).  Thus, this explanation does not actually point the reader to 






J.P. Delphey Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor of Frederick, 396 
Md. 180, 913 A.2d 28 (2006) 
 
Dec. 14 Battaglia, J. Cathell, J., Harrell, J. 
Woodfield v. W. River Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 395 
Md. 377, 910 A.2d 452 (2006) 
 
Nov. 6 Wilner, J. Cathell, J. 
Mayor of Balt. v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154, 909 A.2d 683 
(2006) 
 
Oct. 19 Cathell, J. Harrell, J. 
Lowden v. Bosley, 395 Md. 58, 909 A.2d 261 (2006) 
 Oct. 17 Eldridge, J. Wilner, J. 
Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 908 A.2d 1220 (2006) 
 Oct. 12 Harrell, J. Cathell, J., Wilner, J. 
In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 906 A.2d 915 (2006) 
 Sept. 8 
Battaglia, 
J. Wilner, J. 
State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 906 A.2d 374 (2006) 
 Sept. 1 Raker, J. Bell, J. 
Garg v. Garg, 393 Md. 225, 900 A.2d 739 (2006) 
 June 8 Wilner, J. Raker, J. 
Chmurny v. State, 392 Md. 159, 896 A.2d 354 (2006) 
 Apr. 13 Wilner, J. Bell, J. 
State v. Pitt, 390 Md. 697, 891 A.2d 312 (2006) 
 Feb. 1 Bell, J. Cathell, J. 
Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 
93, 887 A.2d 1029 (2005) Dec. 12 Raker, J. Bell, J. 
Whiting v. State, 389 Md. 334, 885 A.2d 785 (2005) 
 Nov. 8 
Battaglia, 
J. Bell, J. 
Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 884 A.2d 1171 
(2005) 
 
Oct. 14 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
Wynn v. State, 388 Md. 423, 879 A.2d 1097 (2005) 
 Aug. 11 Raker, J. Bell, J. 
                                                          
any further information and means simply that Judges Cathell and Harrell were silently concurring 
in River Walk just as they did in Delphey.  Id.  






Rockwood Cas. Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Emp’rs Fund, 
385 Md. 99, 867 A.2d 1026 (2005) 
 
Feb. 8 Greene, J. Bell, J. 
Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. 606, 865 A.2d 603 
(2005) 
 
Jan. 14 Raker, J. Eldridge, J. 
Patton v. U.S. Rugby Football Union, Ltd., 381 Md. 
627, 851 A.2d 566 (2004) 
 
June 10 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
State v. Tolbert, 381 Md. 539, 850 A.2d 1192 (2004) 
 June 8 Raker, J. Bell, J. 
Richardson v. State, 381 Md. 348, 849 A.2d 487 
(2004) 
 
May 14 Bell, J. Raker, J. 
Spencer v. Md. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 
846 A.2d 341 (2004) Mar. 11 Raker, J. Bell, J. 
Wilson v. Simms, 380 Md. 206, 844 A.2d 412 (2004) Mar. 11 Battaglia, J. Raker, J. 
Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 831 A.2d 18 
(2003) Aug. 27 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
Creveling v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 376 Md. 72, 828 
A.2d 229 (2003) July 3 Raker, J. Bell, J. 
Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003) June 12 Cathell, J. Eldridge, J., Raker, J. 
Miller v. State, 151 Md. App. 235, 824 A.2d 1017 
(2003) May 29 Krauser, J. Alpert, J. 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Awuah, 374 Md. 
505, 823 A.2d 651 (2003) 
 
May 9 Battaglia, J. Bell, J. 
Livering v. Richardson’s Rest., 374 Md. 566, 823 A.2d 
687 (2003) 
 
May 9 Raker, J. Cathell, J. 
Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 814 A.2d 543 
(2003) 
 
Jan. 7 Wilner, J. Cathell, J. 
Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 813 A.2d 231 (2002) 
 Dec. 19 Raker, J. Bell, J. 






Gross v. State, 371 Md. 334, 809 A.2d 627 (2002) 
 Oct. 11 Raker, J. Bell, J. 
Moose v. Fraternal Order of Police, 369 Md. 476, 800 
A.2d 790 (2002) June 13 Cathell, J. Raker, J. 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Angst, 369 Md. 
404, 800 A.2d 747 (2002) June 12 
Battaglia, 
J. Bell, J. 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Lane, 367 Md. 
633, 790 A.2d 621 (2002) Feb. 7 Cathell, J. Bell, J. 
Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 774 A.2d 1136 (2001) June 26 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 766 A.2d 98 
(2001) Feb. 5 Harrell, J. Bell, J. 
Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 765 A.2d 97 (2001) Jan. 9 Harrell, J. Cathell, J. 
Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 762 A.2d 125 (2000) Nov. 16 Bell, J. Cathell, J. 
Markov v. Markov, 360 Md. 296, 758 A.2d 75 (2000) Aug. 23 Raker, J. Bell, J. 
Cty. Council of Prince George’s Cty. v. Collington 
Corp. Ctr. I Ltd. P’ship, 358 Md. 296, 747 A.2d 1219 
(2000) 
Mar. 13 Rodowsky, J. Eldridge, J. 
McNeil v. State, 356 Md. 396, 739 A.2d 80 (1999) Oct. 19 Wilner, J. Eldridge, J. 
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 739 
A.2d 58 (1999) 
 
Oct. 14 Raker, J. Rodowsky, J. 
Calabi v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 353 Md. 649, 728 A.2d 
206 (1999) 
 
Apr. 21 Rodowsky, J. Chasanow, J. 
State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998) 
 Nov. 17 Cathell, J. Bell, J. 
Edwards v. State, 350 Md. 433, 713 A.2d 342 (1998) 
 July 17 Wilner, J. Chasanow, J. 
Pettit v. Erie Ins. Exch., 349 Md. 777, 709 A.2d 1287 
(1998) 
 
May 21 Rodowsky, J. Chasanow, J. 
Argyrou v. State, 349 Md. 587, 709 A.2d 1194 (1998) 
 May 18 Bell, J. Eldridge, J. 






Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 705 
A.2d 1144 (1998) 
 
Feb. 18 Chasanow, J. Raker, J. 
Kroll v. Nehmer, 348 Md. 616, 705 A.2d 716 (1998)  Feb. 11 Wilner, J. Eldridge, J. 
Ginsberg v. McIntyre, 348 Md. 526, 704 A.2d 1246 
(1998) 
 
Jan. 23 Rodowsky, J. Eldridge, J. 
Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 697 
A.2d 1358 (1997) 
 
Aug. 22 Karwacki, J. Chasanow, J. 
Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 697 A.2d 432 
(1997) 
 
July 28 Karwacki, J. Bell, J., Eldridge, J. 
Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 690 A.2d 1000 (1997)  
 Mar. 14 
Karwacki, 
J. Bell, J. 
Williams v. State, 344 Md. 358, 686 A.2d 1096 (1996) 
 Dec. 26 Bell, J. Raker, J. 
In re Lakeysha P., 343 Md. 627, 684 A.2d 5 (1996) 
 Nov. 1 per curiam Raker, J. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 341 Md. 408, 
671 A.2d 22 (1996) 
 
Feb. 7 R. Murphy, J. Chasanow, J. 
Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995)  
 June 30 Eldridge, J. Chasanow, J. 
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 656 A.2d 
307 (1995) 
 
Mar. 28 R. Murphy, J. Eldridge, J. 
Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 655 A.2d 901 (1995) 
 Mar. 22 
R. Murphy, 
J. Bell, J. 
Davis v. Dipino, 337 Md. 642, 655 A.2d 401 (1995) 
 Mar. 13 
Chasanow, 
J. Eldridge, J. 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 
653 A.2d 430 (1995) Feb. 6 
Karwacki, 
J. Chasanow, J. 
Chambers v. State, 337 Md. 44, 650 A.2d 727 (1994) 
 Dec. 19 Raker, J. Rodowsky, J. 






Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 
645 A.2d 1147 (1994) 
 
Aug. 22 Chasanow, J. Bell, J. 
Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160 
(1994) 
 
Aug. 22 Chasanow, J. Bell, J. 
Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522 (1994) 
 July 18 
Karwacki, 
J. Bell, J., Chasanow, J. 
Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 643 A.2d 906 
(1994)  
 
July 5 Raker, J. Bell, J., Eldridge, J. 
In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 
642 A.2d 201 (1994) June 7 
Karwacki, 
J. Bell, J., Raker, J. 
State v. Montgomery, 334 Md. 20, 637 A.2d 1193 
(1994) 
 
Mar. 9 Bell, J. Eldridge, J. 
B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628, 636 A.2d 1016 
(1994) 
 
Feb. 10 Orth, J. McAuliffe, J., Rodowsky, J. 
Walsh v. Walsh, 333 Md. 492, 635 A.2d 1340 (1994) 
 Jan. 27 
Chasanow, 
J. McAuliffe, J. 
Eckard v. Eckard, 333 Md. 531, 636 A.2d 455 (1994) 
 Jan. 18 
Rodowsky, 
J. Eldridge, J. 
Condon v. State of Md.–Univ. of Md., 332 Md. 481, 
632 A.2d 753 (1993) Nov. 1 
R. Murphy, 
J. Bell, J. 
State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 629 A.2d 731 (1993)  Aug. 26 Bell, J. Chasanow, J. 
Beatty v. Trailmaster Prod., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 625 
A.2d 1005 (1993) June 10 
R. Murphy, 
J. Bell, J. 
Prince George’s Cty. v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 330 
Md. 297, 623 A.2d 1296 (1993) Apr. 22 
Rodowsky, 
J. Bell, J. 
Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992) Dec. 9 Bell, J. Eldridge, J. 
Kline v. Cent. Motors Dodge, Inc., 328 Md. 448, 614 
A.2d 1313 (1992) Nov. 16 
Rodowsky, 
J. Chasanow, J. 
Willey v. State, 328 Md. 126, 613 A.2d 956 (1992) Oct. 13 Chasanow, J. McAuliffe, J. 






Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 610 A.2d 782 (1992) Aug. 24 Chasanow, J. Eldridge, J. 
Hare v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 326 Md. 296, 604 
A.2d 914 (1992) Apr. 14 Bell, J. Eldridge, J. 
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Chamberlain, 326 Md. 306, 
604 A.2d 919 (1992) Apr. 14 Bell, J. Eldridge, J. 
Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604 
A.2d 445 (1992) Apr. 10 
Rodowsky, 
J. Chasanow, J. 
C.N. Robinson Lighting Supply Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Howard Cty., 90 Md. App. 515, 602 A.2d 195 (1992) Feb. 28 Motz, J. Cathell, J. 
Campbell v. State, 325 Md. 488, 601 A.2d 667 (1992) Feb. 19 Bell, J. R. Murphy, J. 
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Le, 324 Md. 71, 595 
A.2d 1067 (1991) Sept. 13 Eldridge, J. Chasanow, J. 
Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 589 
A.2d 944 (1991) May 10 Eldridge, J. McAuliffe, J. 
Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co. v. Grp. Hospitalization Med. 
Servs., Inc., 322 Md. 645, 589 A.2d 464 (1991) May 6 
McAuliffe, 
J. Eldridge, J. 
Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Trs. of Clients’ Sec. Tr. 
Fund of Bar of Md., 322 Md. 442, 588 A.2d 340 
(1991) 
 
April 8 McAuliffe, J. Eldridge, J. 
Girouard v. State, 321 Md. 532, 583 A.2d 718 (1991) 
 Jan. 8 Cole, J. Eldridge, J. 
Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 582 A.2d 525 (1990) 
 Dec. 5 Cole, J. Eldridge, J. 
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TABLE 2.  CASELOADS AND SILENT CONCURRENCES BY YEAR 
YEAR NUMBER OF CASES DECIDED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS569 NUMBER OF SILENT CONCURRENCES 
2019 138 2 
2018 161 6 
2017 194 4 
2016 174 5 
2015 177 3 
2014 208 5 
2013 239 7 
2012 217 5 
2011 237 13 
2010 186 18 
2009 176 9 
2008 174 3 
2007 206 6 
2006 211 10 
2005 203 6 
2004 200 5 
2003 227 7 
2002 192 5 
2001 143 3 
2000 134 3 
1999 148 3 
1998 132 7 
1997 126 3 
1996 114 3 
1995 155 5 
1990–1994 See note 569 29 
 
                                                          
 569.  Maryland Appellate Court Opinions, MD. CTS., 
https://www.courts.state.md.us/opinions/opinions.  This data was only available from 1995 onward.  
